

The Spanish Campaign, 218 BC to 205 BC

A Detailed look at the Spanish campaign based on assumptions, guesses and the histories of Livy and Polybius

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The Second Punic War must rank as Ancient version of a World War. From the straits of Gibraltar to the coast of Asia the armies and fleets of the two mighty alliances fought each other. History was to prove that the victor of this war would become the master of the known world.

One of the most significant campaigns of the Second Punic Wars was the Spanish Campaign. It was here that the Roman victory was forged. The victor of the Spanish Campaign would be the victor of the 2nd Punic War.

If the Carthaginians had won then Hannibal would of been able to gain a steady supply of manpower and armies from this theatre providing him with almost certain victory. Instead the Roman victory cut off any hope of major reinforcements to Hannibal and freed up Roman armies for the invasion of Africa. Without Spain, Carthages second major source of manpower, only Africa was left to face the full might of Roman forces, and history was to prove this was a hopeless struggle.

Table of Contents

Assumptions	1
The Romans gain their tow hold in Hispania - 218 BC	2
The Campaign (218BC)	2
Gnaeus arrives in Spain (October)	2
The Battle of Cissis (November)	4
Hasdrubal Raids Tarraco (November)	6
Ilergetes, Ausetani & Laetani Revolt (November-January)	7
Chronology of events - 218 BC	8
Balance of Forces - 218 BC	8
Carthaginian Counter attack fails - 217 BC	9
The Campaign (217 BC)	9
Ebro (May)	10
Celtiberi (August)	12
Roman advance towards Saguntum (August-September)	12
Time Line - 217 BC	13
Chronology of events - 217 BC	14
Balance of Forces - 217 BC	14
The Revolt of the Tartesii - 216 BC	15
The Campaign (216 BC)	15
Hasdrubal plans his attack (June)	16
Tartesii (July - October)	16
Time Line (216 BC)	18
Chronology - 216 BC	19
Balance of Forces - 216 BC	19
Hasdrubal fails to break through - 215 BC.....	20
The Campaign (215 BC)	20
Himilco Arrives (May)	20
Ibera (July)	21
Hasdrubal Regroups (August)	23
Time Line (215 BC)	24
Chronology - 215 BC	25
Balance of Forces - 215 BC	25
Double defeat at Iiliturgi and Intibili - 214 BC	26
The Campaign (214 BC)	26
The Roman offensive (May-July)	27
Iiliturgi & Intibili (July-September)	27
Time Line (214 BC)	29
Chronology - 214 BC	30
Balance of Forces - 214 BC	30
The Romans take Saguntum - 213 BC	31
The Campaign (213 BC)	31
Defeat of the Celtiberi (April)	32
Battle of Iiliturgi (June)	33
Munda (August)	35
Aurinx (August)	35
Saguntum & Turboletas (August - November)	36
Actions in Africa (May - October)	36
Hasdrubal arrives in Africa (July - November)	38
Time Line (213 BC)	39
Chronology - 213 BC	41
Balance of Forces - 213 BC	42
Roman disaster - 212 BC.....	43
The Campaign (212 BC)	43
The Romans launch their invasion (May)	45
Orongis (June - July)	46
Ilorci (July)	48
Tarraco (September)	50
Time Line (212 BC)	53
Chronology - 212 BC	54

Balance of Forces - 212 BC	54
Carthaginians fail to follow up - 211 BC	55
The Campaign (211 BC)	55
Nero Arrives (May-June)	56
Chronology - 211 BC	58
Balance of Forces - 211 BC	58
Scipio prepares his army - 210 BC	59
The Campaign (210 BC)	59
Chronology - 210 BC	61
Balance of Forces - 210 BC	61
Scipio takes New Carthage - 209 BC	62
The Campaign (209 BC)	62
Nova Carthago (August)	63
Chronology - 209 BC	66
Balance of Forces - 209 BC	66
Hasdrubal breakthroughs to Italy - 208 BC	67
The Campaign (208 BC)	67
The Fate of Saguntum	68
Scipio Gains allies	68
Scipio Forces Hasdrubal Back (March - August)	69
Baecula (September)	71
Time Line (208 BC)	75
Chronology - 208 BC	76
Balance of Forces - 208 BC	76
Scipio consolidates his gains - 207 BC	77
The Campaign (207 BC)	77
Carpetani (June - August)	78
Orongis (September - October)	81
Time Line (207 BC)	82
Chronology - 207 BC	83
Balance of Forces - 207 BC	83
Carthaginian defeat at Ilipa - 206 BC	84
The Campaign (206 BC)	84
Ilipa (May)	86
The Turdentani Desert (May)	89
Hasdrubals army is besieged (may-June)	90
Castulo & Iliturgi (June-July)	94
Spanish Revolt (July-August)	96
Mago's Raid (September)	99
Time Line (206 BC)	101
Chronology - 206 BC	103
Balance of Forces - 206 BC	104
Spanish Revolt crushed - 205 BC	105
The Campaign (205 BC)	105
Chronology - 205 BC	107
Balance of Forces - 205 BC	107
Charts and Tables	108
Personalities	108
Spanish & Numidian Tribes	116
Towns & Places	118
SUMMARY OF BATTLES IN SPAIN (218 - 205BC)	121
Index	122

Assumptions

This account of the Spanish Campaign is based on Livy's and Polybuis's history of the campaign. Many assumptions and guesses have been made in attempt to provide a full, complete and understandable account of this campaign. All assumptions, options and my observations are included in this account, which may make it difficult to read but at least complete so you can yourself determine the validity of my version of this campaign.

Certain key assumptions are made in order to come to this account. The most important is the time it takes to march and sail. The Roman army would commonly march 30 kilometres per day, constructed a camp at the end of each day. For short bursts this could be greatly increased, but at the cost of constructing a camp and with all siege and transports left behind. While it was true greater march rates could be achieved, for example Alexander chased Darius for 640 kilometres averaging 58 kilometres per day, excluding two or three rest days. Even including the rest days he averaged over 45 kilometres per day. Alexander also covered 216 kilometres in 72 hours when relieving Maracanda. However all these advances were abnormal, either a pursuit or an emergency dash to save a city. For the purposes of this article we have assumed the greatest speed an army could achieve for a sustained period is 30 kilometres. This figure can drop if the army is foraging, Hannibal average a bit under 10 kilometres per day during his march to Italy. When moving in areas with no supply we have assumed an army will average 15 kilometres per day. Finally terrain will have an effect, crossing major rivers may take a day, crossing difficult terrain will slow a march down, etc.

As for a fleet, under oars a quinquereme can average 60 kilometres per day over a sustained period of time. This involves a third of the oarsmen rowing and the rest resting, swapping over at regular intervals. Without getting any more complex than this we have assumed naval movement at this rate. Normally transports had warships accompanying them, and if there was any chance of enemy ships in the area this was normally done under oars. Thus this seems a reasonable average speed.

We have to make some assumptions of the campaign year. When there was no urgency May seemed to be the average start to the campaign season. November normally the end, although there were exceptions. In times of vicious fighting the start of the season was normally April in the north of Spain and March in the South. The key factor seems to be availability of forage and water, with the effect bad weather had on the troops as a secondary consideration. Based on this we can have activity from April (in the north) and March (in the south) to the end of November. The main reason why some campaigns did not start until May was the assembly of armies and allies. When Hannibal left in May he would of spend a few months assembling his army. If it was already ready he could of left far earlier. In Spain this was normally not possible, as most Spanish allied troops dispersed home during winter, which meant time was needed to assemble them the following year. In some rare cases the Spanish were kept in the winter quarters of the main army which allowed almost immediate campaigning.

The Romans gain their tow hold in Hispania - 218 BC

After failing to catch Hannibal on the Rhone River Publius Cornelius Scipio left his two legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus Scipio. Gnaeus Scipio sailed to Upper Spain and landed at Emporiae. He then marched to Cissa where he defeated a Carthaginian army of 10,000 foot and 1,000 cavalry which was supported by an unknown number of unwilling allies (probably 10,000) under the command of Hanno. Gnaeus Scipio then took Cissa and advanced his fleet to Tarraco.

Hasdrubal in Southern Spain marched up to help Hanno with an army of 8,000 foot and 1,000 cavalry but failed to arrive before Hanno's defeat. Once he learned Hanno was defeated he launched a surprise attack at Tarraco. The Romans stationed their fleet at Tarraco, however he failed to dislodge the Romans and withdrew.

The Campaign (218BC)

To understand the Spanish campaign we need to understand why it began at all and how it began. Hannibal left Nova Carthago with his army about the middle of May. He reached the Rhone about the end of August. By the end of October, Hannibal had reached the summit of the Alps. Now about the time Hannibal was at the Rhone, possible after he had crossed it, a Roman army under Publius Scipio and Gnaeus Scipio arrived. After a bit of skirmishing the commander, Publius Scipio, made the decision to send his brother with the army into Spain, while he himself went back to Rome to take command of another Roman army there. This in effect began this long and difficult campaign, a campaign which was to result in the destruction of the Carthaginian empire in Spain and as a result the whole Carthaginian empire.

Gnaeus arrives in Spain (October)

When Gnaeus arrived in Northern Spain he took the Carthaginian's totally by surprise by arriving very late in the campaign year. Gnaeus landed in Gaul at the end of August. At least one week were spent campaigning against Hannibal before Gnaeus left for Spain. Livy implies Gnaeus transported his army by sea, which is a distance of about 260 kilometres. He could of crossed this in about a week. If he marched his army it would of taken closer to 3 or 4 weeks, making his arrival simply too late. He must of travelled by sea and he must of done this very quickly. Gnaeus probably arrived at Emporiae about mid October. This was very late in the year to start a campaign.

According to Livy Gnaeus Scipio started from the mouth of the Rhone and he sailed past the Pyrenees and landed at Emporiae. There seemed to be no conflict during this move and it stands to reason the Carthaginians had failed to secure Emporiae, thus allowing easy Roman access. Emporiae was a Greek colony that would of been all too pleased to see Roman troops. Again, according to Livy the Romans managed to almost immediately extend their influence to the Ebro by the use of diplomacy. This is almost certainly an exaggeration as Hanno still had a sizeable Spanish force in his army when he met Gnaeus several weeks later, thus indicating some Spanish support remaining for the Carthaginians. What seems more likely is that from Emporiae to Tarraco/Cissis the Greek cities gave the Romans full support and the Spanish tribes possibly gave tact support. Between Cissis and the Ebro the Carthaginians would of had secure control. If this was not the case Hanno would of retreated to behind the Ebro, as he would of been losing nothing and abandoning no allies.

Hanno met Gnaeus close to the main Carthaginian camp in the North, which was close to the town of Cissis. This is interesting as it would seem more logical to use Tarraco as the Carthaginians main base, as this was a large town with a good harbour. Once again it seems likely that the Carthaginians had not fully secured the Greek colonies on the coast and either Tarraco was under Greek control, or the Carthaginians did not feel safe in that town. Whatever the situation we know that almost immediately after the battle the Romans controlled Tarraco, which would mean the town was not defended or Gnaeus had already taken the town. It is possible that after the difficulty Hannibal had in taking Saguntum, the Carthaginians decided not the besiege any more Greeks colonies, but to win them over by diplomacy or threats. If this was the case the Carthaginians would of not controlled Tarraco when the Romans arrived, which would explain many things. This is my pet theory.

There is another interesting observation about the scene of the battle. As this was the main Carthaginian camp it seems that Hanno's army did nothing while the Romans advanced from Emporiae down the coast. It could be the Carthaginians were taken by such surprise Hanno's army was not ready for battle and he spend that time desperately assembling what troops he could. Another option is that Carthaginian control north of this point was non-existent, so why bother defending territory which was not controlled. As a result Hanno was defending the most north point of Carthaginian control. Possibly both are true.

The Battle of Cissis (November)

When Gnaeus Scipio finally came to within a short distance of the Carthaginian camp Hanno sallied out and took a good defensive position close to Gnaeus. It seems that it was Gnaeus who actually attacked, which indicates the defensive nature of Hanno's manoeuvring. Gnaeus would of had his entire army of 2 legions with him. This probably totalled 17,600 infantry and 1,800 cavalry, which would of been the standard strength of two legions. He would of almost certainly had some Spanish support, but possibly not too much. A guess of 3,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry was probably the scale of Spanish support the Romans enjoyed at this time.

(Livy, Book XXI, Para 60) with these tribes he (Gnaeus) succeeded in concluding an offensive and defensive alliance, and raised a number of strong auxiliary contingents from amongst them.

Hanno's forces are much harder to calculate, however we have these quotes from Livy and Polybius to give us some clues.

(Livy, Book XXI, Para 23) The next objectives were the Ilergetes, Bargusii, Ausetani, and the district of Lacetania on the foothills of the Pyrenees; this whole coastal area Hannibal put in charge of Hanno, to keep control of the passes between the provinces of Spain and Gaul, assigning him a force of 10,000 infantry for this purpose.

(Polybius, Book III, Para 35) He detached from his army a contingent of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to be commanded by Hanno, and deposited with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force.

We know Hannibal left 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry with Hanno, however this force would of been simply too small to risk a battle. Hanno would of certainly spent the time he had available getting all the Spanish help he could. My guess is something like 7,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry could of been raised by Hanno's Spanish allies. This puts his total force at 20,000, which means he was outnumbered by Gnaeus, but not so terribly to make a battle suicide. Livy's description of the battle is as follows;

(Livy, Book XXI, Para 60) The fight was by no means a desperate one: 6,000 of Hanno's men were killed and 2,000 taken prisoner, together with the garrison of the camp - which was subsequently stormed, the commander (Hanno) himself and a number of leading men were captured.

Assuming the local Spanish allies deserted after the battle and the garrison numbered at least 3,000 men, then all of Hanno's original 11,000 men would of been lost. The entire Carthaginian force in the north had been wiped out in a single blow. If the battle was so easy for the Romans to win, why did Hanno hold his position. He was probably forced by the rapidly changing situation to do so. He simply failed to raise enough Spanish allies and Carthaginian reinforcements from the South failed to get there in time. Gnaeus acted quickly and aggressively, leaving Hanno no choices, which shows us the strategic brilliance of Gnaeus.

Whenever I look at Hanno's position I always ask myself why didn't Hanno garrison Tarraco and hold out there for help from Hasdrubal Barca. There must of been a very good reason. Tarraco was almost certainly already lost and Roman controlled. Another option is that Hanno simply did not want to lose his camp, as it contained a great deal of supplies and equipment. But if Tarraco was available I am sure the Carthaginian camp would of moved their very quickly. Whatever the reasons it turned out his decision to fight at Cissis was a mistake.

What was Hasdrubal Barca in Nova Carthago doing while this disaster was occurring. According to Livy Hasdrubal was left with 11,850 African foot, 300 Ligurians, 500 from the Balearics, 450 Libyphoenician horse, 1,800 Numidian and Moors, and 300 horse from the Ilergetes in Spain. Finally he had 21 elephants. His naval forces was 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes and 5 triremes, although only 32 quinqueremes and 5 triremes were actually fitted out and manned.

(Polybius, Book III, Para 35) For a naval force he (Hannibal) left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes and all the triremes being fully manned. He also provided him with a contingent of cavalry consisting of 450 Libyan and Libyo-Phoenicians, 300 Ilergetes, and 1,800 Numidians drawn from the tribes of the Massyli, Masaesyli, Maccaei and Maurusii who inhabit the coastal districts of Africa. His infantry strength consisted of 11,850 Libyans, 300 Ligurians and 500 Balearians, together with twenty-one elephants.

What was this not inconsiderate force doing while Hanno was being defeated. We need to create a chronology of the events leading up to the battle of Cissis and a bit further on in order to work out what may have occurred.

Livy claims that Hasdrubal crossed the Ebro before he heard news of Hanno's defeat, which may indicate he had not yet crossed, or was crossing when the battle of Cissis actually took place.

(Livy, Book XXI, Para 61) Hasdrubal had crossed the Ebro before he heard the news of his colleague's defeat. His intension was to challenge the Roman army with his force of 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse, ; but when he learned of the disaster at Cissis and the loss of Hanno's camp, he changed his route and proceeded towards the coast.

Hasdrubal had 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry in this force, which means that he was not powerful enough to meet Gnaeus Scipio by himself. The fact of the matter is that the Carthaginians were simply not prepared for the Roman invasion. Being close to the end of the year Hasdrubal may have already dispersed the bulk of his army into winter quarters, leaving only the core of his army in Nova Carthago. This would of been the 9,000 men he had with him, as well as the garrison of Nova Carthago, possibly another 1,000 men.

To give him credit he did react quickly with what forces he had readily available. It is about 640 kilometres from Emporiae to Nova Carthago. A messenger can possibly travel that in 5-6 days. It may have taken him a few days to prepare his force and then march north. The distance from Nova Carthago and the Ebro is about 400 kilometres. By land it would of taken him a minimum of 2 weeks to march to the Ebro. A total of about 3 weeks. I feel that this was probably too long and that Hasdrubal Barca transported his army in boats and he sailed up the coast with this force. A fully loaded quinqueremes can average 5 kilometres per hour over an average 12 hour day, which gives us our 60 kilometres per day. He could of reduced the trip time to 1 week, making his arrival at the Ebro 2 weeks after the Romans arrived at Emporiae. We do know that by the time Hasdrubal got to the Ebro he was inland, thus his force was dropped off on the coast and he marched inland to a crossing at the Ebro. It is also possible, although just barely, he marched this small force at its maximum possible speed to reach the Ebro when he needed to. Regardless of the exact week, he reached the Ebro when the battle of Cissis was occurring.

Gnaeus Scipio on the other hand had a march of only 180 kilometres from Emporiae to Cissis. Now its true that marching in unfriendly territory is slower than marching in friendly territory, but even so if we assume advances of 30 kilometres a day (this was the standard average march rate of a Roman legion) he could of got to Cissis in 1 week. Assuming he took a few days to get ready at Emporiae and he took his time in the advance to make sure of the loyalty of his new allies it may have taken him 2 weeks before he engaged Hanno. This would of put Gnaeus at Cissis at the same time Hasdrubal arrived at the Ebro. To put it simply, Hasdrubal had a lot more distance to cover than Gnaeus. Hasdrubal realised the strategic danger of the situation quickly and did what he could. If Gnaeus was a bit slower Hasdrubal would of probably meet up with Hanno and outnumbered Gnaeus, thus saving the Carthaginian position up North. As it was Gnaeus also realised the strategic advantage he had and he took full advantage of it by advancing as fast as he could. He won the race.

Hasdrubal Raids Tarraco (November)

When Hasdrubal did discover the disaster of Hanno's defeat he raided the area around Tarraco causing heavy Roman casualties, however he withdrew before there was any chance of a battle as he was heavily outnumbered. He withdrew to just over the Ebro and prepared his camp about early/mid November. The year must of been coming to a close as Gnaeus began to prepare for winter quarters. This plan was disrupted when the Ilergetes revolted. This probably occurred during mid-November, just after both Romans and Carthaginians made winter camp. The Ilergetes probably though the late season would save them from any Roman invasion, allowing them lots of time to prepare their forces to meet the Romans during the following year. Gnaeus was not going to permit this and he acted quickly.

Ilergetes, Ausetani & Laetani Revolt (November-January)

Gnaeus Scipio would of made winter camp at Emporiae, as this was the more secure position. Its about a distance of 300 kilometres to the lands of the Ilergetes. It would of taken Gnaeus over a week to march to the Ilergetes, as they are located north of Cissis. He besieged their main town, Atanagrum and after a few days they surrendered. This would of taken Gnaeus about 2 weeks.

While he was away the two main tribes between Tarraco and Emporiae revolted, these were the Ausetani and the Laetani. Gnaeus marched back on the main town of the Ausetani and besieged it. The distance was probably around the 200 kilometres mark and it would of taken Gnaeus about a week to cover the distance. It would of been mid December. Gnaeus defeated a Laetani relief army, causing losses of 12,000 men.

(Livy, Book XXI, Para 61) He (Gnaeus) then proceeded against another people allied to Carthage, the Ausetani, near the Ebro; while he was blockading their town, their neighbours, the Laetani, attempted to come to their aid under cover of darkness, but quite near the town, just as they were hoping to enter, they were surprised and caught, Twelve thousand were killed.

Gnaeus continued the siege for 30 days. Accordingly to Livy winter was truly occurring, with heavy snow around the Ausetani fortress. Finally the Ausetani leader, Amusicus escaped the siege and fled south to Hasdrubal Barca. Soon after this the Ausetani surrendered and were forced to pay tribute provide hostages to the Romans. After this Gnaeus went back into winter quarters. It was almost certainly mid January by the time he re-established himself at Emporiae for winter.

The battle between Gnaeus and the Laetani relief army is of interest as it is Gnaeus second victory. Gnaeus would of had almost the entire Romans army with him, with some Spanish allies. He probably had a force of 20,600 infantry and 2,800 cavalry. The Laetani lost 12,000 men, so that gives us the lowest possible figure. It would of been smaller than the Roman army of 23,000, but would of been larger if it combined with the Ausetani army. After all what was the point of joining with the Ausetani if the resulting force had no chance of defeating Gnaeus. Both tribes had a similar strength, so my guess is both tribes had an army of 15,000 men, or 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Gnaeus shows his brilliance by concentrating his army against the Laetani and defeating it, before the Ausetani army could be brought to bear.

Livy blames Hasdrubal of abandoning his allies, however Hasdrubal was probably unable to help the revolting tribes simply because he was in winter quarters already. The Romans may have been much more use to the cold than the Carthaginians, thus the different attitude to warfare in winter. More likely an explanation is that Hasdrubal was unaware of the revolt, as the Spanish revolt was probably a popular one and not encouraged by Hasdrubal, as Livy claims. After all why bother to help the nation which had controlled them previous to the Roman arrival. However a nationalistic revolt would of put the Romans into the role of the conqueror, something Livy was not keen on doing. To him the Romans were liberators.

Chronology of events - 218 BC

October	Beg	Gnaeus & Publius Scipio arrives in Gaul, but misses Hannibal. Gnaeus Scipio sails for Spain.
	Mid	Gnaeus arrives in Northern Spain. Hasdrubal leaves Nova Carthago with his relief army.
November	Beg	Hasdrubal's army crosses the Ebro. The Battle of Cissis, Hanno's army destroyed. Hasdrubal raids the area around Tarraco.
	Mid	Hasdrubal withdraws over the Ebro and makes camp. Gnaeus puts his army into winter quarters. Ilergetes revolt.
December	Beg	Gnaeus marches to the main town of the Ilergetes, Atanagrum and after a short siege they surrender. Ausetani and the Laetani revolt.
	Mid	Gnaeus marches back to the main town of the Ausetani and besieges them. Gnaeus defeats a Laetani relief army.
January	Mid	Ausetani town surrenders. Gnaeus marches his army back to Emporiae into their winter quarters.

Balance of Forces - 218 BC

Romans

Gnaeus **(20,600 infantry, 2,800 cavalry, 37 vessels)** 17,600 Roman/Italian infantry and 1,800 Roman/Italian cavalry. 3,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry. 37 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.

Carthaginians

Hasdrubal Barca **(12,650 infantry, 2,450 cavalry, 21 elephants, 37 vessels)** 12,650 veteran infantry, 2,250 veteran cavalry and 21 elephants. 200 cavalry from the Ilergetes. 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes and 5 triremes (although only 32 quinqueremes and 5 triremes were fitted out and ready). The relief force he commanded consisted of 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.

Hanno **(17,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry)** 10,000 veteran infantry and 1,000 veteran cavalry. 7,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Pro-Carthaginian Spanish

Amusicus **(14,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)** Ausetani army

Laetani Tribe **(14,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)** Laetani army

Ilergetes Tribe (Unknown)

Carthaginian Counter attack fails - 217 BC

After the defeat the previous year Hasdrubal recruited more troop and prepared a fleet of 40 quinqueremes for battle. Hasdrubal was to command the army while the command of the fleet was given to Himilco. Himilco sailed his fleet and Hasdrubal marched his army to the mouth of the Ebro. While camped there the combined Roman fleet of 35 quinqueremes and 20 ships from Massilia launched a surprise attack which almost totally destroyed the Carthaginian fleet.

Soon after this Gnaeus Scipio's brother Publius Scipio joined him with 20 Quinqueremes and 6,000 reinforcements. The Roman army then marched South to the gates of Saguntum, but failed to take it. On the way back the towns of Intibili and Ilturgi were taken.

The Campaign (217 BC)

After the disaster of the previous year Hasdrubal Barca decided to assemble all his forces and launch an attack against the Roman position North of the Ebro. He fully prepared his fleet and increased its strength of 40 fully manned and prepared vessels, probably 35 quinqueremes and 5 triremes. (There were 5 triremes in the fleet last year and this probably had not changed.)

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 19) Hasdrubal added ten ships to the fleet he had taken over, ready for sea, from his brother, entrusted the whole fleet of forty vessels to Himilco, and set out from New Carthage.

Of his army we are not too sure, but according to Livy Gnaeus Scipio did not feel confident of meeting the Carthaginians on land, so Hasdrubal probably had more strength than the Romans. As Gnaeus probably had an army of 24,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (A Roman force of 17,600 infantry and 1,800 cavalry with a Spanish force of 6,400 infantry and 2,200 cavalry) Hasdrubal must of had a larger force. He had his core of 12,630 infantry, 2,250 cavalry and 21 elephants. In addition he may of had a Spanish force almost equal in size to his core army and he must of raised further Carthaginian troops from the Carthaginian towns in Spain, giving him a force of 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. We know that once Publius Scipio arrived in Spain the Romans felt brave enough to advance south of the Ebro, thus Hasdrubals army could not of been much larger than this figure.

Gnaeus Scipio felt he could not meet Hasdrubal Barca in a normal land battle, so he assembled the largest possible fleet he could. According to Livy this was a naval force of 35 vessels, mainly Roman quinqueremes of which 2 ships were from Massilia. These were probably not quinqueremes, almost certainly triremes. Now we must look at this strength in a bit more detail. When Publius and Gnaeus landed in Gaul in 218 BC they had 60 quinqueremes. Where had these ships gone. Its fairly certain that Gnaeus did not get them all, otherwise he would of had 60 quinqueremes.

One option is the fleet was split in two, yet why would Publius Scipio need 30 quinqueremes back in Italy. Hannibal had no fleet and the Roman fleet in Sicily was more than looking after things. Its true the Carthaginians did try and raid the Italian mainland, but the Roman fleet in Sicily outnumbered the entire Carthaginian fleet in Africa. Now we know the Romans had 35 vessels in Spain and we know that Publius arrived in Spain later that year with 20 quinqueremes. These two numbered added together come suspiciously close to the magic number of 60. It is very possible that 5 quinqueremes were lost, or unmanned and their crews involved on land. So a split of 40 to Gnaeus, of which 5 were lost or unmanned, and 20 to Publius, which arrived in Spain later that year. Wait a minute, we know that at least 2 Massilian triremes were with the Romans. Some sources claim as many as 20 Massilian triremes joined Gnaeus in his invasion of Spain (Tony Bath in his book "Hannibals Campaign"), after all Emporiae was a Massilian colony. However we are only sure of 2, so lets only use this. Gnaeus manned these ships with Roman marines, probably a force of 4,200 heavy infantry. With this naval force he sailed South to meet the Carthaginians.

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 19) he (Gnaeus) embarked a picked force of marines and with his fleet of thirty-five vessels sailed to meet his antagonist. two reconnaissance vessels from Massilia

Ebro (May)

Hasdrubal Barca commanded the army with Himilco commanding the fleet of 40 quinqueremes. Both forces advanced up the coast from Nova Carthago until they reached the Ebro where Hasdrubal made his camp. It was while the Carthaginians were at their Ebro camp that the Roman fleet struck. The Romans took the Carthaginian by surprise and after initial resistance the Carthaginian fleet turn tail and ran towards the shore, with the expected loss of ships.

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 19) The Roman fleet was now not only near but actually advancing to the attack. The Carthaginians, who were thrown off their balance less by the prospect of an encounter than by the appalling muddle aboard their own ships, made no real attempt at resistance, but fled. Their fleet was strung out on a broad front, and there were far too many ships to be able to enter the estuary all at once, so the crews ran them ashore where they could, in shallow water or on the beach, and the men aboard them, whether armed or not, sought safety with their comrades who were drawn up in battle order on the shore. Two vessels were, however, captured at the first onslaught of the Romans, and four were sunk.

The Carthaginians lost 25 quinqueremes, although they lost almost no crewmen at all (Only six quinqueremes were lost or captured at sea, the rest towed from the beach.). The Carthaginian fleet had been effectively destroyed.

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 20) They took in all twenty-five out of the forty. (Carthaginian naval losses)

Livy now claims the Roman fleet sailed to all sorts of amazing places. This is normally ignored by historians as unreasonable, but lets look at this in more detail. Gnaeus Scipio first sailed to Onusa, the location of which we are not to sure about. This was probably a very small town on the coast, between Saguntum and Nova Carthago. The town was taken and sacked. The fleet then sailed down to Nova Carthage and landed there raiding the coast around it. This may be possible as Hasdrubal Barca would of left a standard garrison in the City of 1,000-2,000 men. This would of not been able to stop the Roman force of at least 4,000 Roman troops. The fleet then sailed off to Longuntica, again the location is unknown. This was probably north of Nova Carthago, against between Saguntum and Nova Carthago. They raided the countryside and then sailed across to the island of Ebusus. Here they tried to take the chief town, probably Ebusus but failed. The fleet then returned back home. All this is more than possible, although seemed to really achieve very little in real terms.

According to Livy Gnaeus advanced his army to Castulo forcing Hasdrubal back into the Baetis valley. This is clearly fantasy as it would of assumed Hasdrubal had abandoned Saguntum and possibly Nova Carthago. I think that rather than lying Livy misunderstood his information. What seems likely is that Roman scouts may have got as far as Castulo in an attempt to encourage as many Spanish tribes as possible to revolt. This could of occurred when the fleet was raiding the countryside around Nova Carthago. My reasoning is one of the major Spanish tribes in the Baetis valley, the Tartesii revolted the following year. As for the Roman army, it probably advanced to a different town, possibly Intibili, which was a reasonable 44 kilometres south of the Ebro. As for Hasdrubals retreat towards the Baetis valley, this can't be true. According to Livy his main army ended up at Iliturgi, 75 kilometre south of the Ebro. It probably never retreated further than that town. What might of occurred was that Hasdrubal sent reinforcements to Nova Carthago to deal with the Roman raids. Livy now says that due to some trouble with the Spanish tribes in his rear Gnaeus Scipio retreated finally ending up at a place called Nova Classis. We do not know where this is, but it may be on the Ebro or very close to it.

Celtiberi (August)

After both armies had stabilised in their new position the Celtiburians upset the balance by invading Carthaginian territory. They managed to take three towns by storm before Hasdrubal arrived to stop them. These were almost certainly very minor towns. The Celtiberi probably invaded by marching south down the Salo River and into the coastal valley just behind Saguntum. This is purely guess work, but seems reasonable considering the positions of all the armies at the time. Hasdrubal had to march South to meet this threat and according to Livy fought two battles. Hasdrubal lost 1,500 men and 4,000 were captured, which indicated they were minor Celtiburians victories. The Celtiberian army would of been fairly large, possibly in the order of 30,000 men. A force any weaker would of been unable to meet the combined Carthaginian army, which would of still been in the order of 30,000 men at least.

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 21) invaded Carthaginian Spain with a strong force and took three towns by storm. They then twice engaged Hasdrubal himself, on both occasions fighting magnificently, killing 1,500 and capturing 4,000, together with many military standards.

Roman advance towards Saguntum (August-September)

After the engagement between the Carthaginians and the Celtiburians Gnaeus Scipio was joined by his brother, Publius Scipio, with 8,000 additional Roman troops and 20 quinqueremes. He landed at Emporiae and was met by his brother, which may mean the army was commanded by someone else at this time. More likely his brother was down south commanding the army. Publius quickly marched South to meet up with the main Roman army, and the combined Roman army of 32,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry advanced to the gates of Saguntum with no opposition, but failed to take it by storm.

(Livy, Book XXII, Para 22) This was the state of affairs in Spain when Publius Scipio entered upon his duties there. His command had been extended after his consulship and he was sent by the senate with twenty warships, 8,000 men, and a large stock of supplies.

Hasdrubal Barca would of been occupied further South-West with his conflict against the Celtiberi, leaving only a garrison in Saguntum which was powerful enough to hold out against the Romans. The fact the Romans did not stick around indicates that Hasdrubal was coming back to Saguntum, which may indicate he had forced the Celtiberi back and won at least one major victory. As this tribe caused the Carthaginian no trouble during the following year this seems to be the likely outcome. Whatever the reason the Romans withdrew north of Ebro before the end of the year, effectually ending the campaign year.

Time Line - 217 BC

Lets look at the events of this year and create a time line. If Hasdrubal took a few weeks to assembled his forces and he started out as soon as possible he probably found himself at his Ebro camp at the beginning of May. It took Hannibal about 2 months to prepare his army in 218 BC before he left in mid-May, Hasdrubal probably did not have such a large job and completed this by mid-April. The distance between Nova Carthago and the Ebro camp is about 400 kilometres, which would take about 2 weeks to cover. This marks the naval battle occurring early in May.

Lets look at the wandering of the Roman fleet and how long it would of taken. After the naval victory at the Ebro the Roman fleet sailed a distance of about 1,000 kilometres, which would of taken about 18 days. (A fully loaded quinquereme can average 5 kilometres per hour over an average 12 hour day) It raided two spots and took or attempted to take two towns, 7-8 days for each of these events gives us a journey of about 7 weeks which puts us at the beginning of July. Gnaeus advanced his army and then retreated it a bit, which could put us at the beginning of August.

The Celtiberi invade now. The Celtiberi may have advanced a distance of about 240 kilometres before Hasdrubal arrived. This probably took them about 2 weeks, they probably also needed some time to prepare their army, lets say 4 weeks. If true than some time soon after the Carthaginian defeat at the Ebro the Celtiberi began their preparations, about 2 weeks after. They would of needed proof of this event which would explain the delay.

Hasdrubal immediately marched his army out to meet the Celtiberi. If my guess is right this would of been a march of about 160 kilometres, which could of been covered in a week. Some manoeuvring and two small battles may of brought us to mid-August.

By mid August Publius arrives in Emporiae and he marches down south and with the main Roman army goes all the way to Saguntum, which is a distance of 400 kilometres. This would of taken 2 weeks to do. The Romans stuck around Saguntum for a while and then retreated. We don't know how long, but it must of been a few weeks if we can believe Livy. Assuming Hasdrubal was still occupied for this period, about 4 weeks, fighting the Celtiberi. This brings us to mid September. Hasdrubal must of won a major victory against the Celtiberi and he would of marched back, taking a week. This may have been the reason for the Roman withdraw.

We have about 9 weeks for both armies to re-establish themselves in their winter camps before the snow began to fall. In short the account by Livy does make some sense. Without all the activity indicated in Livy's book we would of had to believed that Both armies faced each other for six months doing nothing.

Chronology of events - 217 BC

May	Beg	Hasdrubal and Himilco arrives in there Ebro camp. Battle of the Ebro occurred resulting in a Roman victory. Roman fleet makes epic journey raiding Carthaginian coastal areas.
July	Beg	Roman fleet arrives back at Tarraco. Gnaeus advances his army South.
August	Beg	Gnaeus withdraws north again. Celtiberi invade Carthaginian Spain, Hasdrubal marches to meet them.
August	Mid	Hasdrubal and the Celtiberi meet each other, resulting in at least two minor battles. Publius Scipio arrives in Emporiae.
August	Mid	Roman army arrives at the gates of Saguntum.
September	Mid	Hasdrubal forces the Celtiberi back. The Roman army marches North. Hasdrubal arrives at Saguntum, missing the Romans.
September	Mid	Both armies prepare their winter quarters, after possibly manoeuvring around a bit.

Balance of Forces - 217 BC

Romans

Gnaeus Scipio	(24,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 37 vessels) 17,600 Roman/Italian infantry and 1,800 Roman/Italian cavalry, 6,400 Spanish infantry and 2,200 Spanish cavalry. 35 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.
Publius Scipio	(7,800 infantry, 200 cavalry, 20 vessels) 8,000 Roman troops and 20 Roman quinqueremes.

Pro-Roman Spanish

Celtiberi Tribe

(28,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry)

Carthaginians

Hasdrubal Barca

(30,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, 21 elephants) 12,650 veteran infantry, 2,250 veteran cavalry and 21 elephants. 300 cavalry from the Ilergetes. 5,350 Carthaginian colonist infantry, 12,000 Spanish infantry and 1,950 Spanish Cavalry. 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes. (although none of these ships were manned or ready, thus they were probably in dry dock in Nova Carthago).

Himilco

(40 vessels) 35 quinqueremes and 5 triremes.

The Revolt of the Tartesii - 216 BC

Carthage sent 4,000 men and 500 cavalry to Hasdrubal. With his reinforced army and his rebuilt fleet he planned to attack the Romans. However two things stopped him, his ship captains deserted and a former ally revolted, the Tartesii. Hasdrubal invaded the Tartesii where he found a Tartesii army under the command of Chalbus. After an initial success he was forced back to a hill position which he fortified. Waiting for the correct moment he attacked the Tartesii army, surrounding and destroying it.

The Campaign (216 BC)

At the beginning of this year Publius Scipio and Gnaeus Scipio seemed to adopt a defensive strategy, with Publius taking command of the navy and Gnaeus command of the army.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 26) Publius and Gnaeus Scipio had divided the command between them, the former conducting operations at sea, the later on land. The Carthaginian commander Hasdrubal was not confident of the adequacy of either his naval or his military forces, so he continued to avoid the risk of finding himself anywhere near the Roman armies until, in answer to his frequent and urgent requests, reinforcements of 4,000 foot and 500 horse were sent him from Africa.

Livy now claims that Hasdrubal Barca demanded reinforcements from Carthage before he would risk moving close to the Roman armies, in fact it is claimed he avoided finding himself anywhere near the Roman army until these reinforcements arrived because he felt his force was not able to stand up to the Romans. This may indicate some manoeuvring did occur, but it did not seem to achieve anything or be of any significance. This was almost certainly because the Romans were adopting a defensive strategy and was not serious about attacking.

Hasdrubal finally got reinforcements of 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry from Africa. Livy indicated that these reinforcement arrived after a long delay. Now the sailing distance from Carthage to Nova Carthago is about 1,200 kilometres, if they sail via Gades. The reinforcements would of arrived on sailing ships, which we all know have no constant speed. To make matters worst the current and winds in the Mediterranean runs in the opposite direction, or from Spain around to Africa. As a result ships travelling in this direction take a long time do so, for example a quinquereme under oars would take about 20 days to cover this distance, ignoring the effects of the currents.

I feel it would take about a month to sail a force from Carthage to Nova Carthago, however to assemble it would of taken longer thus the major delay. It is also very possible Hasdrubal Barca did not send his request for reinforcement the previous year, thus his request would of taken a month to reach Carthage and reinforcement a month to sail to Spain, not including the time it took to prepare. Three months is possible the minimum figure and possibly a figure of 4 months reasonable. We can't really guess, however if Hasdrubal had to manoeuvre his army around a bit to avoid the Romans before they arrived he may have received them mid year.

Now the strengths of both armies is of interest, if we assume Hasdrubal had insufficient troops to meet the Romans until his reinforcements arrive, and we know the Roman strength was probably in the order of 32,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. (A Roman force of 25,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with a Spanish contingent of 7,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). Hasdrubal had about 18,000 core non Spanish infantry and 2,500 core non Spanish cavalry, so the reinforcements would of brought him up to 22,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. If we assume an additional 12,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry we get a army of 34,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. This would of been large enough to meet the Romans on more than equal terms.

Hasdrubal plans his attack (June)

With this new army Hasdrubal moved up closer to the Roman position. Exactly where this position was we do not know, but it may have been close to the Ebro. He also made every effort to build up his naval power again, as he had actually suffered little losses in naval crewmen. It was only the quinqueremes that were lost. We know that 10 quinqueremes survived the disaster the previous year. We also know that the Carthaginians had 15 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes and 5 triremes in Nova Carthago which were not in a ready state. If he had mobilised all this naval power he could of got together a fleet of 25 quinqueremes and 7 other ships. He may of built some new ships or even received reinforcements from Carthage, however all this was in vain as his ships captains deserted. Why this occurred we do not know, possibly they had lost confidence and knew their new fleet was still outnumbered, or perhaps Livy is wrong and Hasdrubal never intended to bring out his outnumbered fleet. It should be noted the Roman fleet was 55 quinqueremes strong with possibly 2 triremes from Massilia. More than likely a naval action was the last thing in Hasdrubals mind.

Tartesii (July - October)

Hasdrubal now suffered a more real problem, a Spanish tribe in the depth of the Baetis Valley revolted, the Tartesii. The reasons for the revolt is unknown, possibly the Romans had sent agents down to them to encourage them, or possibly they saw an opportunity for independence as the Carthaginians seemed to have their hands full. Hasdrubal would of left a large force in Saguntum (probably under the command of Himilco) and marched or sailed a core force down South.

If he marched he would of entered the territory of the Tartesii from the head of the Baetis River, which is a distance of about 740 kilometres. This would of taken about a month to march. If he sailed he would of gone down to Gades and advanced in the opposite direction, which is a distance of 960 kilometres by sea and 130 kilometres by land. This would of taken him about 3 weeks. A message from this region to Hasdrubal would of taken between 1 and 2 weeks to reach Hasdrubal. A total of 5 weeks from the time of the revolt and Hasdrubals initial arrival.

If we are not too sure how Hasdrubal Barca got his army down to meet the Tartesii, we know is he finally met the Tartesii leader, Chalbus, at a town which had been taken a few days previously by the Tartesii. Hasdrubal attacked this force, initially winning the battle but then being forced back into a defensive position. This was a hill top position with a stream around most of it. Hasdrubal began to fortify this position and reassembling his scattered troops. The Tartesii made several attempts to draw Hasdrubal out, but failed. They then decided to storm Ascus, which was used by Hasdrubal as a supply depot. The town was taken and the Tartesii army became over confident. Hasdrubal attacked at this point, as the opposing camps were not too far from each other. The Spanish troops left their camp and it seems that their flanks collapsed and the Carthaginians surrounded them, almost totally destroying the army. Soon after the tribe surrendered to Hasdrubal.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 27) Soon however discipline began to tell: small parties of the Spaniards found themselves up against massed enemy ranks, and, too weak to defend themselves, began to look back for support from other groups, until under pressure from every side they were driven inwards upon each other; at last they were completely surrounded and packed so close, body to body, weapon to weapon, that they were scarcely had room enough to raise their swords for a blow. Till late in the day the slaughter went on, only a few of them managing to break through and escape to the woods and hills.

The strength of Hasdrubals army he took with him is unknown. He could of taken the entire force as he did the previous year against the Celtiberi, or he may have divided his army in two, with his army being the much stronger one. We really need to know how strong the Tartesii army was. A constant Spanish tribal strength that comes up again and again in Livy's account is 30,000 men. A much smaller threat may not have needed Hasdrubals presence, so lets go with a guess of 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry in the Tartesii army. Hasdrubal had a lot of trouble defeating this force so he would of probably taken a force smaller than this, lets say a force of 22,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. The bulk of this would of come from his non-Spanish core, leaving a force of 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry in Saguntum. We do not know who commanded this, but Himilco seems like a good candidate. This type of force would of made Saguntum invincible to a quick assault and the cavalry would of given an invading Roman army supply problems.

After this victory against the Tartesii Livy then tells us about a series of communications between Hasdrubal Barca and Carthage, where Carthage orders Hasdrubal to advance to help Hannibal and Hasdrubal tells Carthage that if he did this he Carthage would lose control over Spain. He may of got the message soon after his victory and he probably marched his army up north to meet up with Himilco, who may have possibly been at Saguntum. He then sent Himilco back to Carthage with a message demanding reinforcements to make it possible for him to help Hannibal. Himilco must of left about a month before winter set in, otherwise the passage would of been too dangerous. Livy seems to merge the activities of 215BC with that of this year, however most agree the campaign year ended about this point.

What were the Romans doing while Hasdrubal was dealing with the Tartesii. It seems the Romans were doing nothing this year, except consolidate their position. They would of had an ideal opportunity to invade the territory around Saguntum, but they seemed not to have done so. My feeling is the Romans probably campaigned up the Ebro River securing the Spanish tribes in that area and gaining the allegiance of many of them. We heard even in Livy's account the Romans had to deal with Spanish revolts constantly. It could be that the Romans needed this time to really consolidate their position. It really becomes obvious that for all the bluster of Livy the Romans were very much in a defensive position, only reacting to Carthaginian initiatives, such as move to the Ebro the previous year. The Romans may have possibly not been aware of Hasdrubal absence initially and may not of been sure exactly where Hasdrubal was. Even if they did invade Hasdrubal was probably only gone for 3 months, which would of not been enough time to besiege and take Saguntum, especially if the garrison was large.

Time Line (216 BC)

If we try and make a time line of this campaign year we need to look at the major event of this campaign season, the revolt of the Tartesii. If Hasdrubal marched his army down to defeat them he would of probably marched aver 700 kilometres. We know he took the precaution of assembling depots of supply, so this was a major campaign indeed. Based upon this he could of got down there and prepared for his attack in about 6 weeks.

The campaign itself probably only lasted a maximum of 4 weeks and his march back would of taken about 5 weeks. Over 4 months of activity, which would of ended about the beginning of November. Remember Himilco needed enough time to sail back to Carthage so he probably left very early in November. So if we count backwards the Tartesii revolt occurred about the middle July. The Carthaginian reinforcements would of arrive some time in either May or June, with the beginning of June being the best bet. Once again Livy's account does make some logical sense, with only the inactivity of the Romans between August to November unexplained.

Chronology - 216 BC

May	Beg	Hasdrubal manoeuvres, avoiding battle with the Romans.
June	Beg	Carthaginian reinforcement arrive.
June	Mid	Hasdrubal marches to the Ebro, possibly forcing the Romans back.
July	Mid	Hasdrubals ship captains revolt. Tartesii revolt. Hasdrubal marches or sails a force to meet the Tartesii.
August	Mid	Hasdrubal arrives in the territory of the Tartesii and prepares for battle, establishing supply depots.
September	Beg	Hasdrubal meets Chalbus and after initial success is forced to a hill top position.
October	Beg	Hasdrubal finally defeats Chalbus.
November	Beg	Hasdrubal arrives back at Saguntum. Himilco leaves for Carthage. Both Romans and Carthaginians seek winter quarters.

Balance of Forces - 216 BC

Romans

Gnaeus Scipio **(32,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry)** 25,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 7,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Publius Scipio

(57 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.

Pro-Roman Spanish

Chalbus

(30,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry)

Carthaginians

Hasdrubal Barca

(30,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry, 21 elephants, 10 vessels)
12,650 veteran infantry, 2,250 veteran cavalry and 21 elephants.
300 cavalry from the Ilergetes. 5,350 Carthaginian colonist infantry, 12,000 Spanish infantry and 1,950 Spanish Cavalry. 25 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes. (although only 10 quinqueremes were initially manned and the rest in dry dock. Early in the year the captains deserted, negating even this fleet). Hasdrubal probably took with him 22,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry to meet the Tartesii, leaving the rest with Himilco.

Himilco

Commanded main army left in Saguntum, probably 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.

Reinforcements

(4,000 infantry, 500 cavalry) Arrived early June.

Hasdrubal fails to break through - 215 BC

Carthage sent an army and a fleet under the command of Himilco to hold Southern Spain while Hasdrubal attempted to break through to Italy. The Romans intercepted Hasdrubal at Ibera on the Ebro. The Romans would of had a force of about 20,000 to 25,000 Romans and Italians and a unknown force of Spanish allies. Hasdrubal had a force of about equal size. Hasdrubal tried the same tactic that Hannibal used at Cannae, but his centre of Spanish troops broke before his flanks had turned around to surround the Romans. Hasdrubal Barca was forced to retire suffering heavy losses among his excellent African troops.

The Campaign (215 BC)

According to Livy Hasdrubal Barca was ordered to take his, by now veteran, army into Italy to help his brother Hannibal. In order to do this in a reasonable time he needed to break through the Roman position and cross the Pyrenes at its Eastern end. With Hasdrubal gone a second Carthaginian army would be needed to hold Spain. Hasdrubal sent Himilco to Carthage at the end of the previous year to do just that, ask for another army.

Himilco Arrives (May)

Himilco returned with an additional army and fleet from Carthage. Himilco probably arrived early in the year, possibly at the beginning of May. Any later and Hasdrubal would not of had enough time to get into Italy.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 28) Himilco was sent with a fully equipped force and an enlarged fleet to hold and protect Spain by land and sea,

We do not know the size of his army or fleet. In order to determine this we need to now exactly what this second army was suppose to do. If Hasdrubals objective was to sneak past the Romans then the army he left behind would of needed to be very large, possibly in the 20,000 men region. On the other hand if Hasdrubal first intended to defeat the Romans before he made the march over land into Italy, then this second army only needed to be large enough to hold down the Spanish tribes. A force similar to last years reinforcement may have been sufficient to do this, lets say 5,000 men. This is my preferred theory.

Ibera (July)

Once Himilco arrived in Spain Hasdrubal Barca now marched north to the Ebro. While he was doing this the Romans combined their army and advanced to Ibera to besiege it. Ibera was a Carthaginian controlled city at the time. Livy claims this was to distract Hasdrubal, however Hasdrubal decided to attack another town which had recently gone over to the Romans.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 28) they then crossed the river (The Roman army), and after long deliberations upon whether they should advance directly upon Hasdrubals camp or content themselves with delaying his proposed march (towards Italy) by attacking tribes or settlements allied to Carthage, they made preparations to attack Ibera, a town which took its name from its proximity to the Ebro and was at that period the most flourishing in the neighbourhood. Hasdrubal did not attempt to assist his allies; instead, he himself, in turn, moved to the assault of a town which had recently gone over to the Romans, with the result that the Romans abandoned the siege of Ibera and turned their attention directly against Hasdrubal.

Now there is an interesting clue in Livy's account, that of a town recently going over to the Romans before the battle of Ibera. The Town was probably close of Ibera, which in turn was close to the Ebro River. This seems to indicate the Romans may have been campaigning for a short period in this area before the Carthaginians arrived. The Romans may have crossed the Ebro and marched to this town, which then went over to the Romans. The Romans then marched to Ebro to see if they could take this town. Hasdrubal may have reacted to this and tried to retake the original town. The quick reaction of the Romans is of interest, as if this town was truly loyal it could of held out for a while against a Carthaginian siege. If it was not loyal the Romans could not afford to see if it would defy the Carthaginians.

This account goes against Livy's basic theme this year, that of Hasdrubal trying to break through the Romans. If all he wanted to do was to break through to help his brother I have no idea why Hasdrubal would assault a Roman controlled town, unless his real objective was to first defeat the Romans before he made his epic journey. This actually seems the most reasonable explanation for the events which were to follow. Actually after reading the account of Livy, the Romans seemed to have launched the invasion rather than defending against a Carthaginian invasion. This puts a new light on the campaign as if Hasdrubal was actually reacting to a Roman offensive, the time of this action could be much later in the year than we have been led to believe. In fact Hasdrubal probably did not need to arrive in Italy the following year, his objective could of been to draw the Romans out into a major battle and if he won started for Italy late in the year, arriving in Italy in 213 BC rather than 214 BC. After all this is what occurred in 208 BC, it was 206 BC before Hasdrubal arrived in Italy.

Anyway the Romans abandoned their siege and advanced towards Hasdrubal Barca and both armies met each other and camped 8 kilometres apart. This state remained for a few days until both sides marched out to do battle. Livy describes the battles as follows;

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 29) The Roman line was drawn up in three divisions; some of the light troops were posted in advance of the standards, amongst the pick of the infantry, others in the rear with the veteran reserves. The cavalry were stationed on the wings. Hasdrubals centre was strongly held by his Spanish contingents; on his right wing he posted the Carthaginians, on his left the African units with the hired auxiliaries, the latter supported by all the mounted troops except the Numidian, which were sent to cover the Carthaginian infantry on the right. Actually, not all the Numidians were on the right, but only those of them which had been trained to ride into battle leading a spare horse; such was the quickness of these men, and so highly trained were their mounts that often in the heat of the engagement when the horse they were riding tired, they would leap, like circus riders, fully armed upon the back of the fresh one

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 30)..... so at the very first onset, almost before the javelins were thrown, Hasdrubals centre gave, and, on a vigorous charge by the Roman infantry, turned their backs and fled. On the wings the fighting was, none the less, pretty hot: there was string pressure from the Carthaginians on the one side and the Africans on the other, and they had the Romans almost surrounded and fighting in two directions simultaneously. But once the Roman infantry had been driven inward into a solid mass, they found themselves string enough to force apart the encircling enemy wings, and in the double thrust which resulted the Romans had unquestionably the best of it, as, once the enemy centre had been routed, they were superior both in numbers and in fighting quality

Livys account is colourful and full of bias, however it seems that Hasdrubal was trying to repeat the tactic Hannibal used at Cannae. In fact this was the tactic Hasdrubal used the previous year against the Tartesii, so it may of been a standard Carthaginian tactic. The Spanish centre obviously did not immediately collapse, but must of fallen apart before the Carthaginian flanks had done their work and surrounded the Romans. None the less it must of been close as once men are packed together as Livy describes, its hard for them to do anything except defend. Against poorer quality troops, or if the Spanish centre held a bit longer, the Romans would of been totally eliminated. This was not the be and it was a Carthaginian defeat instead.

What about army sizes, assuming the Roman strength had not really changed much the maximum strength the Romans would of had was in the order of 32,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry (Roman total of 25,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with a Spanish contingent of 7,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). Hasdrubal would of had an army of about the same strength with more cavalry and possibly less infantry. Lets say 31,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. This was probably the 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry of his core non-Spanish army and a Spanish force of 11,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. He did have elephants in this battle, however we are unsure of their numbers. They probably numbered in their twenties and we do know he had 21 elephants in 218BC.

Now the issue concerning Himilco is interesting. Ibera was a close thing, so if Himilco's army was involved in this battle the Carthaginians may of won. Why didn't the Carthaginians concentrate all their forces together to defeat the Romans. There are two possible explanations, the forces were actually combined and Livy does not tell us, or Himilco was further down south securing various Spanish tribes and making sure no more revolts occurred. In both cases I am assuming Hasdrubals real plan was to first defeat the Romans before going to help his brother, so Himilco did not need a force large enough to hold back the Romans. If this was the case then Himilco probably only brought with him a small force, lets say similar to the previous years reinforcements of 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. We can't guess how large the fleet was, but it must of been in the order of 25-30 quinqueremes which brings the Carthaginians fleet up to parity with the Romans. This force would of been large enough to keep control down south in the Baetis Valley and was probably needed there, which is why Hasdrubal Barca could not use it. Once Hasdrubal defeated the Romans he could of redivided his total force, taking with him a smaller force and leaving enough troops behind to give Himilco a decent army.

Hasdrubal Regroups (August)

Lets now look at what troops Hasdrubal saved from this defeat. Livy claims Hasdrubal lost all his troops less the ones who broke earlier in the battle. Livy does say the Numidian and Moorish cavalry escaped with no losses as did the elephants. Now we need to look at a bit of logic, based on the description of the battle Hasdrubals army was divided into two. It seems to reason he got away with half his army and may have lost the bulk of the other half. This would of been a very serious defeat, but not one bad enough to give the Romans free reign in Spain for the rest of the year. The Romans did take the camp and sack it which seems to reinforce the seriousness of Hasdrubals defeat. He probably escaped with about 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry from his core non-Spanish force. As for his Spanish allies, we can only guess. I am sure a large number would of deserted, but some may have stayed with Hasdrubal.

We now enter another limbo period, Livy indicates no action at all for the remainder of the year. Now based on when the Battle of Ibera occurred this time could of been as great as five months, which does seem a bit unreasonable. I feel Ibera occurred much later than we originally though it did and that some low key campaigning did occur for the remaining few months of the campaign year. Campaigning which probably resulted in the towns on the south bank of the Ebro River going over to the Romans. This would of almost certainly included Ibera.

Time Line (215 BC)

To try and make some sort of sense of when events occurring this year we need to look at the latest and earliest possible date of Ibera. Lets look at the earliest possible date first. Himilco could of arrived in Spain at the beginning of May. Lets now say that Hasdrubal was in Saguntum and he marched north to Ibera, a distance of about 150 kilometres. He assaulted a town and when the two armies met they skirmish for a few days, lets say 2 weeks. The Battle of Ibera could of occurred in mid-May. Now we know Hannibal left Nova Carthago in mid-May, however he took his time and he started from Nova Carthago. Hasdrubal could of waited till the beginning of July to fight his battle or at worst mid-July. This would of allowed him to cross into Italy before the worst of the winter began.

If on the other hand Hasdrubal had no intension of getting into Italy the following year, all he needed to do was to get into Gaul before winter began. If this was the case he could of left his dash to well into September.

Both dates, mid-May to mid-September were probably the two extremes. The real date lies somewhere in between. I favour the date of the beginning of July, this was the last possible date to win a victory if Hasdrubal was to charge into Italy. Even if Hasdrubal did not want to rush into Italy, the significance of this date must of had some affect. When Hasdrubal found himself in a position to fight a battle, he probably took it rather than withdraw. After the defeat he would of withdrawn to, lets say Saguntum. This puts us at mid-July. The Romans probably remained in the area of Ibera, but even they suffered heavy losses and possibly spent a month regrouping and recovering, as were the Carthaginians. They would of then spent the remaining three to four months campaigning against any remaining pro-Carthaginian towns. Hasdrubal probably took some part in this action, although it would of been generally unsuccessful. The whole southern bank of the Ebro would of ended up as pro-Roman.

Chronology - 215 BC

May	Beg	Himilco arrives back in Spain with an army and fleet.
May	Mid	The Roman army crosses the Ebro and takes one town, at least and marches on Ibera. Hasdrubal marches his army north to counter the Roman move.
July	Beg	The Battle of Ibera.
July	Mid	Hasdrubal withdraws his survivors back to Saguntum where he reforms his army. The Romans do the same.
August		The Romans campaign south of the Ebro, securing the southern bank of that River.

Balance of Forces - 215 BC

Romans

Unknown	(57 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.
Gnaeus Scipio & Publius Scipio	(32,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry) 25,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 7,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Hasdrubal	(31,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 21 elephants, 10 vessels) 19,000 veteran/african infantry, 2,500 veteran/african cavalry and 21 elephants. 300 cavalry from the Ilergetes, 12,000 Spanish infantry and 2,500 Spanish Cavalry. 25 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes. (although only 10 quinqueremes were initially manned and the rest in dry dock.)
Himilco	(4,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, 25 vessels) Arrived in May and was involved down South.

Double defeat at Iliturgi and Intibili - 214 BC

Due to the loss of Hasdrubal Barca during the previous year Carthage sent Mago to Spain with a army of 12,000 foot, 1,500 cavalry, 20 elephants, and 60 quinqueremes, which was originally destine for Italy. Hasdrubal took over the Southern army under Himilco , Hamilcar Bomilcar recruited Spanish allies and the three combined armies engaged the Romans at Iliturgi where the Carthaginians were defeated. They met again at Intibili where the Carthaginians were defeated again.

The Campaign (214 BC)

Over all this year seemed like a stalemate, Hasdrubal Barca reformed his army. He probably had a core non-Spanish army of 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry which survived Ibera the previous year. Himilco had 4,000 infantry and he may have assembled a Spanish force half as large as the previous year, lets say 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. This gives him an army of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. In addition he probably lost all his elephants the previous year.

After the disaster of Ibera, Carthage sent Mago Barca and an army he had been preparing to Spain. This was an army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 20 elephants and 60 quinqueremes, which was earmarked originally for Italy. It seems that Carthages grand plan involved Mago landing his army down south in Italy and Hasdrubal marching his army down south from Gaul, with Hannibal still causing a great deal of problems in the centre. This operation was probably originally designed to occur this year, or at the very latest next year. We can only guess what would of occurred if the plan had gone ahead, probably the end of Rome. As it was the disaster at Ibera ended any possibly of this occurring forever. Mago Barca arrive very early in the year, possibly by the beginning of May.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 32) Meanwhile news reached Carthage of the defeat in Spain and the revolt to Rome of nearly all the Spanish tribes. Hannibals brother was on the point of leaving Carthage for Italy with reinforcements of 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse, twenty elephants, and 1,000 talents of silver, under an escort of sixty warships.

There was a third force under the command of Hamilcar son of Bomilcar, who recruited a large number of Spanish troops. We do not know who Hamilcar was, but he was probably sent from Carthage with a large amount of gold to recruit mercenaries. His force probably numbered no more than 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Now this is an interesting event as it makes a change in the nature of the campaign. Before Hamilcar arrived both sides mainly used Spanish allies which were incorporated into an existing Carthaginian army. In many cases the loyalty of these allies was ensured by the use of hostages and the fact their contingent was heavy outnumbered by the rest of the army. In some exceptional cases an independent Spanish army joined one side by attacking the other side, for example the Celtiberi or Tartesii. But these armies acted independently and only co-operated with their so called allies if convenient. We now begin to see the large scale use of Spanish mercenaries which seemed to act with a fair degree of independence. This something which the Romans began also do in the following years.

The Roman offensive (May-July)

Livy does not indicate what may have occurred early this year, but we do know a few facts. The Romans had managed to extend their area of influence as far as Ilturgi, which was not too far from Saguntum. The Roman army probably crossed the Ebro River in May and first advanced to Intibili, which they took. It could of been by force or the town may have thrown their lot in with the Romans. Both actions probably would of required the presence of the Roman army. They then marched on Ilturgi and there also took the town. Hasdrubal Barca was almost certainly opposing the Romans, by mid-May or early June the army of Mago arrived and possibly a bit later the Spanish mercenary army under Hamilcar son of Bomilcar arrived. The two armies probably manoeuvred around a bit and possibly by July-August they met in battle at Ilturgi.

Ilturgi & Intibili (July-September)

All three Carthaginian armies met at Ilturgi, which is a town 75 kilometres south of the Ebro and which had just gone over to Rome. According to Livy their combined strength was 60,000 men. The Romans marched their army into the town and they attacked the Carthaginians with only 16,000 men. Livy now says the Carthaginians lost 16,000 men killed, 3,000 men prisoner and 1,000 horses and 7 elephants captured. In addition the three Carthaginian camps were captured.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 48) It was at this moment, when fresh supplies were arriving, that the town of Ilturgi, which had gone over to Roman, was being besieged by Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hamilcar the son of Bomilcar. Grain was short in the town - which was nor an ally - and the Scipios, bringing a new supply, forced their way into it between the three armies which beset it, not without hard fighting and heavy losses to their opponents. They then urged the inhabitants to defend themselves with the same courage with which they had seen the Roman army fighting on their behalf, and proceeded to the assault of the main enemy position under Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal was soon joined by the other two Carthaginian armies, as their commanders realised it was there that the immediate issue would be decided. The battle began by a sortie from the camp ; and though the Romans on the day had only 16,000 men in the field against 60,000 of the enemy, the undisputed nature of their victory is evident from the losses they inflicted : the enemy lost in killed more than the total strength of the Roman army ; over 3,000 were taken prisoner together with just under 1,000 horses, fifty-nine standards, and seven elephants - five other elephants having been killed in the fighting. The three camps were also captured.

What is even more amazing is that after this defeat the Carthaginians advanced to Intibili to assault it. It should be noted a march from Ilturgi to Intibili is actually an advance towards the Ebro River, something which would hardly undertaken if Carthaginian had just suffered a defeat. Here the Carthaginians met the Roman army again and lost 13,000 men killed, 2,000 men and 9 elephants captured.

(Livy, Book XXIII, Para 48) After the relief of Ilturgi the Carthaginian armies moved to the attack of Intibili, having made good their losses by drawing recruits from a province which was full at the time of likely young men and passionately devoted to war, provided that pay was to be earned or plunder picked up. Here there was a second engagement, and each side fared as before : more that 13,000 of the enemy were killed, over 2,000 taken prisoner, forty-two standards captured and nine elephants.

Now we need to look at this in a little more detail. To start off with the Roman armies must of been larger than 16,000 men. If we say the 16,000 men was the total of Roman and Italian infantry, which gives us 2 legions worth, it would be more believable. The Romans had pumped 25,000 Roman and Italian infantry into Spain, but losses and garrisons may have reduced this to 16,000 men or the missing 9,000 men may have been elsewhere. They would of had about 2,000 Roman and Italian cavalry and probably a very large Spanish allied contingent we could get a total of about 32,000 men. As for the Carthaginians, their largest possible force would have been about 44,000 infantry and 7,500 cavalry, and that assumes a very large Spanish presence. In addition the Carthaginians would of had 20 elephants. The Romans were certainly outnumbered, but not as much as Livy claims.

A more reasonable scenario of events may read as follows. When the Carthaginians arrived at Ilturgi the Romans may have surprised them, inflicted heavy losses. The Romans probably then retreated to Intibili and the Carthaginians followed them where they engaged in battle a second time. The Romans may have collected reinforcements at Intibili, possibly the missing 9,000 Roman/Italian infantry, which gave their army parity with the Carthaginians. This may have been sufficient to defeat the Carthaginians and stop their advance. If Livy's casualty figures are correct, they probably also include Spanish troops deserting. If we look at Livy's total casualty figure of 34,000 men and take this away from Livy's total of 60,000 men, we end up with 26,000 men. This may have been the strength of the Carthaginians after this double defeat. This seems reasonable as Carthage has to send another army to Spain to help out, which may of been needed due to the heavy losses suffered.

The naval situation should be looked at as the Carthaginians had about 105 quinqueremes in its navy this year. However they seem to have done nothing with them. It is possible that many of these sailed back to Carthage during this year.

Time Line (214 BC)

Lets do our time line of the Campaign year again. Mago probably arrived in Nova Carthago about early May. Hamilcar Bomilcar needed a few months to recruit Spanish allies. The three armies probably combined at Ilturgi no earlier than the beginning of June and probably much later, perhaps mid-July. We have two battles and a march of 60 kilometres, which may have taken 1-2 weeks. After the defeat the Carthaginians would of retreated to Saguntum, or a similar location, which would of taken about a week. We are now about mid-August.

If this is correct we have a gap of about three months to fill. This was probably filled with the Romans securing their gains, in fact its possible that Ilturgi joined the Carthaginians and that the Romans needed to retake it. Even though the Carthaginians suffered heavy casualties, they were probably still a formidable force, which would of had the effect of slowing down the advance of the Romans.

Chronology - 214 BC

May	Beg	The Roman army crosses the Ebro and advances to Intibili, taking it. Mago arrives in Nova Carthago with an army from Africa. Hamilcar son of Bomilcar begins to recruit a Spanish mercenary army.
June	Beg	The Roman army advances to Iliturgi and takes that town in the face of opposition from Hasdrubal. Mago joins Hasdrubal, putting a great deal of pressure on the Romans.
July	Beg	Hamilcar son of Bomilcar joins Hasdrubal and Mago, the Carthaginian offensive begins.
July	Mid	The three Carthaginian armies combine at Iliturgi and besieged that town. Battle of Iliturgi, minor Carthaginian victory. Iliturgi may have joined the Carthaginians. Carthaginian advance towards Intibili. Battle of Intibili, minor Roman victory.
August	Mid	Carthaginian survivors regroup at Saguntum. Roman army consolidates their new position and retakes Iliturgi.

Balance of Forces - 214 BC

Romans

Unknown

(57 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.

Gnaeus Scipio

Publius Scipio

(32,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry) 25,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 7,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Hasdrubal Barca

Himilco

(16,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 35 vessels) 10,000 veteran/african infantry, 3,000 veteran/african cavalry (All survivors of the Battle of Ibera). 6,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish Cavalry. 50 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes. (although only 35 quinqueremes were initially manned and the rest in dry dock.)

Mago Barca

(12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 20 elephants, 60 vessels) The 60 vessels were probably all quinqueremes and they probably sailed home as soon as Mago arrived in Spain.

Hamilcar son of Bomilcar

(12,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry) These were all Spanish mercenaries.

The Romans take Saguntum - 213 BC

The Romans planned to cross the Ebro and join up with a large Spanish allied army in the South, however Hasdrubal and Mago managed to intercept the Spanish army and defeat it before the Romans could get their. In order to salvage something from this disaster Publius Scipio sent a flying column to help the survivors of the Spanish allied army. He met up with Hasdrubal, Mago and a newly arrived Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal son of Gisgo who harassed and surrounded him. Scipio was only saved by the arrival of his brother Gnaeus Scipio and the rest of the Roman army.

One Carthaginian army then marched to Iliturgi, a Roman ally, in an attempt to take it but Publius Scipio managed to save it by sneaking into the town with his one legion. The combined Spanish and Roman force sallied out and defeated the Carthaginian army. At the same time the other Carthaginian army marched to Bigerra, but this town was saved by the other Roman legion under Gnaeus Scipio.

The Carthaginians joined their two armies at Munda and the Romans did the same. Both armies fought each other at Munda and the Romans were defeated and forced back into their camp. The Carthaginians then marched to Aurinx and fought another battle where they were defeated. The Carthaginians then retreated due to Hasdrubal being recalled to Africa making it possible for the Roman army to besiege and take Saguntum.

The Campaign (213 BC)

We have some interesting events to interpret here. Lets first look at the armies. According to Livy the Carthaginians had three armies in the field, they were respectively commanded by Hasdrubal Barca, Mago Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, who arrived early in the year. Based on the previous year we can guess some strengths. If we believe Livy's strengths and losses numbers of the previous year we end up with a Carthaginian army of 26,000 men. These are certainly the non-Spanish numbers. To make life easy we could divide this into two armies, Mago's army of 12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry and Hasdrubal Barca army of 11,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Hasdrubal probably had control of the Numidians. Now the third army is that of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, he probably had 12,000 men and 1,000 cavalry which may have arrived in early May. After the losses of the previous year Hasdrubal probably sent another request for reinforcement late the previous year. As for Spanish allies, Hasdrubal Barca and Mago probably had 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry each. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo would of had very few Spanish allies, if any.

Let now look at the Romans. This year we find the Roman army divided into two. One commanded by Publius Scipio and the other by Gnaeus Scipio. Each would of been made up of one legion, with an Italian/Roman strength of 12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Each would of probably also had a Spanish contingent of about 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry giving them a total strength of 36,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. The Romans would of needed these numbers to meet the Carthaginians on equal terms, as the Carthaginians had a combined force of at least 53,000 men..

Defeat of the Celtiberi (April)

The Romans needed some equalising forces to meet the Carthaginian and they seemed to have got some Spanish tribes south of the Ebro River to assembled an army. Which tribes and from where we do not know. A likely source is the Celtiberi as they had helped the Romans several years before and were to continue to help them in the following years. We have no clue on how large this army was, although Livy does describe it as very large. A very large army may have been a force of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Now by itself it would of been too weak to meet up with the combined Carthaginian armies so it probably marched towards the coast to meet up with the Roman armies in an attempt to combine their actions. Both Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Barca managed to intercept this army with their combined armies and managed to inflict a very heavy defeat on it, all before the Romans had even crossed the Ebro.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 41) Mago and Hasdrubal inflicted a heavy defeat on a very large Spanish force before the Romans could cross the Ebro, and all Spain south of the River would have been lost to Rome but for the prompt action of Publius Cornelius Scipio, who crossed over with all speed and was on the spot while the tribes allied to Rome were still hesitating which way to go.

The location of this battle would depend on how this army was meeting the Romans. They could of marched along the Ebro, which would of made it very hard to intercept, or they may have travelled down the Salo River to emerge behind Saguntum, a position which would of been very easy to intercept. I favour the latter theory for many reasons, the major one being that any Spanish force marching down the Ebro could of crossed over to the Roman side at the first sign of Carthaginian troops and thus avoid interception. My other reason is that the Romans, at least later in the year, decided to change there strategy and go on the offensive. It seems reasonable that this strategy was decided at the beginning of the year, and the defeat of the Spanish army simply delayed it. The Romans main target would of been Saguntum and a Spanish army marching down to the rear of Saguntum would of allowed the Romans to outflank and encircle the Carthaginian position. This is supported by Publius Scipio's action, he crossed the Ebro and drove deep down South, so far he was forced to withdraw. If the Spanish were still in the field he may not of needed to withdraw, so his position was dependent on a Spanish army helping out. Because this force was destroyed, Publius was forced to withdraw.

The Roman plan was foiled by the very prompt action of Hasdrubal Barca and Mago Barca, who would of marched deep up the Salo River the intercept the Spanish before the Romans had managed to cross the Ebro River. Here their combined army of 35,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry would of outnumbered the Spanish. This probably occurring about April and by May the Carthaginians were back again facing the Romans.

Battle of Iliturgi (June)

Publius Scipio crossed the Ebro upon hearing of the defeat of their Spanish allies. He made camp in a place called White Fort, the location of the great Hamilcar's death. The was almost certainly very close of Saguntum, in land. A perfect location to meet the Celtiberi if they marched down the Salo River. However Publius was too late and the Celtiberi had been defeated and the Carthaginian armies were very active in his area. Livy then indicates the countryside was too hostile for Publius. A Roman column had been attacked by enemy cavalry and 2,000 Roman stragglers had been caught and killed. Livy implies that he was facing both Hasdrubal and Mago, so possibly there was constant skirmishing between the two armies. Publius would of been heavily outnumbered, which may have been the real reason for his movement. If this was the case the movement was really a withdraw.

He moved to a new location called Mount Victory, which was probably north of White Fort and may have been close to Iliturgi. Here he met his brother Gnaeus Scipio with the rest of the Roman army. Soon after this Hasdrubal son of Gisgo arrived with his army. The Roman force probably totally 36,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and was probably outnumbered by the Carthaginians. I estimate the Carthaginians had 47,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, less any casualties suffered fighting the Spanish earlier in the year. The Carthaginians also had at least 50 elephants with them, if we can believe Livy's casualty figures.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 41) The Romans first encamped at White Fort, famous as the place the great Hamilcar was killed in action ; it was a well fortified stronghold and supplies of grain had previously been stored there. However, as the surrounding country was heavily occupied by enemy troops, and the Roman columns had been attacked - though without loss - by enemy cavalry, while some 2,000 stragglers in various places had been caught and killed, Publius Scipio decided to shift his position nearer the regions where there was less activity, and fortified a camp at Mount Victory. Here he was joined by his brother Gnaeus Scipio, just as Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, arrived on the scene with an army at full strength.

Both forces now made camp close to each other with only a river dividing them. During the ensuring skirmishing Publius was almost captured. In Livy's account there seems a gap here and next we hear is the Carthaginians assaulting Iliturgi. What occurred in between we may ask. The location of the two armies may have been close to Iliturgi, possibly on the Mijaras River. This may explain the next Carthaginian move towards Iliturgi, which was Roman controlled at the time. Now it is likely that both armies faced each other for a period of time, but due to several factors no battle occurred. My guess is that the Romans feared giving battle and avoided it, thus causing the Carthaginian to force the situation by attacking Iliturgi.

However before the Carthaginians assaulted Iliturgi Livy claims that Castulo went over to the Romans. Unless there is more than one Castulo this seems very unlikely, considering its location. On the other hand lets look at a few interesting facts. After this

point we do not really hear about Hasdrubal son of Gisgo again, although Hasdrubal Barca and Mago Barca's named is mentioned. In addition the Romans seemed to avoid battle until the battle of Munda. Instead they simply marched around making it impossible for the Carthaginians to take any town, in short they avoided battle. What may have occurred is that another revolt in the Baetis Valley occurred and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had to march over to suppress it. With his forces gone the Romans would have had parity of numbers and they would have been able to meet the Carthaginian in battle. This is an explanation I like, because it simply explains the following events.

Anyway back to Ilturgi, at least two Carthaginian armies marched out to attack it. Livy only mentions two camps, where was the third camp. This army may have begun to march south to deal with the revolt in the Baetis River. Gnaeus Scipio marched to the aid of the town and according to Livy inflicted a serious defeat on the Carthaginians, killing 12,000 men. Now Gnaeus must have been commanding the entire Roman army, as we do not hear of Publius Scipio for the rest of the year. If this is the case he would have had an army of 36,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. If Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had left the Carthaginians would have had a similar force, let's say 35,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 41) The Carthaginians tried to take Ilturgi, where there was a Roman garrison; it seemed likely that the place would be starved into surrender, but Gnaeus Scipio came promptly to its aid. Marching with one legion, unencumbered by baggage, he passed between the two enemy camps and entered the town after inflicting heavy casualties, and against on the following day made a sudden sortie with equally successful results. More than 12,000 men were killed in the two engagements, and over 1,000 taken prisoner together with thirty-six military standards.

The Carthaginians then marched to Bigerra where they tried to take that town. Gnaeus arrived here again and the Carthaginians withdrew without a fight.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 41) The next town to be attacked was Bigerra, which was also within the Roman alliance; it was beset by Carthaginian troops but relieved without a battle by the arrival of Gnaeus Scipio.

What seemed more likely is that at Ilturgi the arrival of Gnaeus made the Carthaginians realise to take Ilturgi would have taken a lot of effort and time and they decided to march on to easier pickings. There may have been some skirmishing, but certainly not enough to inflict 12,000 casualties Livy indicates. At Bigerra the Carthaginians were once again foiled by the arrival of Gnaeus. This time Livy indicates there was no fighting. Obviously there was a lot of manoeuvring going on and these two actions were all part of it. If the Carthaginians really lost all the men Livy claims they did, they would have never met the Romans in battle at Munda.

Munda (August)

Livy now claimed that the combined armies met at Munda. If we are speaking of the Munda well down south, this must of been impossible. Likely this may of been a Roman nickname of the battle, possibly it resembled the later battle at Munda, or possibly there is a second Munda, who knows. According to Livy the battle lasted for four hours after which the Romans ordered a withdraw. Livy then goes on to explain this withdraw by saying Gnaeus had been wounded and that if this had not occurred the Romans would of won. The guess is that the Romans suffered a minor defeat and Livy was trying to explain it away. According to Livy the Carthaginians lost 12,000 men killed, 3,000 men captured (if the Romans withdrew, how did they capture anyone) and 39 elephants were killed. I feel the real losses would of been low and about equal, possibly 10% of each armies total force.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 42) After the Carthaginians moved to Munda and the Romans followed them with all speed. The opposing forces met and after four hours of fighting, in which the Roman troops were conspicuously superior, the retreat was sounded because Gnaeus Scipio had been wounded by a javelin through his thigh and the men near him had a moment of panic lest the wound prove fatal. But there was no doubt that the enemy camp could have been taken that day, but for this unlucky check. Already not only men but elephants were right back against the rampart, and thirty-nine elephants were killed with pikes as they were actually crossing the trenches. In this battle too nearly 12,000 men are said to have been killed and 3,000 taken prisoner together with fifty-seven standards.

Aurinx (August)

Now the losses suffered at Munda may have weakened the Carthaginian army, so there march to Aurinx may have been the withdraw that Livy indicates. Regardless of the type of march the Carthaginians marched to Aurinx followed by the Romans. Another battle was fought, this time the Romans were definitely victorious. The Carthaginians lost 8,000 men killed and 1,000 men captured, mostly Gauls. In addition two gallic chieftains were killed, Moenicaptus and Vismarus. Finally 8 elephants were captured and 3 killed.

Now this seems more than reasonable as after this battle the Carthaginians seemed to withdraw south very rapidly, in fact probably down to Nova Carthago or Castulo. We do not know where Aurinx was but it stands to reason it was close to Saguntum, as after this defeat the Romans manage to take Saguntum. The Romans then marched onto the territory of the Turboletas (Livy writes Turdentani, however he must of meant the Turboletas, as the Turdentani were beyond Gades) and destroyed their capital city and sold the population into slavery.

The critical battle seemed to be Aurinx as it was this that gave the Romans the opportunity to take Saguntum. As for the army size, both sides probably had about 36,000 men each. If the Carthaginians lost 9,000 more men than the Romans, it would of been sufficient to fall back. We may even assume the 12,000 men lost at the battle of Munda was the non-gallic losses, as Livy claims that 9,000 Gauls were lost. If this was so then the Carthaginians really suffered the decisive defeat I suspect they did. If I am right they lost 24,000 men killed, captured and deserted, heavy losses indeed. Livy now talks about Mago Barca going out to recruit more men, indicating the Carthaginians were in no condition to fight without reinforcements.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 42) The Carthaginian withdrew then withdrew to Aurinx, followed by the Romans, who were determined to press their advantage. There Scipio fought another battle, having himself carried into the line in a stretcher. It was a decisive victory, though the enemy losses were only half what they had been before, as there were fewer of them left to take the field. However, the family of the Barcae were born fighters and it was in their blood to set a tottering cause on its feet again : Mago was sent to raise fresh troops, and soon the army was once more at full strength and the spirit of the men ready for a renewed effort. Most of the soldiers were Gauls, and they fought no worse than their predecessors for a side which had suffered so many defeats within a few days, and with the same result: more than 8,000 were killed, nearly 1,000 captured, with fifty-eight standards. Most of the spoils, too, were taken from Gallic soldiers, golden collars and bracelets in large numbers. Two distinguished Gallic chieftains, named Moenicaptus and Vismarus, were killed in action. Eight elephants were captured and three killed.

Saguntum & Turboletas (August - November)

The Romans now marched on Saguntum and took it either immediately or after a short siege. The Romans then marched on the Turboletas (Livy writes Turdentani, however its the Turboletas who are close to Saguntum while the Turdentani are clear beyond Gades on the other side of Spain) and took their capital city. After this event the campaign year ended.

Actions in Africa (May - October)

We need to look at what was occurring in Africa to try and puzzle a riddle out, that is how were the Romans able to take Saguntum. The answer could be in Africa. Livy indicates that possibly at the beginning of this year, the Scipio's decided to extend their influence to Africa.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 48) During this year (213 BC) the two Scipios were led by their successes in Spain, with the recovery of many former allies and the acquisitions of new ones, to extend their hopes to Africa as well. There was, for instance, the Numidian prince Syphax, who had suddenly turned against Carthage: to him they sent three centurions, charged with the mission of forming a pact of friendship and promising that, if he continued to press hostilities against Carthage, he would earn the gratitude of the Senate and the people of Rome.

The situation in Africa is a bit unclear, but it appeared that Carthage kept Numidia weak by keeping it divided. There were two tribes, one the Massyles tribe under King Gala and the other the Masaesyles tribe under king Syphax. Syphax seemed to be the junior of the two and as he was closest to Carthage probably under some sort of Carthaginian control. Syphax had revolted from the Carthaginians, possibly late in 214 BC and the Carthaginians had raised an army under a local commander in order to suppress the revolt. This army marched out early in 213 BC, possibly in May.

Scipio sent three centurions, probably early in 213 BC, to Syphax to make an alliance. Of the three centurions, Quintus Statorius stayed behind to train Syphax's infantry. Syphax's army managed to defeat the Carthaginians force sent out from Carthage, probably in July. The defeat would have caused great concern in the Carthaginians city and one of the Hasdrubals was called back to Africa to lead the Carthaginians army.

Now we know that after the battle of Munda things went bad for the Carthaginians in Spain. In fact we can probably go back to before Munda as from about here on we do not hear about Hasdrubal Barca any more, although Livy does mention Mago Barca. Possibly Hasdrubal Barca was called back to Africa with a small force leaving the weakened army under the command of Mago. So Mago commanded at Munda and Aurinx and after Aurinx his army may have withdrawn all the way back to the Carthaginians army dealing with the Spanish revolt around Castulo while he went off looking for more Spanish mercenaries. Hasdrubal could have left in mid July, arriving in Africa by early August.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 48) Statorius found ample material from which to enrol infantry soldiers for Syphax; he organised them very much after the Roman pattern, gave them instruction in forming up, manoeuvring, following the standards, and keeping formation, and accustomed them to the various regular military duties, including fortification, and all so successfully that the prince soon came to trust his infantry no less than his cavalry, and that when an engagement took place on open ground he defeated his Carthaginian foe.

Now it could have been Hasdrubal son of Gisgo which was called back home, however when Hasdrubal son of Gisgo met Syphax in 206 BC, both seemed to be strangers or at least no mention of the events of 213 BC was made. This seems strange and indicates it was the other Hasdrubal which defeated Syphax in 213 BC, thus making it more likely that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo would be able to win over Syphax in 206 BC and then in 205/204 BC.

Hasdrubal arrives in Africa (July - November)

When Hasdrubal Barca arrived the first thing he did was make an alliance with Gala, who ruled the other half of Numidia. Gala quickly joined the Carthaginians in an alliance, it very possible that he feared a strong Syphax and would of jumped at the chance of getting on top of him. Gala formed a army, put it under command of his son Masinissa and together with Hasdrubal defeated Syphax. Syphax then ran west, indicating he may have fought his battle in the land of Gala which was west of his normal tribe. Syphax arrived in the territory of the Maurusian tribes and raised another army, however Masinissa followed him and defeated him a second time ending the war. The fact that Hasdrubal Barca was not involved in this could indicate he needed to get back to Spain as soon as possible.

(Livy, Book XXIV, Para 48) Gala was easily persuaded to send an army, as his son begged for the command, and Masinissa, reinforced by Carthaginian troops, encountered Syphax in a great battle and defeated him. Thirty thousand men are said to have been killed; Syphax himself escaped with a small company of horse to the Maurusian Numidians - the tribe far away to the west, near the Atlantic coast opposite Gades. These native warriors, hearing of his presence, came flocking to him from all sides so that he was soon able to equip a huge fighting force with which to cross the narrow strait into Spain. But Masinissa arrived with his victorious army, and, this time without any help from Carthage, carried on the war with Syphax with great gallantry and success.

The Battle probably occurred in October and Hasdrubal Barca sailed back to Spain with his force as soon as possible, arriving in Nova Carthago in late November. Masinissa followed Syphax and probably ended the war in December, or possibly even later. He could of crossed into Spain every early the following year.

Time Line (213 BC)

Lets look at our time line of this year. During April the Carthaginians defeated the Spanish army coming to the aid of the Romans. By mid May they were facing the Romans again. The Romans probably advanced to White Fort, close to Saguntum while the Carthaginians were returning from the defeat of the Spanish, so by mid May both armies were in contact again. After some skirmishing and minor conflicts Publius withdrew to Mount Victory, close to Iiliturgi, where he meet up with his brother and formed a new camp. Both armies were about equal in strength and they probably stalemated each other. About this time Hasdrubal Gisgo appears, he probably landed at Nova Carthago in mid May and marched up the coast. This upset the stalemate. We may now be at the end of May.

Also during May Publius sent three centurions to Africa, leaving in early May and arriving at Syphax's army headquarters by mid May. By the end of May an alliance was made, two centurions sailed back leaving one centurion to train the infantry.

The Carthaginians probably courted battle and during some manoeuvring they almost captured Publius. After a while they must of forced the situation by besieging Iiliturgi, possibly at early June. Gnaeus marched the Roman army to help out the town but probably did little until Hasdrubal son of Gisgo left.

Now we have two events, the revolt of Castulo and the manoeuvring the occurred between the two armies. We can guess that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was sent down to deal with the revolt and he would of taken him about a month to get there. Castulo was not a minor town and he may have needed to besiege it. In fact we do not hear about Hasdrubal son of Gisgo for the rest of the year, so he was probably occupied down there till the end of the year. If the revolt occurred about late May or early June Hasdrubal son of Gisgo left Iiliturgi by mid-June at the latest and arrived at Castulo at mid-July.

Back at Iiliturgi, the loss of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at mid June left both armies equal in strength. Gnaeus engaged the Carthaginians and inflicted some sort of loss. This was probably not serious, but convinced the Carthaginians they could not take Iiliturgi due to its strength and the Roman army. They marched on to Bigerra and attempted to take the town by storm, but Gnaeus foiled them. Gnaeus probably arrived at the town before the Carthaginian or so close behind them he would of made a storm of the town impossible.

Now sometime during July Syphax defeated a Carthaginian army. Carthage decided to recall Hasdrubal Barca to defend Africa and he would left by mid-July leaving his brother, Mago, in command of an outnumbered army.

The Carthaginians now march on and the two sides meet in battle at a place called Munda. This was probably either incorrect, or a nickname, but was probably close to Saguntum. This would indicate the Carthaginians had withdrawn, which was very possible. The Battle of Munda probably occurred in mid July and resulted in a minor Roman loss. The Carthaginian were attacking against and they marched North to Aurinx, possible a town between Saguntum and Iiliturgi which had recently gone over to the Romans. Here the two armies met against and this time the Carthaginians lost the battle. The Carthaginians withdrew, possibly past Saguntum and the Romans reached Saguntum by the beginning of August.

After the Romans took Saguntum they invaded the territory of the Turdentani and took their capital city. The Romans probably took Saguntum after a short siege, possibly a few months and then probably spend the remaining two months attacking the Turdentani. While this was occurring the Carthaginians were probably regrouping their forces and getting more Spanish allies, possibly in Nova Carthago. Its very likely they lost most of their Spanish troops after Aurinx which resulted in them abandoning the area around Saguntum.

Hasdrubal Barca would of arrived in Africa by early August and after making an alliance with gala met Syphax by September or October, where he defeated him. Soon after this he sailed back to Africa, arriving back too late to do anything about the deterioration of the position their.

Chronology - 213 BC

April	Beg	Carthaginians defeat Celtiberi army.
April	Mid	Romans cross the Ebro and advance to White Fort, close to Saguntum
May	Beg	Carthaginians meet up with the Roman army and Publius withdraws from White Fort to Mount Victory, close to Iiliturgi, where he met up with his brother. Publius send three Centurions to seek an alliance with King Syphax, in Africa.
May	Mid	Hasdrubal son of Gisgo lands at Nova Carthago and marches North, arriving close to the end of May. Roman centurions meet up with Syphax and form an alliance. Quintus Statorius begins to train Numidian infantry.
June	Beg	Carthaginian army besieges Iiliturgi, Romans harass the Carthaginians army making the siege difficult. Castulo revolts.
June	Mid	Hasdrubal son of Gisgo leaves the siege of Iiliturgi to deal with the revolt. Gnaeus Scipio engages the Carthaginians army around Iiliturgi inflicting a minor loss. Hasdrubal and Mago Barca abandon the siege of Iiliturgi and march on Bigerra, however Gnaeus arrives before them or is following close behind making an assault impossible.
July	Beg	Syphax defeats Carthaginian army.
July	Mid	Hasdrubal Barca leaves for Africa with a small force, leaving Mago in charge and outnumbered. The Battle of Munda occurs, possibly resulting in a minor Roman loss. However losses begin to tell and Mago withdraws to Aurinx, close to Saguntum.
August	Beg	The Battle of Aurinx, resulting in a major Carthaginians defeat. The survivors withdraw South to meet up with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, which Mago begins to recruit more Spain troops to replace losses. The Roman army reaches the gates of Saguntum and begin their siege.
October	Beg	Saguntum taken after a two month siege. Romans invade the territory of the Turdentani, taking their capital city. Hasdrubal Barca and Masinissa defeat Syphax, Syphax retreats followed by Masinissa.
November	Mid	Hasdrubal Barca arrived back in Spain.

Balance of Forces - 213 BC

Romans

Unknown	(57 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.
Gnaeus Scipio	(18,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry) 12,000 Italian/Roman infantry, 1,000 Italian/Roman cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.
Publius Scipio	(18,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry) 12,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 1,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Pro-Roman Spanish/Numidian

<i>Celtiberi Tribe</i>	(30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry) destroyed and dispersed early in the year.
<i>Castulo Rebels</i>	(15,000 men) This is unknown and probably was a maximum of 15,000 men. More likely it was less and they were holding out in their cities.
Syphax	(30,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry) Again a guess, but would of been in this order.

Carthaginians

Unknown	(35 vessels) 35 quinqueremes. 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes were in dry dock in Nova Carthago.
Hasdrubal Barca Himilco	(17,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry) 11,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry.
Mago Barca	(18,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 20 elephants) 12,000 African infantry, 1,000 african cavalry. 6,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry. The elephants may have been lost the previous year.
Hasdrubal son of Gisgo	(12,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry) These troops arrived in May.

Pro-Carthaginian Numidian

Gala	(30,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry) Probably about 10,000 Carthaginian infantry included in the total as well as Hasdrubal Barca in command.
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Roman disaster - 212 BC

Now that the Scipio brother controlled Saguntum they had a good base to strike deep into Carthage held Spain. Even though they were outnumbered by the three Carthaginian armies they decided to adopt an offensive policy. They recruited 20,000 Celtiberians mercenaries and allies. They split their army into two parts of one legion each. Each of the brothers took an army. These two armies then marched South to meet the Carthaginians.

Publius Scipio advanced his army of one Legion and 14,000 Celtiberians to the upper course of the Baetis River where he met Hasdrubal Barca's army. Publius Scipio's Spanish allies first deserted him and while he tried to withdraw his army he was destroyed by Hasdrubal Barca.

Gnaeus Scipio advanced his army of one legion and 7,000 Celtiberians to the hinterlands of New Carthage when he heard of the destruction of his brother's army. His Spanish allies also deserted him and like his brother his army was destroyed as he tried to withdraw. About 9,000 survivors did manage to get back to the Ebro where they reformed electing Lucius Marcius Septimus as commander.

The Carthaginian for some reason did not follow up their victory and did not advance.

The Campaign (212 BC)

This was going to be the decisive year, after the taking of Saguntum the previous years the Romans probably decided to continue their offensive towards Nova Carthago. Livy indicates that one major factor in the Romans deciding they could go on the offensive was the arrival of 20,000 Celtiberi troops. In his account Livy claims that it was this year the Romans decided on launching an offensive against the Carthaginians, this is obviously not true as during the previous 2 years the Romans were doing all the attacking under the sun, while it was the Carthaginians defending.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 32) A council was held (Roman) and it was unanimously agreed that it was time for action: hitherto all that had been done was to prevent Hasdrubal marching into Italy; now steps must be taken to bring the Spanish war to a conclusion. They believed that they had adequate forces for the purpose, as they had been reinforced by 20,000 Celtiberian troops.

Now the nature of the Celtiberi troops need to be looked at in more detail. We know that they deserted the Romans before any major battle even occurred. This would indicate that the Romans had no hostages back in the rear of ensure the loyalty of these troops. In short these troops were mercenaries which had a great deal of control of their own command. We know that the Celtiberi had co operated with the Romans early in the campaign and may of been helping the Romans the last year also. If this was so then they may have decided to join up with the Romans very early in the campaign in order to avoid being defeated in detail. In addition the Romans were now at Saguntum, which is closer to the Carthaginians than the Celtiberi.

Very early in the year the Celtiberi joined up with the Romans, according to Livy this occurred in winter. As the Romans were probably wintering in Tarraco, the combined force met at Saguntum early in the Campaign season, possibly at the end of April. The total Roman force probably consisted of 24,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,000 Roman/Italian cavalry. They had 20,000 Celtiberi and probably a smaller contingent of other Spanish allies, lets say a force equal to the Romans with a bit more cavalry. This may have given the Romans a combined force of 48,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The Romans divided their force into two, with Publius Scipio getting two thirds of the Roman/allied army and Gnaeus Scipio getting the rest and the 20,000 Celtiberi. This probably gave Publius 16,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 1,500 Roman/Italian cavalry. In addition they probably had some Spanish allies, possibly 3,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish Cavalry, A total of 22,500 men. Gnaeus had the rest, made up of 8,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 500 Roman/Italian cavalry, the 20,000 Celtiberi (probably 19,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry) and the rest of the Spanish allies, 2,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry, giving him an army of 31,500 men. This gave Gnaeus the larger army, but its overall quality was lower which may explain the difference in numbers.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 32) Publius Scipio taking two thirds of the total strength of Roman and allied troops for action against Mago and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, and Gnaeus Scipio one third of the original army together with the Celtiberians for action against Hasdrubal Barca.

Let now look at the Carthaginians. They had three armies in the field, under the command of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Barca. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca's army was camped together 5 days march from the Romans, about 150 kilometres. Hasdrubal Barca was closer to the Romans, close to a town called Amtorgis. We can believe Livy Hasdrubal Barca was left with an army of 12,000 men after Aurinx. This may have been 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Recruiting from the Carthaginian towns and Spanish allies may have brought this up to 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. As for Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, he probably had his army of 12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry with a standard Spanish allied force of 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Mago was with him and he was order to recruit Spanish mercenaries, probably a further 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. It could of not been much more than this as this puts the combined Carthaginian army at 26,000 men, larger than Publius army. In addition it seems the Numidian Cavalry under Masinissa were with Hasdrubal Gisgo and they probably numbered 2,000 cavalry.

The Romans launch their invasion (May)

Both Roman armies now marched towards Amtorgis, where Hasdrubal Barca was positioned. They took up position within sight of the Carthaginian, but divided by a River. This may have been the Tader River, based on the actions which now occur. If this is the case then some manoeuvring must of occurred before this point in time, as this location was over 200 kilometres South of Saguntum. This is a good 7 days of marching. What may have occurred is that Hasdrubal Barca heavily outnumbered army withdrew before the Romans to Amtorgis in an attempt to meet up with the other Carthaginian army marching North from the Baetis Valley. This may indicate Hasdrubal son of Gisco didn't suppress the revolt until winter had set in.

Anyway the Romans divided their armies at this point, with Gnaeus Scipio holding his position on the north Bank of the Tader River, with Hasdrubal Barca holding the southern position. Looking at maps what may have occurred is that the Romans had successfully divided the two Carthaginian armies, with Hasdrubal Barca holding the route to Nova Carthago and the other Carthaginian army towards Orongis. Publius Scipio now took his army and probably marched towards Orongis and towards the Carthaginian army under the command of Hasdrubal son of Gisco. It should be noted that Orongis is a town on the route to Castulo, the scene of the previous years revolt. Livy does indicate that Publius Scipio was proceeding to his agreed position, could this mean he was expecting something to occur at some preordained position. Possibly he expected the revolting forces to meet him, in this he must of been disappointed. In fact Livy talks about a Spanish tribe called the Suessetani under the command of Indibilis coming to the aid of the Carthaginians.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 32) The two commanders with their armies set out together, the Celtiberians marching at the head of the column, and took up their position near Amtorgis in sight of the enemy by separated from him by a river. There Gnaeus Scipio remained with the force already mentioned, while his brother Publius proceeded to his agreed position.

Now Livy makes some interesting observations concerning Gnaeus army, he indicates that previous to this point the Romans had always made sure that any allies in their army never outnumber the native Romans (we also assume this means Italian also). So we know that in before and from now on the Romans never had more Spanish allies in their army than they had Roman/Italian troops. Actually we generally find the Carthaginians did the same, always ensure the bulk of their army consisted of non-Spanish troops. There were exceptions, especially now that they were hiring mercenaries in a big way. But they seem to generally avoid the problems the Romans were facing, although to be fare it seems that whenever the Carthaginians lost a major battle their Spanish mercenaries seemed to melt away. To put it simply Gnaeus took a calculated risk and lost. At some point after Publius had left the Celtiberi allies in Gnaeus army simply left. Livy claims Hasdrubal Barca made a treaty with them, which may be the truth as the Romans seemed to get very little help from the Celtiberi from now on, while we hear of Celtiberi troops in Africa.

It became obvious the Celtiberi threw their lot in with the Carthaginians. This left Gnaeus Scipio with an army of 10,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. He was facing Hasdrubal Barca with 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and was as you can see heavily outnumbered. Gnaeus now decides to withdraw as fast as he can, avoiding any sort of action, and Hasdrubal Barca begins an immediate pursuit. This move cut off the retreat of Publius Scipio, leaving him totally on a limb.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 33) The Celtiberians took up their standards and suddenly departed; and when the Romans asked why they were going and besought them to remain, their only reply was that a war in their own part of the country demanded their presence. Scipio, now that there was no hope of retaining them either by force or entreaty, was fully aware that without them he was no match for the enemy and would also be unable to rejoin his brother; accordingly, since there was nothing else he could do to better the situation, he determined to withdraw as far as he could, taking every possible care not to risk an engagement on open ground. As he moved off, the enemy crossed the river and followed close on his heels.

What of Publius Scipio, he must of been too far away to support Gnaeus Scipio, otherwise Gnaeus would of sent messengers for him to come back. Any march of more than two days, or 60 kilometres would of been too far away. It was probably much more than this, possibly being as much as 180 kilometres away. We know that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was 5 days march away from the Romans at one point, this is about 150 kilometres. We know the Romans put themselves in between Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Hasdrubal Barca. We know Hasdrubal Barca was closer to the Romans, from 1 to 4 days march, or from 30 to 120 kilometres. Now assuming the three forces were points in a triangle, the two Carthaginian armies must have been from 180 to 270 kilometres apart from each other. When we look at the map we see the distance was probably about 200 kilometres, or 6 to 7 days march.

Orongis (June - July)

Now Livy now talks about Publius Scipio's advancing column being severely harassed by Numidian cavalry, under the command of Masinissa. Publius probably made the decision to make camp and according of Livy had difficulty foraging. As his army had 22,500 men in it and he was probably facing a combined Carthaginian army of at least 28,000 men it comes at no great surprise that he was suffering a great deal of pressure. At some point during this siege the Spanish tribe of Suessetani under the command of Indibilis had sent a army of 7,500 men, probably 7,000 infantry and 500 cavalry against Publius.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 34) The Romans, in short, were kept always and everywhere in a state of nervous apprehension and compelled to remain inside their defences with no chance of getting fresh supplies. It was already something like a blockade, and that blockade would clearly become stricter if the Carthaginians were joined by Indibilis, who was said to be on the way with 7,500 Suessetani.

Now this is an interesting event, who was this Indibilis and why was he helping the Carthaginians in this manner. Was he the reason why Publius Scipio marched so far into Carthaginian controlled Spain, possibly Publius had made an agreement with him and he provided untrustworthy. This may have been the reason the Romans were in a state of nervous apprehension. We know that in 206 BC Scipio, the son of Publius Scipio, attacked Castulo and Iliturgi because they betrayed Publius Scipio in 212 BC. Publius probably expected help from these Spanish tribes and never got it. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo probably pacified the area or convinced the tribes to join him, or at least remain neutral. We will never know, but Publius was in a desperate situation. With an additional 7,500 men in the Carthaginian army they may of been powerful enough to really surround the Romans and besiege them.

Publius Scipio decided to attack Indibilis before he could join up with the Carthaginians and leaving a small force in his camp he marched out at night. He left Tiberius Fonteius in command of the garrison and left at midnight. He met Indibilis and began to fight, we are not too sure if this was during the day or not. Considering what occurred next it was probably late afternoon, meaning he marched for over 12 hours, possibly 30 kilometres from his camp. Soon after the battle began the Numidians appeared on his flanks and soon after this the Carthaginian army appeared in his rear. The result was predicable, the Romans were surrounded, Publius was killed and only the falling of night saved some routing troops.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 34) Leaving in camp a garrison of moderate strength under his lieutenant Tiberius Fonteius, he (Publius) started at midnight, met the enemy, and joined battle. As neither column stopped to form into line, it was something of a running fight, and disorderly at that; and, all things considered, the Romans had the advantage. But it was not to last, for suddenly the Numidian cavalry, to whom Scipio though he had given the slip, appeared on both flanks; this, in itself, was alarming enough, but no sooner had they entered upon a fresh struggle with the Numidians that a third enemy appeared upon the scene - the Carthaginian generals, who had come up on the rear while they were engaged. Thus the Romans, subjected to pressure from two directions at once, found themselves in doubt against which enemy, in front or in the rear, it would be best to attempt a breakthrough. Scipio, in the thick of things, fighting, encouraged his men, exposing himself wherever they were hardest pressed, was pierced through the right side by a lance. A section of enemy troops, in wedge formation, had been trying to break through the Roman soldiers massed around him, and when they saw him fall dying from his horse, they ran off shouting and wild with joy to spread the news all along the line that the Roman commander had been killed. That alone, once it was generally known, really decided the issue. Their leader lost, the Romans immediately began to take flight.

Ilorci (July)

Immediately after this victory Hasdrubal son of Gisgo marched his army to help Hasdrubal Barca.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 35) The Carthaginian commanders were quick to follow up their success. Immediately after the battle, having scarcely allowed their men the rest they needed, they hastened with all possible speed to join Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar (Hasdrubal Barca), confident that once the junction had been effected the war could be brought to a triumphant end.

Once the Carthaginians had joined together Gnaeus Scipio knew he was in deep trouble. Even though he was outnumbered 2 to 1 by Hasdrubal Barca, he was able to slowly withdraw, from defensive position to defensive position. This must of been very slow, otherwise Hasdrubal son of Gisgo would of never caught up with him. Gnaeus decided his only course of action was flight, and he began his march during the night. The Carthaginians discovered the Romans had left the following morning and then chased him with the Numidians. These troops soon caught up and forced Gnaeus to slow down his retreat a great deal. Soon the Carthaginian army arrived, forcing Gnaeus into an ad hoc defensive position on top of a hill. The Carthaginians attacked immediately and soon over powered the defenders. A large number of Romans managed to escape into the woods, but the bulk of the Roman army had been destroyed. Gnaeus was killed in this action and according to Livy this occurred 29 days after Publius Scipio was killed.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 35) In the course of the following night he (Gnaeus) got well away before the enemy were aware of his departure or could make any move to stop it; but at dawn they saw he had gone and started in pursuit at their utmost speed, having sent the Numidians in advance. Before dark the Numidians were up with them. Harassing the rear and flanks of the marching column, they compelled it to halt and stand on the defensive. Scipio kept urging his men, as far as was possible with safety, to keep moving and to fight at the same time, before the Carthaginian foot could overtake them.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 36) For some time, what with orders to press on and orders to halt, little progress was made, and night was approaching; so Scipio broke off the action and withdrew his troops to a near-by hill. It was by no means a safe position, least of all for a body of men already badly shaken, but it was at any rate higher than the ground around it. There he formed his infantry in a circle round the baggage and the cavalry, and for a time they were able without difficulty to beat off the assaults of the Numidians; but later when the three enemy commanders with their three fully equipped armies arrived upon the scene, it was plain that without proper defences arms alone would be quite inadequate to hold the hill. Scipio therefore began to look about him in the hope that it might be feasible to construct some sort of earthwork. But the hill was bare and the soil so stony that no timber could be found for stakes, no turves could be cut, no trench could be dug; for any work of fortification whatever it was useless. At no point was the ascent rough enough or steep enough to cause the enemy any serious difficulty: on all sides there was no more than a gentle slope. None the less, to make something at any rate resembling a rampart, and heaping on top of them, where there were not enough, any sort of baggage and gear they could get hold of.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 36) But once they (Carthaginians) had set to work with poles to demolish this erection they cleared a way for the soldiers; and the same being done at

various points in the ring, the whole position was soon in the enemy's hands. Then the blood began to flow, for the Romans were few and already shaken, their enemies many and with victory in their grasp. None the less a considerable portion of the Roman force succeeded in escaping into the neighbouring woods, whence they made their way to Publius Scipio's camp, now commanded by his lieutenant Fonteius.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 36) It was in the eight year after his coming into Spain that Gnaeus Scipio was killed, and twenty-nine days after the death of his brother Publius.

We need to look at this figure of 29 days carefully, because it gives us some clues to what may have really occurred. If Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had taken two days to recover from his victory and then began the march to Hasdrubal Barca, which would of taken from 6 to 7 days. Once there Gnaeus Scipio may have taken a few days to discover the joining of the Carthaginians. It took one day to destroy Gnaeus Scipio, so where we have a total of 11 to 12 days. What was he doing for 17 days. Unless Livy got the days wrong the course of events must of been wrong. Livy often gets days wrong, but not be a factor of over 100%.

What may have happened was that Publius Scipio actually was defeated before the Celtiberi deserted. It may have been news of this event which caused the Celtiberi to desert. In addition to this Publius did leave his camp under the control of Tiberius Fonteius, and survivors of the disaster may have got back to this camp. The Carthaginians may have spent some time trying to besiege it. When Hasdrubal son of Gisgo heard about the Celtiberi deserting he probably immediately marched north to strike a strategic victory. Under strong opposition Gnaeus Scipio probably only moved 60 to 70 kilometres in the 6 to 7 days it would of taken Hasdrubal son of Gisgo to arrive. We think the battle that destroyed Gnaeus occurred around Iorci, which was possibly East of Gnaeus original position at Amtorgis. Gnaeus was probably marching for the coast, where it would of been easier to march up the coast and get naval support.

This is probably what really happened and it certainly lets the Celtiberi off the hook, the Romans had actually lost the entire campaign before any desertion occurs. This actually fits in with reality as in the Carthaginian army large scale desertions only occurs after a battle had been lost, after all why bother desert before a battle which may win you great glory and gain. On the other hand why both to get involved in a battle, whose sole aim is the survive. A treaty with the Carthaginians would do the same thing, and it would involve no loss. In short the Romans stuffed it up and for once the Carthaginians managed to follow up their victory.

After this massive defeat there were two main Roman armies in the field. Down south Fonteius had a small garrison, which had grown with the survivors of Gnaeus and Publius army. Up North a Lucius Marcius Septimus assembled all the garrison forces he could and created an ad hoc army. I am sure he would of had some Spanish support.

Now Livy does not tell us how Tiberius Fonteius managed to march over 500 kilometres to the final position north of the Ebro River, in the face of Carthaginian opposition. Fonteius must of managed to slip past the Carthaginians while they were occupied destroying Gnaeus Scipio. Livy does tell us that survivors of Gnaeus Scipio army did join up with Tiberius Fonteius, so Fonteius must of been close by. Tiberius Fonteius probably stayed on rough ground as much as possible and made a dash to Saguntum.

The Romans would of had a garrison at Saguntum and Lucius Marcius Septimus may have sent some forces down to Saguntum. Initially hoping to keep it. The Carthaginians made a strategic error not marching the Saguntum as fast as possible and thus cutting off Tiberius Fonteius, but possibly they though the war was already over and would of slowly march up the coast with their huge army. We know the Romans assembled an army of 9,000 men, from survivors and garrison troops. Even if we add that many Spanish allies, which is unlikely, the Romans were heavily outnumbered by the Carthaginian force of 52,000 men. As a result they abandoned Saguntum without a fight and retreated to North of the Ebro River.

Tarraco (September)

Livy then claims that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo crossed the Ebro and marched upon the Roman camp. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo would of had an army of about 28,000 men, mainly light infantry and cavalry. If the Romans were 9,000 men strong, they may have had half that number in Spanish allies giving them an army of 12,000 men. The Carthaginians attacked the Roman camp and it seemed the Romans forced the Carthaginians back. According to Livy with a counter-attack. This could of been very true, as it this type of fighting the Romans excel in.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 37) When, however, news came that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had crossed the Ebro and was already close at hand to wipe out what remained of the Roman power of resistance.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 37) every man ran for his weapons, and all, fired with a sort of madness, rushed to the camp gates and hurled themselves upon the enemy. The Carthaginians were coming up in disorder with no precautions against surprise, and the unexpected assault was a severe shock to them. They could not understand where so large an enemy force had suddenly sprung from, since the Roman army had been almost annihilated, or how beaten men could have such audacity and self confidence. Bewildered, almost stunned, by all these surprises, they first gave ground, then, under the weight of the Roman attack, broke and fled.

Livy claims there were two Carthaginian camps. The two camps were divided by a distance of 10 kilometres, and the camp of Mago Barca was closer, while Hasdrubal Gisgo's camp was further away. Now Mago Barca commanded the Spanish Mercenaries and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo the non-Spanish forces. We do not hear of Hasdrubal Barca, so perhaps his force was elsewhere. Perhaps the Romans were holding out in Saguntum and his force was involved in the siege and assault.

Now Lucius Marcius Septimus decided on a risky night attack against the Carthaginian camps, placing his cavalry and a cohort of infantry between the two camps he attacked Mago Barca's camp first. Livy indicates the Carthaginian were very lax in their security, believing the Romans to be already defeated and thus there was no need for security. Another reason could be Mago's camp was Spanish and thus they may not of been professional soldiers, regardless the Romans struck hard and caused great panic, killing most of the troops in the camp. Any troops which escaped and made for the second camp were rounded up by the Roman cavalry and the cohort between the camps, thus ensuring the second camp did not get any warning. There may have been 12,000 men in this camp, so the Romans with 12,000 men could of reasonably succeeded. After all Scipio did a similar tactic in Africa to great effect. Lucius Marcius Septimus then led his men against the second camp, which was even more ill prepared and had even more lax security because it was further away from the Romans. The Carthaginians broke and ran.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 39) Beyond the nearest enemy camp, at a distance of six miles, lay other Carthaginian forces. Between them was a deep and thickly wooded valley. In about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort, supported by cavalry, was concealed - a Punic stratagem. The way between the enemy camps being thus blocked, the rest of the troops marched silently on towards their nearest objective. These were no outposts before the camp gates, no sentries on the ramparts; the Romans walked in, with no opposition whatever, as if the camp were their own. Then the trumpets blared, and battle-cry rang out: men's throats were cut as they lay half asleep, the dry thatch on the huts was set ablaze, and the gates were seized to prevent escape. The enemy were stunned: what with the fire, the noise, and the blood they could hear no orders, do nothing for their own defence. Unarmed they were caught in a ring of swords. Some made a dash for the gates: others, finding the ways blocked, leapt over the rampart. All who managed to get out made straight for the other camp and were surrounded and killed to a man by the cohort and mounted men who sprang from their place of concealment. Even if any had escaped, so swiftly did the Romans move from the nearer camp to the other that no one could have brought the news of its capture before their arrival. There, in the second camp, they found even greater neglect and lack of discipline, partly because it was farther from the enemy's position, partly because a number of men had gone off before dawn to collect wood and fodder, and anything else they might find worth taking. At the neglected outposts weapons were piled; unarmed men were sitting about or lying on the ground, or strolling in front of the rampart and gates; and this was the enemy, men without a thought or care in the world, whom the Romans, hot from their recent exploit and elated by victory, first attacked. Inevitably there was no stopping them at the gates; but inside a savage struggle began, when throughout the camp the noise and confusion brought a general and immediate rush to arms. The fight might have been a long one, if the sight of the blood on the Roman shields had not told the Carthaginians of their other disaster. Then their nerve was broken - they were beaten men, seeking only escape. All who were not caught and killed poured out wherever they could find a way, and the camp was lost.

(Livy, Book XXV, Para 39) Thus in a night and a day two enemy camps were taken, under the leadership of Lucius Marcius. Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius from Greek into Latin, records that the Carthaginian losses amounted to 37,000 killed, 1,830 captured, together with a mass of valuable material. Amongst it was a silver shield weighting 137 pounds and bearing a portrait of Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar. According a Valerius Antias, one camp, Mago's, was taken, and 7,000 of the enemy killed; there was then a second battle with Hasdrubal in which 10,000 were killed and 4,330 taken prisoner. Piso writes that 5,000 were ambushed and killed when Mago was conducting a disorderly pursuit of our troops as they withdrew.

Now Livy tells us the Carthaginians lost 37,000 men and 1,830 captured. I tend to believe the captured figure, but the killed figure is simply fantasy. The number may have been closer to 3,700 men. Livy does also tell another version of this story, written by Valerius Antias. Valerius claims Mago Barca's camp was taken, as indicated, but Hasdrubal son of Gisgo's camp was not attacked at all. He claims that Mago lost 7,000 men in his camp, which seems very reasonable. He then goes on to tell of a battle occurring between the Romans and Hasdrubal Gisgo, possibly when the Romans attacked Hasdrubals camp. The result seems to be a draw, but he then goes on to give us a Carthaginian casualty figure of 10,000 men. Finally another writer, Piso indicates Mago assembled a pursuit of the Romans as they marched back to their camp. During this pursuit he was ambushed and lost 5,000 men.

We can't really say much about this so called battle. The initial Carthaginian assault against the Roman camp seems reasonable. Losses would of been light. It seems very reasonable that the Romans tried a night attack and an ambush strategy, after all they were desperate men with little to lose. I am sure the Carthaginians would of only had Mago Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo facing the Romans, if Hasdrubal Barca was there also the Romans would of not stand a chance. It seems reasonable that the Carthaginians divided their army into two, once being mercenary Spanish and the other non-Spanish troops. It seems more than reasonable that a night attack against the Spanish camp would of been successful, but a second attack against the Carthaginian camp stretched my imagination too much. Possibly all the Spanish mercenaries deserted, leaving Hasdrubal son of Gisgo with his non-Spanish army of 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. There may have been a battle between this and the Roman army of 12,000 men, which may have resulted in a Carthaginian defeat., however we know that the Romans withdrew from the battle not the other way around Its also very possible winter was approaching and the Carthaginians decided to call it a day, they had tried to roll up all of Spain but had suffered some type of reverse. They would now need time to consolidate what they had gained before they could try again.

Time Line (212 BC)

Lets try and time line the events of this year. The Romans probably assembled their combined army by early May at Saguntum. A slow march down the coast and towards their ultimate objective may have taken a month taking us to the beginning of June. Now Publius dies and Gnaeus dies a month later, which takes us to the beginning of July.

It would of taken the Romans a month to withdraw to the Ebro, taking us to the beginning of August. Now we know the Carthaginian took their time advancing to Saguntum and they probably tried to assault the town before laying siege with Hasdrubal Barca's army and following the Romans with the other two armies, so they may have reached the Ebro by the beginning of September.

The Carthaginians crossed the Ebro and marched to the Roman position, after an initial assault both armies dig in, so to speak. Both forces skirmish for a few days before the Romans try their night attack and then fight a battle the following day, which results in a stalemate.

The Carthaginians probably cross the Ebro again and make winter camp. By now it could be the beginning of October. Down at Saguntum the siege continues and Saguntum falls, but not in time to free Hasdrubal Barca's army for an offensive against the Romans. The campaign ends with both sides facing each other over the Ebro.

Chronology - 212 BC

May	Beg	Romans assembled their combined armies at Saguntum, meeting up with the Celtiberi force. The combined army marches South.
June	Beg	The Romans split their army into two, one left facing Hasdrubal Barca at the Tader River and the other, under Publius Scipio, advancing on. Publius Scipio defeated and killed by Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca force march to meet up with Hasdrubal Barca. Celtiberi with Gnaeus desert due to the news of Publius defeat.
July	Beg	Gnaeus Scipio defeated and killed.
September	Beg	Carthaginians reach the Ebro
September	Mid	Carthaginians and Romans skirmish. Carthaginians withdraw south of the Ebro into their winter camp.

Balance of Forces - 212 BC

Romans

Lucius Marcus Septimus

(57 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes and 2 Massilian triremes.

Gnaeus Scipio

(27,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry) 8,000 Italian/Roman infantry, 500 Italian/Roman cavalry, 19,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Publius Scipio

Tiberius Fonteius

(19,000 infantry, 3,500 cavalry) 16,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 1,500 Roman/Italian cavalry, 3,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown

(35 vessels) 35 quinqueremes. 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes were in dry dock in Nova Carthago.

Hasdrubal Barca

(20,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry) 10,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 2,000 Carthaginian militia, 8,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Mago Barca

(4,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry) 4,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo

Masinissa

(18,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry) 12,000 African infantry, 1,000 African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 2,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians fail to follow up - 211 BC

After the disaster the previous year Rome sent a small army of 6,000 Roman foot, 300 Roman cavalry, 6,000 allied foot, and 800 allied cavalry under Claudius Nero to Spain to hold the Ebro line.

The Campaign (211 BC)

This is a year of little activity, at least according to Livy. Lets look at both armies first, starting with the Romans. We know the Romans had 9,000 men left after the double disaster of the previous year. These would of been only the Roman and Italian portion. In addition Rome sent Gaius Nero to Spain with a force of 6,000 Roman infantry and 300 Roman cavalry. In addition he also had 6,000 Italian infantry and 800 Italian cavalry. These were veteran troops as they had been involved in fighting Hannibal previous. He sailed from Puteoli and arrived in Tarraco, probably no earlier than early May. He must of brought with him some naval forces as Livy indicates Nero armed his ships crews to bolster his army and with this combined force he marched down South to join up with Tiberius Fonteius and Lucius Marcius Septimus. We don't really know how many ships crew he had, but a few thousand seem reasonable. Finally the Romans probably had at least 3,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish Cavalry. Thus he probably had a force of about 26,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 17) After settling all business that concerned Capua, the Roman Senate passed a decree assigning to Gaius Nero a force of 6,000 foot and 300 horse, to be chosen by himself from the two legions he had at Capua, and an equal number of infantry together with 800 cavalry from the allies of the Latin Confederacy. Nero embarked these troops at Puteoli for Spain. Arrived at Tarraco he landed his men, beached the ships and, having armed the crews as well to increase his numbers, started for the Ebro, where he took over the army from Fonteius and Marcius. He then proceeded against the enemy.

Now lets look at the Carthaginians, Livy speaks of Hasdrubal Barca, but makes no mention of Hasdrubal son of Gisco or Mago Barca. There were about 22,000 non-Spanish infantry and 5,000 non-Spanish cavalry. Carthage probably did not raise any expensive mercenaries this year, so they probably had a standard Spanish ally force of about 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. This gives us a combined force of about 34,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, which heavily outnumbered the Romans. It also stands to reason that the army was divided in two, one under Hasdrubal Barca and the other under Hasdrubal son of Gisco. The Carthaginians probably divided their army into two, one to continue the offensive against the Romans and the other to consolidate their new territory.

Livy indicates that Hasdrubal Barca was camped at a place called Black Stones, a place in the country of the Ausetani between the Ilturgi and Mentissa. This puts him close to Cissis, above Tarraco. This probably indicates that Hasdrubal had crossed the Ebro and was campaigning aggressively against the Romans. This could explain Gaius Nero's haste and the fact he armed his ships crew and included them in his army.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 17) Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, was camped at the Black Stones, a place in the country of the Ausetani between Ilturgi and Mentissa.

One note about this, if the Romans still had their 60 Quinqueremes, then the crew of these vessels number about 16,000 men. It would be hard to believe that all these were used, I have assumed about 2,000 men, but it is very possible the Romans army was larger than I have indicated. The problem with this is that these men would of been unarmed and not use to open combat. My theory is then Gaius Nero only armed as many of these men as was required to provide his core army with skirmishers, about the 2,000 number.

Nero Arrives (May-June)

By the end of May, or early June Nero had arrived at Tarraco and began operations against Hasdrubal Barca. Here Livy tells an interesting story of Nero trapping Hasdrubal in a valley and after promising to leave Spain completely Hasdrubal was allowed to leave. Of course Hasdrubal did not keep his word, as we would expect of anyone who had any brains. This story must be incorrectly as well as being silly. Nero, being a veteran of the Italian campaign against Hannibal, would of stuck to high defendable terrain and harassed the Carthaginian as much as possible. Possibly he trapped Hasdrubal at some point in time, but Hasdrubal probably got out by his own steam rather than by promising to leave Spain.

The army of Hasdrubal Barca and Gaius Nero probably skirmished with each other from June till possibly October, a massive five months of activity. We must guess nothing significant occurred, although if Gaius Nero used the defensive tactic of Flaminius, Hasdrubal must of got very frustrated indeed. We know he wintered close of Saguntum, so he must of made little headway in North Spain and withdrew to Saguntum during October.

Here we come to another interesting account from Livy. According to Livy Scipio, the son of Publius, was appointed commander of the forces in Spain. Scipio assembled a force of 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 30 quinqueremes. As his second in command Marcus Junius Silanus was appointed. Scipio sailed from Ostia to Emporiae. Here he disembarked his troops and then marched his army down to Tarraco, with the fleet following. He must of had some support from Massilia, as he sent back four Massilian triremes who had acted as escorts, or scouts. From Tarraco he reviewed his allies and visited the winter quarters of his army. Once there he appointed Marcus Junius Silanus in command, relieving Gaius Nero, and took Lucius Marcius Septimus with him as his personal assistant. He then marched his new troops into winter quarters.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 19) To the old army in Spain and the forces which sailed with Nero from Puteoli were added 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse, and the pro-praetor Marcus Junius Silanus was appointed as an assistant in the conduct of operations. So with a fleet of thirty ships, all quinqueremes, Scipio sailed from Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber along the Etruscan coast, past the Alps, and across the Gallic gulf, and thence round the promontory of the Pyrenees, finally disembarking his troops at Emporiae, a Greek settlement originally founded by men from Phocaea. ... There he had the ships beached after sending back four triremes from Massilia which had escorted him from their home-port to show their respect.

Now if this is true, Gaius Nero was possibly sent out at the beginning of the year as emergency reinforcements. While this occurred Rome prepared the real relief force under Scipio, and he must of arrived in Northern Spain in November. He obviously marched his troops during winter, as the rest of the army was in winter quarters. Some sources we have indicate Scipio arrived in Spain at the beginning of 210BC, however Livy does seem to make it clear the event occurred at the end of 211BC, and it is Livy we will follow.

Now Livy tells us where the three Carthaginians armies made winter quarters. His words are as follows;

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 20) They, the Carthaginians, had retired to their respective quarters for the winter, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo to Gades on the Atlantic, Mago into the interior beyond the forest of Castulo. Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, wintered nearest to the Ebro, in the neighbourhood of Saguntum.

The fact Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was all the way at Gades and Mago Barca close to Castulo may indicate the Carthaginians may have been otherwise occupied. I have a theory that Publius Scipio advanced as far south as he did to meet up with Spanish forces in revolt against Carthage, possible Spanish tribes deep in Spain who had not been subjugated by Carthage. If this was so they may have become active again this year, keeping both Mago and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo occupied. On the other hand Mago may of been where he was because he was the master at recruiting mercenaries. This may have been a good spot to raise mercenaries.

Chronology - 211 BC

May	Beg	Nero arrives in Emporiae with his army.
June	Beg	Nero marches South to engage with the Carthaginians
November	Beg	Scipio arrives in Spain.

Balance of Forces - 211 BC

Romans

Unknown	(55 vessels)	55 Roman quinqueremes.
Gaius Nero	(14,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry)	6,000 Roman infantry, 300 Roman cavalry, 6,000 Italian infantry, 800 Italian cavalry. (Nero took some of his ships crews and used them in his army, possibly 2,000 infantry worth).
Lucius Marcius Septimus		
Tiberius Fonteius	(12,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry)	8,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 1,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 3,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown	(35 vessels)	35 quinqueremes. 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes were in dry dock in Nova Carthago.
Hasdrubal Barca	(17,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry)	11,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,500 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry and 1,500 Spanish cavalry.
Mago Barca	(4,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)	4,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.
Hasdrubal son of Gisco		
Masinissa	(17,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry)	11,000 Veteran/African infantry, 1,500 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 1,500 Spanish cavalry.

Scipio prepares his army - 210 BC

Rome sent further forces of 10,000 foot, 1,000 cavalry and 30 quinqueremes to Spain and placed the entire Spanish army under the control of Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Publius Cornelius Scipio which had been killed in Spain in 212BC. The army totalled about 35,000 men, not including Spanish allies. Scipio used this year to train his army.

The Campaign (210 BC)

Our account by Livy has a strange break here. According to Livy Scipio launched his assault of Nova Carthago in 210BC and then he misses 208BC totally. We know Scipio took Nova Carthago in 209 BC and that by 207BC we again get back into sync. As a result we have no account of what may have occurred this year. Lets look at the armies.

The Roman army, close to Tarraco on the north side of the Ebro River numbered 31,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,100 Roman/Italian cavalry. Part of the navy may have been serving as skirmishers, possibly no more than 2,000 men. Finally Roman probably had about 3,000 Spanish infantry and 1,000 Spanish cavalry. This gives him an army of 39,100 men.

The Carthaginians had three armies in the field. The Carthaginian had 22,000 non-Spanish infantry and 5,000 non-Spanish cavalry. This may have been boosted a bit from recruiting in the Carthaginian cities, lets say an addition 2,000 infantry. Finally the standard Spanish allies numbered half this number again, giving the Carthaginians 36,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry or a total of 44,000 men. These men would of been divided between Hasdrubal Barca, close to Saguntum, and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, at Gades. With Hasdrubal Barca getting the lions share of the forces, lets say three quarters of the army. This gave Hasdrubal Barca a force of 33,000 men and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had a force of 11,000 men. Finally we have Mago Barca, he would of had a fully mercenary force and its size is something we can only guess at. If we knew what Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was doing at Gades we could get a better picture of how many mercenaries would of been required this year. If Hasdrubal Barca wanted to launch another offensive against the Romans Mago may have been required to raise as many men as possible, possibly 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. If he was to remain on the defensive a far lesser total would of been needed.

Lets look at Polybius, according to him in the following year the disposition of the Carthaginian armies were as follows;

(Polybius, Book X, Para 7) Mago, he heard was occupying an area east of the Pillars of Hercules in the country of the tribe known as the Conii; (In southern Portugal) Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, was in Lusitanian near the mouth of the Tagus; (On the Atlantic coast of Portugal) the other Hasdrubal was engaged in besieging a city in the territory of the Carpetani (near Segontia, deep in Spain).

Polybius also goes on to say that all the armies were at least 10 days march from Nova Carthago. In fact is these locations are correct Hasdrubal Barca was about 420 kilometres away, about 13 days away over very bad terrain. Mago Barca was over 500 kilometres away, or 17 days away. As for Hasdrubal son of Gisgo he was over 770 kilometres away and 26 days away.

Finally what were the Carthaginians up to, it seems that according to Polybius they were involved in a major invasion of Spain. The question we must ask is why. Perhaps the tribes on the Atlantic coast were causing the Carthaginians trouble, if so why not defeat them when they come into Carthaginian territory. Possibly the Carthaginians were expanding their empire, but the question is why. Its true the Carthaginians were free to do what they liked, but we know the Hasdrubal Barca invaded the Roman position the previous year and he must of known the Romans were not totally defeated.

My feeling is the Polybius has got it slightly wrong, the mouth of the Tagus is probably the source of the Tagus, which is close to the area Hasdrubal Barca is suppose to have occupied. Mago's position east of the Pillars of Hercules may be true, although we have reason to believe it should read. Finally Hasdrubal Barca was probably closer to the coast than we have been told. If Polybius mentions 10 days specifically, then possibly one army was this close. Hasdrubal Barca's army could be it.

What were the Carthaginian forces doing this year. One clue we have is the following;

(Polybius, Book X, Para 7) So when he (Scipio) learned later that the allies of Rome north of the Ebro were still loyal, and that the Carthaginian generals were quarrelling with one another and treating the Spaniards oppressively,

The key here is the Spanish tribes being treated oppressively, the Carthaginians may have been bringing the Spanish tribes to heel. After all there would be no point attacking the Romans if behind them they had to constantly deal with Spanish revolts.

Based upon his location Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was probably involved in an invasion of the Carpetani, supported by Hasdrubal Barca who was besieging a city owned by this tribe. Mago may have assembled a mercenary army, which may have joined up with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo on his way through. However Mago ends up in a rather odd place, possible he was sent down to deal with a minor revolt, possibly of the Conii. This is about as much as I can guess.

Chronology - 210 BC

May	Beg	Scipio begins to prepare his army.
June	Beg	Carthaginians launch an invasion of the Carpetani. Mago marches down south to deal with a possible revolt of the Conii.

Balance of Forces - 210 BC

Romans

Unknown	(55 vessels) 55 Roman quinqueremes.
Scipio	(36,000 infantry, 3,100 cavalry) 31,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 2,100 Roman/Italian cavalry, 2,000 crewmen acting as skirmishers, 3,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish Cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown	(35 vessels) 35 quinqueremes. 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes were in dry dock in Nova Carthago.
Hasdrubal Barca	(24,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry) 16,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 2,000 Numidian cavalry, 8,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.
Mago Barca	(12,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry) 12,000 Spanish infantry, 3,000 Spanish cavalry.
Hasdrubal son of Gisgo	(12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry) 8,000 Veteran/African infantry, 1,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 4,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.

Scipio takes New Carthage - 209 BC

The Carthaginians had three armies in Spain, all of which were in separate locations. Hasdrubal Barca had an army in central Spain, Hasdrubal Gisgo had an army near the source of the Tagus, and Mago Barca had an army near Carteia. All three armies were over ten days march from New Carthage. Using this faulty deployment to his advantage Scipio sent an army of 25,000 foot and 2,500 cavalry in a lightning campaign towards New Carthage, which was guarded by 3,000 foot under Mago, and took it by storm. He left an army of 3,000 foot and 300 cavalry under the command of Marcus Junius Silanus north of the Ebro. This was a massive disaster for Carthage as this was the main Carthaginian city in Spain.

The Campaign (209 BC)

This year is a strategic significant year in Spain. Lets look at the armies again. First we know that Scipio refitted and prepared his entire navy. This probably numbered about 85 quinqueremes by now, the original 35 quinqueremes which arrived in 218 BC, the 20 quinqueremes which Publius Scipio brought with him in 217 BC, and the 30 quinqueremes Scipio brought with him in 211 BC. In 208 BC we know his fleet numbered 80 quinqueremes, so his fleet this year ranged between 85 and 80 quinqueremes. In addition he had a large transport fleet, we know that Gaius Nero's force of 13,400 men arrived in Spain by sea, as did Scipio's 11,000 men. This gives Scipio a sea lift capacity of at least 24,400 men, as well as what ever men could fit on the warships, possibly 9,000 men.

Now for the army, this was 31,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,100 Roman/Italian cavalry. All the rowers were once again employed as oarsmen. Livy does tell us he left Marcus Junius Silanus at Tarraco with 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, taking with him 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. This gives us a figure of 28,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,800 Roman/Italian Cavalry. This is probably the more accurate figure, as the numbers of Romans and Italians probably fell due to casualties. Gaius Laelius was given command of the fleet and its assumed Scipio commanded the army. Scipio ordered the fleet and army to gather at the mouth of the Ebro River. Livy then indicates Scipio marched with 5,000 allies from Tarraco to the Ebro, indicating he may have had about 5,000 Spanish allies, if not more. These probably stayed with Silanus, while Scipio only took Romans and Italian troops.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 41) In Spain at the beginning of spring Scipio got his ships afloat again; then, having summoned the allied auxiliaries to Tarraco, he ordered the fleet, warships and transports, to the mouth of the Ebro. The legions were ordered to leave their winter quarters and assemble at the same point, and Scipio himself with 5,000 allied troops marched from Tarraco to join them.

Lets look at the Carthaginians. We may first look at the Carthaginian fleet. We know Hasdrubal Barca was left with 10 quinqueremes after the disaster at the Ebro in 217 BC, we know Hasdrubal had a further 15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes in Nova Carthago. In 215 BC Himilco brought with him a fleet, of unknown size. My guess is that it must of been at least 25 quinqueremes strong, which would of brought the Carthaginian fleet up to parity with the Roman fleet at the time. Finally in 214 BC Mago Barca brought with him 60 quinqueremes, giving us a maximum fleet of 110 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes. Yet where was the Carthaginian fleet, when Scipio captured Nova Carthago he found either 8 or 18 ships, possibly the vessels in dry dock since 218 BC. This brings our maximum Carthaginian fleet down to about 95 quinqueremes. Where was this fleet, possibly in Gades. We know Mago uses Gades as a base later in the war, sailing with at least 30 quinqueremes from here in 206 BC. This still leaves us with a missing 70 quinqueremes. Either the Carthaginians had the whole lot based at Gades and they did nothing which is unlikely, or they sent back to Carthage the 60 quinqueremes which escorted Mago Barca, very possible. Due to the lack of Carthaginian naval activity I favour the latter theory. This means the Carthaginians had an active fleet of 35 quinqueremes, probably based in Gades, with 17 vessels in Nova Carthago. These were probably unmanned and in dry dock.

Now lets look at the armies. The Carthaginians had about 24,000 non-Spanish infantry and 5,000 non-Spanish cavalry. They probably had half as much normal Spanish allies and possibly a mercenary army which Mago would of raised the year before. Mago Barca was close to Gades, possibly only with a small force. The two Hasdrubals probably had each half of the army. We can guess that Hasdrubal Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo each had an army of 22,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Mago Barca probably only had 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. In addition to this we know the standard garrison of Nova Carthago was 1,000 men, under the command of Mago. In addition there were about 2,000 citizen militia available.

Nova Carthago (August)

Scipio divided his army into two, he took the fleet, transports and 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. Marcus Junius Silanus commanded the rest. This would of been the 3,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 300 Roman/Italian cavalry as well as most of the allies, possibly the 5,000 indicated earlier. This puts his force at 8,300 men, far to small to stand up against a Carthaginian army.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 42) After these heartening words Scipio left Silanus on guard with 3,000 foot and 300 horse and crossed the Ebro with the rest of the army, 25,000 infantry and 2,500 mounted troops.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 6) When he had made this speech, he (Scipio) left his colleague Marcus Silanus with a detachment of 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to guard the ford and protect the allies to the north of the river,

Scipio now goes straight for Nova Carthago, both Livy and Polybius claims he marched his army down in 7 days. As the distance is about 480 kilometres Scipio would of needed 16 days. Even if he forced marched his troops as hard as they could go, he could not of gotten there in 7 days. The only way he could of done this is if he transported his entire army by sea and sailed down. He had the transports and it seemed like he had the naval supremacy. This would also explain why Hasdrubal Barca did not intercept him. By sea he could of gotten to Nova Carthago in 8 days, and with a bit of luck the 7 required days. Once at Nova Carthago he assaulted the city and took it in one day.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 9) he (Scipio) next issued secret orders to Laelius, who commanded the fleet, and who was, as I have explained, the only man who knew the details of the plan, to sail to New Carthage while Scipio himself advanced with his army by forced marches. He had with him about 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. He arrived at New Carthage on the seventh day of his march.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 12) Mago, the Carthaginian commandant, divided his garrison of 1,000 men into two groups, one being posted in the citadel and the other on the eastern hill. As for the rest of the inhabitants, he armed 2,000 of the most able-bodied with such weapons as he could find in the city, and posted them near the gate which faced the isthmus.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 47) Of the free males about 10,000 were captured: all of these who were citizens of New Carthage Scipio released and allowed to keep possession of the town and of such of their property as the fighting had left them. The artisans numbered about 2,000: these he made by decree state-slaves of the Roman people, with the hope of freedom in the near future if they worked hard to provide necessary war material. Male non-citizens and able-bodied slaves he sent to the fleet (which was increased by eight captured ships, fifteen according to Polybius) as supplementary oarsmen.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 47) The amount of captured war material was very great: 120 catapults of the largest sort, 281 smaller ones: twenty-three large, fifty-two smaller ballistae; countless 'scorpions' large and small, and a great quantity of equipment and missiles, and, finally, seventy-four military standards. In addition, much gold and silver was brought to Scipio; it included 276 gold platters, nearly all of them a pound in weight; 18,300 pounds of silver, either coined or in ingots; and a great many silver vessels. All this was handed over, weighted and counted, to the quaestor Flaminius. There were 400,000 measures of wheat and 270,000 of barley; sixty-three merchant vessels were attacked and taken in the harbour, some of them with their cargoes of grain and arms, besides bronze, iron, sail-cloth, esparto for rope making, and timber for shipbuilding.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 50) After holding a levy of his dependents he returned a few days later with a brigade of picked cavalry 1,400 strong. (Allucius, a Spanish hostage captured at Nova Carthago, was sent home by Scipio and he returned a few days later with this force)

We need to ask ourselves exactly when did this occur. The fact that Hasdrubal Barca was besieging a town indicates that by the time Scipio launched his assault it was well into the campaign year. My guess is that Scipio launched his attack about mid year, lets say the beginning of August. Any earlier and the Carthaginians would of been able to get some armies down to Nova Carthago in an attempt to recapture it before the end of the year. Also the position of all the Carthaginian armies indicate they were busy campaigning when Scipio did his deed. After a period of time not specified Scipio returned to Tarraco, leaving we assume a strong garrison in Nova Carthago.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 51) With all this for a beginning, the damaged sections of the wall were then rebuilt, a garrison was posted to guard the town (Nova Carthago), and Scipio set out for Tarraco.

What were the Carthaginian doing this year and how did Scipio get the chance to take Nova Carthago. At the beginning of the year Hasdrubal Barca was probably close to Saguntum, keeping an eye on the Romans. As Hasdrubal son of Gisgo ended up deep in the territory of the Carpetani when Scipio struck, he probably started from around Castulo and marched North. Mago Barca was probably close by with his mercenary force, possibly towards Gades.

Livy does hint that the Spanish tribes were beginning to negotiate with the Romans and my guess is that the Romans struck up a good relationship with the Carpetani. If so this tribe may have raised an army at the beginning of this year and invaded Carthaginian territory. Another possibility is that the Carthaginians may have continued an invasion of this tribe they started the year before, which is probably the higher probability. Seeing no activity from the Romans Hasdrubal son of Gisgo saw no reason not to invade the Carpetani. Mago Barca ends up close to Gades, so possible there was a revolt in this area. Possibly the Conii mentioned by Polybius had revolted and Mago had to go down with a small army to teach it a lesson. Finally Hasdrubal Barca decided to support Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and moved deep into Spain to besiege some minor Carpetani town, or perhaps he was campaigning north of Saguntum against some town which had gone over to the Romans.

By the time the fall of Nova Carthago had occurred it was too late to do anything about it. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was probably too far away and too involved with his campaign. Mago Barca probably moved along the coast to secure the coastal strip south of Nova Carthago, possibly to Abdera. Hasdrubal Barca would of moved back to Saguntum, secured it and moved towards Nova Carthago. However it was probably too late to besiege the city so no serious attempt was made to do so. In fact this must of been the case as Scipio went home to Tarraco after taking Nova Carthago, possibly he was moving into winter quarters.

(Livy, Book XXVI, Para 51) But when he learned that three generals, with three victorious hostile armies were on the way, then, they declared, he would soon enough remember the deaths which had already occurred in his family.

Chronology - 209 BC

May	Beg	Scipio begins to prepare his army.
June	Beg	Carthaginians launch an invasion of the Carpetani.
August	Beg	Scipio launches a lightning attack against Nova Carthago while the two main Carthaginian armies are occupied, taking Nova Carthago.
October	Beg	Scipio goes back to Tarraco after securing Nova Carthago.

Balance of Forces - 209 BC

Romans

Gaius Laelius	(85 vessels)	85 Roman quinqueremes.
Scipio		
Lucius Marcus Septimus	(25,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry)	25,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 2,500 Roman/Italian cavalry.
Marcus Junius Silanus	(8,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry)	3,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 300 Roman/Italian cavalry, 5,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish Cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown	(35 vessels)	35 quinqueremes.
Mago	(3,000 infantry)	1,000 infantry, 2,000 militia. (15 quinqueremes and 2 quadriremes were in dry dock in Nova Carthago.)
Hasdrubal Barca	(18,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry)	12,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 2,000 Numidian cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry.
Mago Barca	(4,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)	4,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.
Hasdrubal son of Gisgo		
Masinissa	(18,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry)	12,000 Veteran/African infantry, 1,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.

Hasdrubal breakthroughs to Italy - 208 BC

After taking New Carthage Scipio launched an attack into Baetica, where he was met by Hasdrubal Barca. Both armies fought a battle at Baecula where Scipio defeated Hasdrubal Barca. Hasdrubal managed to extract the bulk of his army from the battle and sneaked past Scipio towards the North. Hasdrubal was to continue his march towards Italy in an attempt to join his Brother Hannibal. Scipio sent a fleet of 50 quinqueremes to Sardinia leaving him with a fleet of 30 quinqueremes in Hispania.

The Campaign (208 BC)

Lets now look at the strength of both armies. Scipio had about 28,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 2,800 Roman/Italian cavalry. He disbanded his fleet and incorporated the crew into his army. This is a figure of 24,000 men, which is simply too much. What is more likely Scipio striped the crews down to a minimum and used the troops as garrisons and light troops in his army. Polybius does say he picked out the best crews and distributed them among the maniples. Lets say a maximum of 4,000 men, giving him about 32,000 infantry. He gained a great deal of Spanish support and would of had about half again the strength of his army in Spanish allies giving him an army of about 48,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry. We know he had at least 80 quinqueremes in some state of availability.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 35) Scipio's affairs were now developing as favourably as he could wish, and so after the Spanish envoys had left he disbanded his naval force, seeing that there was nothing to challenge his command of the sea. He picked out the best of the crews, distributed them among the maniples, and in this way increased the strength of his land force.

We know from previous years the Carthaginians had about 24,000 non-Spanish infantry and 5,000 non-Spanish cavalry. The Carthaginians were beginning to lose Spanish support, but probably still had a core of Spanish allies. A Spanish force of half this number seems very reasonable, or an army of 36,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry. Mago Barca was still running around raising mercenaries, so he may have a reasonable sized mercenary army. Hasdrubal Barca seemed to have the main army, so by the time he retreated to Baetis River he probably had under his command the bulk of the field army. We are fairly sure he was outnumbered by Scipio and that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo must of had some force. Mago was probably occupied raising new troops and securing the Carthaginian positions in Spain. Most historians feel Hasdrubal had about 25,000 men at Baecula, or about 21,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. This leaves Hasdrubal son of Gisgo with about 18,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry and Mago with 8,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, of which he probably left with Hasdrubal Barca early in the year. It was possibly these forces which deserted to Scipio before the battle of Baecula.

The Fate of Saguntum

Before we go any further we need to determine what happened to Saguntum. With Nova Carthago captured Saguntum loses much of its strategic position, on the other hand its possession in Carthaginian hands would of divided the Roman position in two. Any reasonable commander would of seen this and made sure a sizeable Carthaginian army remained in the area. However we know from this year activities this did not occur. We can look at two events Livy mentions, he indicates after the fall of Nova Carthago Scipio goes back to Tarraco. We also know that Scipio demobilised his fleet during the winter, according to Polybius. In this account the reason given was that there was no one to challenge his control of the sea.

There are two possible answers, the Carthaginian abandoned Saguntum the previous year, or Scipio went back to Saguntum to lead a force against Saguntum. Such a victory would of been mentioned by Livy, so we can assume Hasdrubal Barca simply abandoned Saguntum during the previous year. Once Saguntum was Roman controlled Scipio would of needed no naval power, as he now had a line of communication between Nova Carthago and Tarraco open. We also know that Carthage had little, if any fleet available for action. One theory is that the crew had long since been incorporated into the army.

There is another option, we know that Scipio had assembled the bulk of his army at Tarraco and he marched for Hasdrubals position from this town. Livy does not talk about any division of the army, so perhaps Hasdrubal still controlled Saguntum, at this time. Scipio's army would of heavily outnumbered Hasdrubal, so Hasdrubal probably withdrew in front of massive forces, abandoning Saguntum. What ever may have occurred we next hear of Hasdrubal at Baecula. Even here Hasdrubal was outnumbered by Scipio, possibly it was finally here that Hasdrubal decided to end his retreat and stand. This is the theory I favour.

Scipio Gains allies

During the winter after the fall of Nova Carthago Scipio received many offers of help and changes of allegiance from the Spanish. However in the description of these changes of side in both Polybius and Livy we learn some interesting facts. It seemed that the prince of the Edetani, Edeco had hostages in Nova Carthago. This would indicate that he was an ally of Carthage, even though the Edetani are North of the Ebro River and not too far away from Tarraco. This could of been one reason why Scipio returned to Tarraco after the taking of Nova Carthage.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 34) In this undertaking he (Scipio) gained by chance the help of Edeco, the chief of the Edetani.

We also have some examples of actual Spanish forces deserting the Carthaginians. Two powerful Spanish chiefs, Andobales and Mandonius deserted Hasdrubal Barca with their forces. Note: Andobales as written by Polybius, in Livy's history he is called Indibilis.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 35) They (Andobales and Mandonius) decided the present moment provided a good opportunity and so they collected all their forces, left the Carthaginian camp by night, and withdrew to some high ground which offered a strong enough position to ensure their safety.

Scipio Forces Hasdrubal Back (March - August)

Scipio had assembled his army at Tarraco and began his march south. Livy claims he began his march at the beginning of Spring, or possibly March. We also know that Gaius Laelius had just arrived from visiting Rome and we are fairly sure this occurred in March 208 BC. My guess is the end of March or beginning of April. Livy does indicate Scipio did not want to leave until Gaius Laelius arrived back, so he may have delayed until early April.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 17) With these forces Scipio left Tarraco at the beginning of spring and made for Hasdrubals position. Laelius had already returned to Rome, and he did not wish to undertake any major action without him.

He must of left some force behind him and a similar army to last years seems reasonable, possibly 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry under Marcus Junius Silanus at Tarraco. On his march south he was met up with the armies of Indibilis and Mandonius. These probably joined him as he approached Orongis.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 17) It was in the course of this march that he was met by Indibilis and Mandonius together with their forces.

Now we know from Polybius that Indibilis (Andobales in Polybius history) and Mandonius has earlier deserted from Hasdrubal Barca and positioned themselves in a strong position. Obviously Hasdrubal Barca had left them and when the Romans arrived this force joined Scipio. This seems to indicate Hasdrubal was withdrawing from the Romans and on the way the desertion occurred. Hasdrubal Barca probably withdrew from Saguntum to his final position at Baecula.

We need to look at what might have occurring from the time Scipio began his attack to the Battle of Baecula. When Scipio marched out from Tarraco he probably had an army of 26,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 2,500 Roman/Italian cavalry and probably 10,000 Spanish infantry and 1,500 Spanish cavalry giving him an army of about 40,000 men. He probably had 2,000 Roman/Italian infantry in Nova Carthago and left a small army behind him, probably 4,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 300 Roman/Italian cavalry and slightly more than half as many Spanish allies. Facing him was Hasdrubal Barca at Saguntum with probably 12,000 African infantry, 2,000 Balearic infantry, 2,000 African cavalry, 2,000 Numidian cavalry and half as many Spanish infantry. A total force of 21,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Now this is the force he had at Baecula. We know that he lost some Spanish troops to desertion, 8,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under the command of Indibilis and Mandonius. This meant he had about 35,000 men to face Scipio's 40,000 men. He was outnumbered, but not terribly so.

What about the other two Carthaginian commanders. Mago Barca probably deposited all his Spanish mercenaries with his brother and spent the bulk of the early part of the year raising mercenaries. So he was out of the equation. As for Hasdrubal son of Gisgo we can only guess. He may have been involved in securing the Carthaginian controlled Spain, or he may have been facing Nova Carthago thinking of ways to get in. I am sure Carthage suffered lots of revolts this year, as all their hostages were gone. This was what Hasdrubal son of Gisgo did in the early part of the year. He knew Hasdrubal Barca was outnumbered but not so bad as to be forced in helping him out.

As Scipio advanced Hasdrubal Barca would of performed a skilful withdraw, possibly trying to pick up extra allies but more interested in pinning down Scipio. He would of abandoned Saguntum and slowly retreated towards Orongis, which would of been a logical point to stand fast. This town controls the main route into the Baetis valley, however disaster struck. Indibilis and Mandonius revolted and left camp with a sizeable portion of Hasdrubal strength, 8,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. In one night his army went from 35,000 to 25,000 men and Scipio's force was now 50,000 men strong. Scipio probably now outnumbered Hasdrubal two to one. Hasdrubal was in trouble and he would of immediately continued his withdraw to Baecula. He could of had a good defensive position in mind and this location could of been close enough to Hasdrubal son of Gisgo's position to expect reinforcements. Scipio bypassed Orongis entering the heart of Carthaginian control, the Baetis valley, where he marched to Baecula, where Hasdrubal was camped.

An interesting point about Indibilis and Mandonius. Livy indicates later in his history they were brothers. In 212 BC Indibilis was commanding a Suessetani army of about 7,500 men. In 206 BC he was commanding a allied army of Northern Spanish tribes. If this was the same man, which seems very reasonable, his forces came from the North of the Ebro River. We know after Nova Carthago fell at least one tribe from the North of the Ebro joined Scipio because the Carthaginians no longer had hostages. This may be another example of this, although the desertion occurred later. If this is so this Spanish force may have deserted Hasdrubal Barca considerably earlier than I suggest, possible early in the year which Hasdrubal Barca still had an army North of Saguntum. The desertion of the Spanish may have been the reason he abandoned Saguntum and withdrew as far as he did.

Baecula (September)

Now we get a slightly conflicting story from both Livy and Polybius, Polybius indicates that Hasdrubal Barca was camped in the district of Castalon, near the town of Baecula. This was not far from the silver mines. When he learned of Scipio's arrival he moved his camp to a new site, in which his rear was shielded by a river and his front by a stretch of level ground. This was wide enough to enable him to deploy his troops and was bounded by a ridge sufficiently steep for effective defence. In short he prepared himself for battle.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 38) The Carthaginian commander was then encamped in the district of Castalon, near the town of Baecula and not far from the silver mines. When he learned of the arrival of the Romans, he moved his camp to a new site in which his rear was shielded by a river and his front by a stretch of level ground: this was wide enough to enable him to deploy his troops and was bounded by a ridge sufficiently steep for effective defence.

Livy, on the other hand, claims that Scipio attacked Hasdrubal Barca at his original camp first, causing some confusion and casualties. Hasdrubal then withdrew his forces to a hill which had a wide area of level ground at its summit. Behind him was a river and on the front and on each side there was a steep ridge. Below him was another stretch of open ground, again surrounded by a ridge. It was here that Hasdrubal deployed his forces.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 18) The nearest of the three Carthaginian armies was Hasdrubals, in a position near Baecula. His camp was guarded by cavalry outposts: these were promptly attacked by the Romans light troops and those at the head of the column - they went for them as they came up, straight from the march, without waiting to choose a site for their camp, and with such contemptuous confidence as to leave no doubt about the respective morale of the two armies. The cavalry pickets were driven helter-skelter back into camp and the Roman standards were all but carried through the gates. Passions were up, but for that day there was no further fighting. The Romans encamped, and during the night Hasdrubal withdrew his forces to a hill which had a wide area of level ground at its summit; behind him was the river, in front and on both sides the whole position was encircled by a sort of steep bank. Below him was another stretch of open ground, on a slight slope, and this too was surrounded by a wall-like rim, no easier to get over. It was into this lower area that Hasdrubal on the following day, when he saw the Roman line in position in front of his camp, sent his Numidian cavalry together with his light-armed Balearic and African troops.

Besides some minor terrain discrepancy the main issue here was why Hasdrubal Barca moved to his new position. This shows an excellent example of how Livy makes every action some sort of great and mighty Roman deed. What almost certainly occurred was that Hasdrubal forwards scouts met up with the Roman forwards position. They were obviously forced back, as they would of had no inclination to fight. The Romans would of never attacked the Carthaginian position without any sort of preparation. Possibly some Roman skirmishers got as far as the camp, which may have caused some tension. The Romans made their camp, as was their custom. Hasdrubal obviously already had in mind a good position from which to offer battle, which he would of occupied the following day. The position was a good defensive position, this is no doubt. However Hasdrubal would of had to be stupid to give the Romans any advantage. Hasdrubal could expect reinforcements, Scipio could not. On the other hand he needed to stop Scipio, the best tactic was to offer battle from a good position. End of story.

Livy now claims Scipio did not want to attack such a good position, but he feared the arrival of the other Carthaginian armies. Again this was probably Hasdrubal Barca strategy and to be honest a fairly good one. As a result after two days he acted and attacked. We have two accounts of the battle, of which I will print Polybius account.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 39) Having prepared his army for battle, he kept the main body within his camp but sent forward the velites and a picked force of infantry with orders to climb the ridge and attack the enemy's covering force. They carried out the order with great gallantry, and at first the Carthaginian commander made no move and waited for the outcome of this action; however, when he saw that his men were being hard pressed and were suffering heavy losses from the fury of the Roman attack, he led out his troops and drew them up along the brow of the hill, relying on the natural strength of the position. Scipio responded by sending forward his light-armed troops, ordering them to reinforce the velites who had begun the attack; then, having the rest of his army for action, he took half of the main body and working his way around the ridge attacked the Carthaginians from the left flank. The other half under the command of Laelius were ordered to proceed in similar fashion and attack from the right. While this manoeuvre was in progress Hasdrubal was still engaged in leading his troops out of the camp. Up to this moment he had waited there, trusting to the natural strength of his position and feeling confident that the enemy would never venture to attack him, and so because the flank assault took him by surprise, he was too late in deploying his troops. The Romans were now attacking the wings of the Carthaginian position where their opponents had not yet occupied the ground, and they not only succeeded in scaling the ridge without loss, but as the enemy were still moving into their positions when they charged, they killed some of them by attacking on the exposed flank, and forced others to turn and flee while they were still attempting to form their line.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 39) When Hasdrubal saw his troops retreating and thrown into confusion, he fell back on his original plan and decided not to fight it out to the death. Instead he gathered together his elephants and his war-chest, and collecting as many as possible of the fugitives, he retreated along the Tagus and made for the pass which led over the Pyrenees and towards the Gallic tribes who inhabited that part of the country.

Livy's account is fairly similar and is possibly based on Polybius's account. Let's try and work out what occurred. Scipio's plan was very simple, but effective. He sent out his light troops in the centre to pin down the enemy. Hasdrubal sent most of his light troops out to hold them back and succeeded mainly because he was defending a good position. Remember Hasdrubal Barca's position had a ridge all around it, with a river to the rear. Scipio now divided his heavy troops into two and sent them against the Carthaginian flanks. He probably waited till all the Carthaginian light troops were occupied to their front, which left the flanks open. Sending his heavy troops up the flanks he hit the Carthaginian line in the flank.

Now Hasdrubal would of only had a light skirmish line around his position when the Romans struck. The bulk of his army was in camp, which was probably positioned in the centre with the rear to the river. When the Romans struck the light troops concentrated in the centre and received some reinforcements. Finally Hasdrubal decided to lead out the bulk of his army and while this was occurring the Romans struck. The Carthaginians were totally broken up and either cut off at the ridge or forced back into the camp. Hasdrubal decided to withdraw at this point, as he got his elephants out the river to the rear would of been fordable, which would of become the escape route. In short Hasdrubal probably retreated the bulk of his army before any serious fighting occurred.

Let's look at casualties. Livy claims Hasdrubal lost 8,000 men killed and 10,000 men captured. Polybius does not tell us the number killed, but does claim 10,000 prisoners. Hasdrubal probably had about 8,000 Spanish troops, all of which would of fled after this defeat. If 2,000 Carthaginians were killed we may get a total casualty figure of 10,000 men, or which 2,000 were cavalry. This may be possible, although I think that even this is high. Assuming this as true Hasdrubal had an army of 15,000 men left, of which 1,000 were cavalry.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 40) The next day he collected the prisoners, who numbered some 10,000 infantry and more than 2,000 cavalry,

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 18) About 8,000 of Hasdrubal's men were killed.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 19) Counting the prisoners, he found them to number 10,000 foot and 2,000 horse.

Scipio then sent a small force to the pass over the Pyrenees, the east pass, and spent a while in Hasdrubal camp. Livy claims soon after this he marched his army back north to Tarraco which may indicate the campaign year was coming to an end. It's also interesting that Scipio remained in that area, rather than continue his offensive. I think that Scipio knew that Hasdrubal Barca's army was still capable of causing a great deal of trouble and if the three Carthaginians combined Scipio would be hard pressed. This may have been the reason of occupying a strong defensive position. As it was the Carthaginians had other plans.

(Polybius, Book X, Para 40) After this he moved his troops into the Carthaginian camp because of its excellent situation. He himself remained there, waiting to see what the other Carthaginian generals would do, but he also dispatched a body of men to the pass leading over the Pyrenees so as to keep watch on Hasdrubal's movements. Finally, as it was by now late in the season, he withdrew with his army of Tarraco to spend the winter in that district.

Hasdrubal Barca had decided to march through the west pass over the Pyrenees. Soon after the battle he was joined by Mago Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 20) A few days after the fight at Baecula, when Scipio on his way back to Tarraco had got clear of the forest of Castulo, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, and Mago marched from Further Spain and joined the other Hasdrubal. The latter having been already defeated, their arrival was too late for practical assistance, though opportune enough for the discussion of future plans.

Mago Barca left his force with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Hasdrubal Barca started recruiting Spanish troops on his way into Gaul in order to strengthen his army. Mago then made his way across to the Balearic Islands and hire some mercenaries. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was to retreat deep into Carthaginian controlled Spain and garrison all the towns. Masinissa was given 3,000 of the best cavalry and he would engage in a guerrilla war against the Roman allies. Thus the strategy for the following year was set.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 20) They proposed (the three Carthaginian generals) therefore that his army (Hasdrubal Barca) weakened by desertions and by the losses incurred in the recent defeat, should be made up with Spanish troops and that Mago should hand over his forces to Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and cross to the Balearics with a supply of money to hire auxiliary troops. Further, that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo should take his army deep into Lusitanian and avoid action against the Romans; that Masinissa should have 3,000 of the best available cavalry for a roving commission through Hither Spain, helping allies and raiding enemy towns and farms.

Time Line (208 BC)

We know Scipio left Tarraco in early April. The distance from Tarraco to Baecula is about 750 kilometres, of which about 80 kilometres is over rough terrain. This would take about a month to cover. Now we also know that Baecula occurred fairly late in the campaign year and that soon after this battle Scipio made a leisurely march back to Tarraco, lets say this took 6 weeks and he got back to Tarraco mid November. This meant Baecula probably occurred about the end of September. Lets be generous and assume he stayed around of one month, in this case the battle occurred at the beginning of September. This means he had five months to get to Baecula, or four months too long. Unless Scipio was unusually slow something must of been occurring. My guess is he left Tarraco and forced Hasdrubal back from Saguntum to Baecula. He would of had the numeric force to do this and Hasdrubal may have had sufficient forces to slow Scipio down.

So we have Scipio leaving in April and after a five month campaign against Hasdrubal finally meeting him in battle at the beginning of September. After the victory he stuck around for 2 weeks and made his way back to Tarraco. Hasdrubal probably also stuck around for two weeks, possibly after he met up with his brother, and prepared his army for the long march. He would of left at a similar time and would of got through the West pass before winter, wintering somewhere in Gaul.

Chronology - 208 BC

April	Beg	Scipio leaves Tarraco with his army and marches South to meet up with Hasdrubal Barca.
May-July		Scipio slowly advances against Hasdrubal, forcing him back to Orongis.
August	Beg	Defection of Indibilis and Mandonius. Hasdrubal marches for a prepared position at Baecula.
September	Beg	The Battle of Baecula, Roman victory. Hasdrubal Barca meets up with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca.
September	Mid	Hasdrubal Barca marches North to the Western passes over the Pyrenes.
October	Beg	Scipio leaves Baecula and marches North.
November	Mid	Scipio arrives back at Tarraco.

Balance of Forces - 208 BC

Romans

Gaius Laelius **(85 vessels)** 85 Roman quinqueremes. 50 quinqueremes are sent to Sardinia later in the year.

Scipio

Lucius Marcus Septimus

(36,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry) 26,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 2,500 Roman/Italian cavalry, 10,000 Spanish infantry, 1,500 Spanish cavalry.

Marcus Junius Silanus **(9,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry)** 4,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 300 Roman/Italian cavalry, 5,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish Cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown

(35 vessels) 35 quinqueremes. (Probably at Gades)

Hasdrubal Barca

Masinissa

(29,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry) 12,000 Veteran/African Infantry, 2,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 2,000 Numidian cavalry, 2,000 Balearic infantry, 15,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry. (8,000 Spanish infantry and 2,000 Spanish cavalry joined the Romans in August)

Mago Barca

(4,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry) 4,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo

(18,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry) 12,000 Veteran/African infantry, 1,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.

Scipio consolidates his gains - 207 BC

After Hasdrubal Barca's departure from Spain Carthage sent reinforcements to Spain, under Hanno. He joined Mago's army and the bulk of these joined Hasdrubal Gisgo. Mago and Hanno then went deep into Celtiberi to recruit more troops where they were defeated by a Roman army of 10,000 foot and 500 cavalry under the command of Silanus. During the battle Silanus captured Hanno. Mago managed to escape to join Hasdrubal Gisgo near Gades. Hasdrubal Gisgo adopted a defensive policy and Scipio did little this year, apart from capturing Orongis.

The Campaign (207 BC)

Livy starts this year with the activities of Mago Barca and Hanno, however lets look at what Livy indicated the previous year. According to Livy the plan was very much for Hasdrubal son of Gisgo to adopt a defensive position. Livy then goes on to indicate Hasdrubal had withdrawn to Gades. He then indicates the Romans held almost the entire Eastern coast of Spain, at least from Emporiae to Nova Carthago, and then possibly further. However Scipio probably had not had the opportunity yet to take the towns of Abdera, Sexi and Malaca. Livy then indicates the Carthaginians controlled the western portion of Spain, however west of Gibraltar there is nothing. We can only guess at this point, but it seemed the Carthaginian strong hold was the Baetis Valley from Iliturgi down South to Gades. In addition parts of the Coast of Abdera down to Gades.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 1) Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had withdrawn to Gades and the western Ocean, while the Mediterranean coast and nearly all the eastern part of the country were controlled by Scipio and under Roman rule.

We know that Mago was ordered to raise troops at the Balearic Islands, which he did and had returned. As this order was given late last year, he may have crossed over at the end of last year and spent winter there, returning early next year with some mercenaries. The Balearic Islands are not heavily populated and Mago would of been unlikely to return with any more than a few thousand men, possibly 2,000 infantry. The fact he was able to do this indicates the Carthaginians still had some naval capacity, possibly in the order of 35 quinqueremes which may have been based at Gades.

Masinissa had under his command 3,000 cavalry, which was engaged in raiding and plundering the pro Roman Spanish tribes. He may have been operating independently, or he may have joined Mago. I feel he was independently involved raiding Romans territory based from Orongis. After the fall of this town he probably withdrew to Abdera and eventually met up with Mago Barca and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at Gades, to winter there.

Finally we have a new Carthaginian commander arrive, a Hanno, who had brought fresh troops from Africa. Now the number of troops he brought is in dispute. We know that he met up with a Roman force of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry and was defeated. He had the help of 9,000 raw Celtiberi at the time, so a figure of 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry seems like a reasonable figure for Hanno to have brought over. On the other hand he may have brought more and left many of them with Hasdrubal son of Gisco, I feel this is unlikely as when there is no preparation Carthage seems unable to send over more than about 4,000 men.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 1) A new commander, Hanno, had crossed from Africa with fresh troops to succeed Hasdrubal Barca, and after joining Mago had lost no time in arming large numbers of men in Celtiberi, which lies between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Carpetani (June - August)

Now we are not sure when Hanno arrived, but it was probably about the beginning of June. Once he landed, probably around Gades, he joined up with Mago Barca, who would of returned from Balearic Islands. His force probably consisted of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, probably the 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry Hanno brought from Carthage and Mago Barca's 2,000 Balearic infantry. Together they then marched deep into the Celtiberi territory to raise new troops.

Now I don't believe he went as far as the Celtiberi tribes on the Ebro River, he probably went to the Carpetani tribes. On the other hand the Roman force that went after Hanno and Mago was under the command of Marcus Junius Silanus, who was probably left in command of the army up north at Tarraco. If this is so than Hanno probably did get all the way to the Celtiberi tribes on the Ebro. Livy gives us further clues later, after the battle he claims Mago retreated with all hast for 9 days, arriving in Gades on the ninth day. Assuming the men were running and made no camp, a maximum marching speed of 50 kilometres may be just possible. This means he was about 450 kilometres away, maximum. This could put him right in the centre of the Carpetani tribes. Finally the troops Mago and Hanno raised were not of good quality, which does not sound like true Celtiberi troops. Livy often calls all the Spanish tribes on the large plateau in the centre of Spain Celtiberi.

When Hanno and Mago arrived they raised 9,000 Celtiberi troops and made two camps. One consisted of the Celtiberi army of 9,000 men under Mago's control. Hanno commanded the Carthaginian army, possibly 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.

Now Scipio send Marcus Junius Silanus with 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry against Hanno and Mago Barca. This force was probably split off from Scipio's main army, which may have been campaigning at the North end of the Baetis Valley. This was probably a march of 200 kilometres and probably took a week. Over such bad terrain a normal army would of taken twice the time, however Livy does indicate the Romans did move with unusual haste, guided by friendly Spanish troops.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 1) Against him Scipio sent Marcus Silanus with a force of not more than 10,000 foot and 500 horse.

When Marcus Junius Silanus arrived he saw the Carthaginians were in two camps. On the left the Celtiberi troops under the command of Mago Barca and on the right the Carthaginians army under the command of Hanno.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 1) He (Silanus) learned from his guides, when he was about 10 miles from the enemy position, that it consisted of two camps, one on each side of the road he was using - the raw Celtiberian troops, over 9,000 strong, on the left; and the Carthaginians on the right.

Marcus Junius Silanus swung out to the left and when he was a bit under 2 kilometres from the Celtiberian camp the enemy saw his advance. Mago Barca assembled the Celtiberians and marched out of the camp a force of 4,000 Celtiberian infantry and 200 Celtiberian cavalry. These were the best troops and in reserve he had the light troops posted, about 5,000 light troops. This force met the Romans in a head on head struggle and the result predictable, the Spanish were forced back as they were no match against the heavy Roman infantry. Livy indicates they were nearly all killed before the Carthaginian troops arrived. Livy's account of the battle is as follows;

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 2) In the Celtiberian army there were 4,000 foot equipped with long shields and 200 horse, in numbers a full legion, and the best of his troops; these he posted in the front line, with the light troops as reserves. In this order Mago marched them out of the camp, and they were scarcely clear of the rampart when the Romans discharged their javelins. The Spaniards crouched to meet the hail of missiles, then rose to their feet to reply; the Romans received the volley, as their custom is, on their serried shields, and a hand to hand struggle began, Roman swords coming into action. The Celtiberians normally fight by a series of rapid skirmishing attacks, but their speed of movement was rendered useless by the rough and broken ground, a condition which was not unfavourable to the Romans, who are trained to stand-up fighting, though it is true that in this case lack of room and patches of scrub broke the continuity of their ranks so that they were forced to engage singly or in pairs, like gladiators. The enemy, used to rapid movement, might have had chains on their legs: unable to run, they were butchered where they stood. The shield-men were nearly all killed, and soon the light troops and the Carthaginians who had come to their help from the other camp were yielding to pressure and suffering heavy casualties. Right at the beginning of the battle Mago made his escape with all the mounted troops and not more than 2,000 infantry; Hanno, the other commander, and the men who had arrived last upon the scene, when the day was almost lost, were taken prisoner.

We need to look at the events of this battle to determine what occurred. The Romans attacked the Spanish camp from the opposite side of the Carthaginian camp. In short the Carthaginian camp would of been totally unaware until the fighting had already begun. As soon as Roman troops were spotted Mago Barca galloped out, which implies he led the cavalry out first. Now Livy does indicate the terrain was bad, which would of made the cavalry next to useless. Mago probably left the field of battle with his virtually useless cavalry. This may have been the retreat Livy tell us about.

The Spanish now formed up their heavy troops in the front, with the skirmishers in the rear. Who ordered this is anyone's guess, although Livy does indicate Mago ordered this formation. Possibly he gave his orders before he left the camp, or he may have come back into the camp once he had led his cavalry to a position of safety. The 4,000 Spanish troops met about 10,000 Roman heavy infantry and the result was totally predictable, the Spanish heavy troops were wiped out and the light troops in the rear were no real match against the Romans.

By attacking over bad terrain the Romans had negated virtually all the advantages of the Carthaginians. While the Spanish were engaged with the Romans Hanno began to form up his troops and sent them out to help. The troops must of come out in penny packets and Hanno arrived with the last troops. By this time the Carthaginians, possibly 4,000 men, were battling against the Roman 10,000 men. Again the result was predictable and the Carthaginians collapsed and probably broke. Hanno and the last formations were captured by the Romans.

When all was lost and probably after Hanno became engaged Mago made the decision to withdraw what troops he could. All the cavalry and about 2,000 Carthaginian troops escaped at the beginning of the battle. This was probably the cavalry and Mago's Balearic light infantry which were next to useless in the bad terrain. Next Livy indicates all the old soldiers as were serving with the infantry escaped with Mago. This may have been the survivors of the Carthaginian force. We can only guess how large this was, but 2,000 men possibly sounds right. This implies a weak Carthaginian force, probably the 4,000 infantry I always talk about.

Now Mago met Hasdrubal son of Gisgo in Gades after this battle. Livy then talks about Hasdrubal son of Gisgo making his camp in the area of Baetica, possibly North of where the Baetis River meets the Genil River. He may have marched his army North to this position to see if he could reverse the loss of the previous battle. By the time Hasdrubal son of Gisgo got to this new camp Marcus Junius Silanus had rejoined Scipio. After hearing about the success of this battle he immediately marched against Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, possibly hoping to bring the whole campaign to an end with one major blow. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo immediately withdrew back to Gades, where he broke up his army among his walled towns. This after all was the plan agreed to the previous year.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 2) Hasdrubal had set up his camp in Baetica, to ensure the loyalty of the tribes under his control; none the less on Scipio's approach he got on the move immediately, and with a rapidity which suggested flight withdrew towards Gades on the Atlantic coast.

Orongis (September - October)

Scipio now sent Lucius Cornelius Scipio, his brother, with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to attack Orongis, which was still under control of the Carthaginians. The town was in the territory of the Maesesses, a branch of the Bastetani tribe.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 3) he (Scipio) sent his brother Lucius Scipio with 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse to attack Orongis (as the natives call it), the wealthiest town in that part of the country. It lies in the territory of the Maesesses, a branch of the Bastetani; its land is productive, and the silver is mined by the inhabitants. Hasdrubal had used it as a base for raids against the tribes of the interior.

Lucius Cornelius Scipio now began to ring the town with field works and made the siege secure. After a period of preparation Lucius assaulted the town, taking it. The enemy lost about 2,000 men. After this success it was decided that there was not enough time to engage in any more sieges and Scipio withdrew his force back to Tarraco, where he entered winter quarters.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 4) Then, as winter was approaching, and it was not feasible to attack Gades or follow up Hasdrubals widely dispersed forces, he withdrew into Hither Spain. The legions were dismissed to winter quarters; Lucius was sent to Rome with the Carthaginian general Hanno and the other prisoners of noble rank, and Scipio himself retired to Tarraco.

Time Line (207 BC)

We can guess Hanno arrived about the beginning of June, and that Orongis was taken at the beginning of October. All other activity occurred in the middle. Lets now look at the activities of Hanno. Hanno arrived at the beginning of June at Gades and marched deep into the territory of the Carpetani. This was probably a march of about 450 kilometres, any more and Mago could of never got back in the 9 days indicated by Livy. A normal army, not in a hurry, would of taken about a month to cover this distance. Once there Hanno would of needed a few weeks to raise the 9,000 Spanish troops. We are now in mid July.

We do not really know where Scipio's army was, but its likely he occupied Castulo or Iliturgi. A march from Tarraco to this spot would take Scipio about a month to cross. If he left in early May he was probably in this territory by the time Hanno arrived. Now apart from sending two small forces from his main army out, and a quick dash down South in an attempt to engaged with Hasdrubal, Scipio pretty much did nothing. One possibly activity he was engaged in was defending his allies from Masinissa cavalry, about 3,000 men. Livy does not make any mention of this, probably because this style of warfare would of been boring and dishonourable to him. He does not criticise Masinissa, probably because Masinissa became a great friend of Rome. We also know that Hasdrubal led raids from Orongis, well we know Hasdrubal Gisgo was in Gades so possibly this was Masinissa's base.

Anyway, Scipio dispatched a force of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to deal with Hanno. This was probably a short march of about 2 weeks, so Scipio had plenty of time to deal with this threat. Hanno's army was shattered in mid July and by the end of July Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo had met. Hasdrubal Gisgo now marched his army up North, possibly to threaten Scipio. By the time Scipio reacted to this we may be in mid August. Scipio march caused Hasdrubal to retreat and break up his army. Scipio decided against following up went back to his position and by the end of August sent out another 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to take Orongis. Possibly after a siege of a month the town was taken in an assault and by mid October Scipio's army was once again in one piece. At this time he would of marched North to winter in Tarraco.

The year had ended with very little gains or losses on either side.

Chronology - 207 BC

May	Beg	Scipio leaves Tarraco and marches towards Castulo.
June	Beg	Scipio arrives at Castulo. Hanno arrives from Carthage with reinforcements at Gades and now marches deep into the territory of the Carpetani.
July	Beg	Scipio sends an army against Hanno.
July	Mid	Hanno has raised 9,000 Spanish mercenaries.
	Mid	Hanno is defeated and captured.
August	Beg	Mago meets up with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at Gades and they march toward the Romans.
August	Mid	Scipio marches out to meet Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, who immediately withdraws back to Gades.
September	Beg	Scipio send another army against Orongis, possibly because this is being used as a base by Masinissa's raids.
October	Beg	Orongis was taken by the Romans.
October	Mid	The Roman army is against in one piece. Scipio now marches back to Tarraco.

Balance of Forces - 207 BC

Romans

Gaius Laelius	(35 vessels)	35 Roman quinqueremes.
Scipio		
Lucius Marcius Septimus	(28,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry)	16,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 1,500 Roman/Italian cavalry, 12,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.
Marcus Junius Silanus	(10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry)	8,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 500 Roman/Italian cavalry, 2,000 Spanish infantry.
Lucius Cornelius Scipio	(10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)	8,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 500 Roman/Italian cavalry, 2,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Unknown	(35 vessels)	35 quinqueremes. (Probably at Gades, however Mago would of used them to bring over mercenaries from the Balearic Islands.)
Hasdrubal son of Gisgo	(18,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry)	12,000 Veteran/African infantry, 1,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.
Hanno	(14,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry)	4,000 African infantry, 1,000 African cavalry. Hanno brought the African troops from Carthage.
Mago Barca	(10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry)	2,000 Balearic infantry, 8,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry
Masinissa	(3,000 cavalry)	Mainly Numidian but would of also included other veteran cavalry. This force was mainly used for raiding.

Carthaginian defeat at Ilipa - 206 BC

*Once Hasdrubal Gisgo heard that Hasdrubal Barca had been defeated in Italy he decided to meet Scipio in open battle. He met Publius Scipio at Ilipa with 50,000 foot and 4,500 cavalry . Scipio had an army of about 45,000 men with 3,000 foot and 500 cavalry from the Spanish tribe of **Culchas**. During the battle he decisively defeated Hasdrubal Gisgo. Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago escaped to Gades, but the bulk of the Carthaginian army was destroyed.*

*Scipio then went to Africa to meet Syphax and Masinissa and to negotiate. He then went back to Spain and stormed Ilturgi, **Castax**, and Astapa. The princes Mandonius and Indibilis, of the Ilergetes tribe had revolted during his absence and they assembled an army of 20,000 foot and 2,500 cavalry. Scipio marched against them and defeated them in a battle.*

While this was occurring Hanno was sent by Mago from Gades to raise some troops. He raised a force of 4,000 Spaniards but was defeated by Marcius. Hanno managed to escape with a few survivors to Gades while Marcus returned to New Carthage. Scipio then turned his attention to Gades, where Mago had rallied the last Carthaginian resistance. While Scipio was marching down Mago sent a fleet to New Carthage in an attempt to take it, but failed. He then sailed back to Gades to find Scipio almost there. Mago then escaped to the Balearic Islands just before Gades fell.

The Campaign (206 BC)

Livy indicating that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca had managed to raise an army of 50,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 12) Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, the best and most distinguished general this war produced after the three sons of Hamilcar, had returned from Gades in the hope of offering further resistance, and with the help of Hamilcar's son Mago he set about raising fresh troops in Further Spain and succeeded in arming some 50,000 foot-soldiers and 4,500 horse. Most writers agree about the strength of the cavalry, but some state that the number of infantry brought to the town of Silpia (actually Ilipa) was 70,000.

The cavalry figure is more than reasonable as we know Masinissa had 3,000 cavalry alone. The issue is the infantry figure. We can guess Mago Barca saved 4,000 infantry from his disastrous battle the previous year. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo would of been lucky to have an army of 13,000 non-Spanish infantry. From somewhere an amazing 30,000 infantry had been raised.

We have two options, one is that the Carthaginians were successful raising large numbers of Spanish troops the previous year, which Livy implies did not occur. Or Hasdrubal and Mago spend most of the early campaign year assembling Spanish troops. Now if we read Livy full account for activities this year we quickly realise a lot of activity occurred after the battle of Ilipa, which implies that Ilipa occurred early in the campaign season. If this was so, when did the Carthaginians raise their troops. The Carthaginians still controlled or had access to the tribal regions of the Turdentani, Conii, Tartesii and possibly Bastetani. We know Hanno and Mago failed to recruit troops from the Carpetani and possibly the Oretani, however elsewhere the Carthaginians did have some success. So much success that they were to raise the largest Spanish force of the war.

The combined non-Spanish army consisted of 16,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Assume Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had raised further troops from the Carthaginian cities, this is implied in the account of the battle. Hasdrubal must of cleaned out the cities of military age men and possibly raised as much as 8,000 infantry, giving his army 24,000 non-Spanish infantry. Now he needed to raise 26,000 Spanish troops. These would of come from the tribal groups indicated earlier, with possibly the largest group from the Turdentani. After all when the Turdentani deserted after the battle Hasdrubal made his decision to run. If this portion of the army was small it could of been prevented from deserting, however if it was too large it could go and come as it pleased. This is a very similar situation the Romans faced in 212 BC.

Now Scipio's army totalled 45,000 men for the battle. He had 32,000 Roman/Italian infantry and 3,000 Roman/Italian cavalry. We also know that Marcus Junius Silanus raised 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, possibly mercenary Spanish troops. Scipio probably had about 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry from the Spanish tribes directly under his control. This gives us out figure of 45,000 men, although he must of had other forces garrisoning his towns and the north. These must of been minimal.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 12) On hearing that this immense force had been raised, Scipio did not think that with his Roman legions alone he would be a match for it, unless, if only for appearance's sake, he could also put into the field some foreign auxiliaries. At the same time he knew he must not allow the auxiliaries to be sufficiently numerous to turn the scales in the event of their deserting to the enemy, the very thing which had brought disaster upon his father and uncle. Accordingly having sent Silanus to Culchas, a prince who rules twenty-eight communities, to take over from him the troops, both horse and foot, which he had promised to raise during the winter, he himself set out from Tarraco and reached Castulo after collecting during his march a moderate force of auxiliaries from the allied communities along the route. At Castulo he was joined by Silanus with the auxiliaries, 3,000 foot and 500 horse, and from there proceeded to Baecula with the whole army, which including Roman legionnaires and allies, infantry and cavalry, amounted to 45,000 men.

Ilipa (May)

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo marched his army to Ilipa, where it made its camp. For this to be considered as giving battle, the Carthaginians had probably lost the bulk of the Baetis Valley by this time. Anyway they made camp here and stayed.

Livy now claims Scipio had heard of this large army and had decided to raise mercenaries of his own, Sending Marcus Junius Silanus to Culchas who provided 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Actually I think a bit of the chronology is a bit astray here. What is more likely is that Scipio marched from Tarraco to Castulo, a march of about a month. This was probably the position he held the previous year and it was after this occurred that the Carthaginians marched their army out. Probably some time around now Scipio sent Marcus Silanus out to raise as many mercenaries as possible to increase his strength for the final battle. Culchas was probably close by Castulo, so Silanus could of taken as little as a few weeks to get his troops.

Scipio now marches to Ilipa, a distance of about 220 Kilometres. He would have taken a week to get there, where he prepared a camp not too far away from the Carthaginians. This could of been as early as the beginning of June and considering the heat mentioned in the account of the battle was probably no earlier, although a bit later. For several days Masinissa and Mago Barca used their cavalry to raid and harass the Roman position, causing a great deal of trouble to Roman foragers. Livy claims Hasdrubal used these clashes as a test of strength and they must of gone well for him, because it was after these clashes that he marched his army out in battle formation.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 13) They were (the Romans) engaged in fortifying their camp when Mago and Masinissa attacked them with their cavalry in force, and the Roman working-parties might have been roughly handled but for the timely and unexpected charge by a squadron of horse which Scipio had posted in concealment behind a convenient hill. Mago's leading cavalrymen were in loose order, and those of them who were quick enough to get close up to the rampart or actually amongst the working-parties were soon scattered by the Roman squadron.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 14) Hasdrubal had used these minor clashes to test his strength, and as soon as he was satisfied he led out his main force into line of battle. The Romans followed suit. Each of the opposing armies stood ready in front of the rampart of its camp, neither of them making the first move to engage; the day drew

towards evening; nothing happened, and first the Carthaginians, then the Romans, marched back into camp.

The two camps must of been very close to each other as Livy indicates that once both armies were deployed for battle, they were in front of their camps ramparts. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was the first to form his army up in battle formation, he deployed his Native Carthaginians, mixed with Africans, in the centre. On each flank the Spanish were deployed, with the elephants deployed in front of these. Scipio initially deployed his troops in a similar manner, with his Romans/Italians in the centre and Spanish on each flank. For several days the Carthaginians deployed their army, followed by the Romans. However no one made any move to fight.

After spending over a week facing each other Scipio broke the deadlock by forming his army earlier than the Carthaginians and deploying his Roman/Italians on the flanks and Spanish in the centre. As soon as there was daylight he sent his entire cavalry force against the Carthaginian camp. Following these he had his infantry leave the camp and form up in their new formation.

When the Roman Cavalry struck the Carthaginian camp, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo ordered his entire cavalry force out to drive the Roman cavalry away. The struggle was fairly even, but Hasdrubal must of had the edge as he did manage to drive the Roman cavalry back far enough to allow his troops to deploy. Livy's account of the battle is as follows;

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 14) It was hardly daylight when he ordered all his cavalry and light troops against the Carthaginian outposts; he then immediately advanced in person at the head of his heavy legionaries, and, contrary to what both his men and the enemy confidently expected, posted Roman troops on the wings and allied troops in the centre. Hasdrubal hurried from his tent when he heard the cries of the Roman cavalrymen; seeing running excitedly for their arms and in the distance the gleaming standards of the legions and the ground rapidly filling with enemy troops, he at once ordered out his whole cavalry strength against the Roman horsemen. At the same time he led his infantry out of camp, but made no change in his dispositions he had kept during the preceding days. For a time the cavalry struggle was indecisive, and could hardly have been otherwise because each of the opposing squadrons when overpowered, as happened more or less by turns, could safely withdraw to the protection of the infantry line. But a change was to come, for when the two lines were not more than five hundred paces apart, Scipio sounded the recall, opened his ranks, let through the cavalry and light troops and then, dividing them into two sections, posted them as reserves behind the wings. The moment for action had now come. Ordering the Spaniards, who formed the centre, to advance slowly, Scipio, from the right wing where he commanded in person, sent orders to Silanus and Marcius to watch his extension towards the right and to match it by simultaneous extension of their own men towards the left, and to bring their light infantry and cavalry into action before the two centres had time to engage. Thus with extended wings and three cohorts of infantry and three troops of cavalry on each, supported by light skirmishers, they advanced as a smart pace against the enemy, the rest following to complete the outflanking movement. The centre formed a concave line, where the Spanish auxiliaries were moving forward more slowly.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 14) The wings came into action while the strong enemy centre, composed of veteran Carthaginian and African troops, was still not within range

of missiles; these did not dare to go to the assistance of their comrades on the wings for fear of laying their centre open to the oncoming enemy; both wings were hard pressed and subjected to a double attack - on their flanks by the Roman cavalry, light troops, and skirmishers, and simultaneously on the front by the Roman infantry cohorts which were trying to cut them off from contact with the rest of the army. In every part of the field the scales were heavily weighted in favour of Scipio, and especially because Spanish raw recruits and Balearic Islanders found themselves matched against Romans and Latin's. Moreover, as the day wore on, Hasdrubals men began to feel the effects of exhaustion, for they had been surprised by the unexpected alarm before dawn, and compelled to take the field in a hurray and on empty stomachs. Scipio had, indeed, deliberately contrived that the battle should be fought late in the day; it was round about noon when the infantry make their attack on the wings, and some time later when the fighting spread to the centre, so that even before they went into action Hasdrubals men were beginning to flag from the heat of the midday sun and the strain of standing, hungry and thirsty, under arms, so much so indeed that they had to lean on their shields for support. In addition to everything else the elephants, scared by the rapid movement of the cavalry and light troops, had shifted from the wings into the centre. Tired and discouraged as a result of all this, the Carthaginians began their retreat; but it was still an orderly retreat with the appearance, at any rate, of a planned withdrawal by an unbroken line. But this was not to last, for when the victorious Romans saw their advantage they redoubled the weight of their attacks from every side. The Carthaginians could no longer hold them; Hasdrubal did all he could to keep them in hand and stop the rot, crying out again and again that if only they withdrew slowly and in order they could find safety amongst the hills in the rear. But panic proved stringer than discipline and, as their comrades in the van began to fall, the whole line suddenly faced about and took to flight. At the foot of the hills they paused, and the officers, when the Romans seemed to hesitate to advance up the slope, began to call the men back into their ranks; but soon they saw the Romans coming on again fast as before, the scabble to escape resumed, and they were driven in confusion into their camp.

We need to look at some interesting comments made in Livy's account. First the Romans began their attack as soon as the sun rose, possibly six in the morning. On the other hand the main battle did not occur until after noon. The Carthaginians would of had 6 hours to prepare their line before battle occurred, thus the feeling of chaos and disorganisation in the Carthaginian line which Livy seems to indicate, did not exist. Scipio probably began his armies position very early in the day forcing Hasdrubal to do the same before his men had their breakfast. This was Scipio's first brilliant move, similar in many ways to Hannibal tactics in 218 BC. The next thing Scipio did was change his deployment. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo probably could do nothing, even if Hasdrubal knew about this change. It takes a lot of effort to change an armies deployment and if Hasdrubal tried to it just before a battle it would of resulted in total confusion.

Livy goes on to explain that both armies stood around for quite a few hours in the sun, while light troops and cavalry skirmished in the area between the two armies. Finally sometime before noon Scipio began his advance, with the flanks meeting about noon. The Carthaginians were in an impossible position, if they advanced their centre too far forward it may be cut off, yet if they did not their flanks would collapse anyway. Whatever the exact action on the battlefield the fight seemed to be long and hard and at some point Hasdrubal son of Gisgo began to withdraw his troops. He probably realised it was hopeless, however the Romans were not yet seriously affecting his forces. The Spanish flanks may have broke occasionally, as Livy indicates the troops facing the Romans did break, however the centre probably made it back into their camp with little loss.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 15) The pursuing Romans were close upon the rampart and in the speed of their advance would have captured it, but for a heavy rainstorm: the sun had been blazing through gaps in heavy clouds, when suddenly the downpour came, and with such extraordinary violence that the victorious soldiers could scarcely get back to their own camp.

The Turdentani Desert (May)

It was obvious the Carthaginians had lost, however it was only a minor defeat. The armies would of still been fairly evenly matched. What sealed the Carthaginians army fate was the desertion of the Spanish troops. Livy indicates that Attenes, prince of the Turdentani was the first to desert. Then more desertions occurred and knowing without his Spanish troops Hasdrubal would be heavily outnumber he began his withdraw.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 15) The desertion began with Attenes, prince of the Turdentani, who went off with large numbers of his native troops; then two fortified towns with their garrisons were surrounded to Scipio by their commanders; and finally, to prevent the tendency to revolt, once started, from spreading further, Hasdrubal moved off in the silence of the following night.

In fact I can't help by draw some parallels between this and the Roman disaster which befell on Publius and Gnaeus may years before. In fact if my guess is right, it was Publius Scipio's defeat which caused the desertion of his Spanish allies, which is what occurred here also. This was a feature of the Spanish mercenaries, once an army had lost a battle the Spanish tended to desert from that army. This was no exception.

Hasdrubals army is besieged (may-June)

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo probably had an army of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, no match against the 45,000 of the Roman army. Hasdrubal withdrew from his camp during the night after the battle and began his march towards Gades. Scipio immediately began to pursue and his cavalry caught the Carthaginians and began to harass them. This slowed down their retreat, until they were finally forced to stop. Soon the legionaries arrived and a battle occurred. Once again the result was predictable, Hasdrubals 24,000 men had no chance against Scipio's 45,000 men and soon his army broke. Hasdrubal escaped with about 6,000 men to a hill position and they began to fortify that position. Scipio was unable to take the position and settled down to a siege. After a few days with no water and little food their position became intolerable.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 16) None the less his (Hasdrubal son of Gisgo) attempt to escape was constantly held up by harassing attacks on flanks and rear by the Roman cavalry and light troops; soon they became so engaged either with the Roman cavalry or skirmishers and auxiliary foot, the legions arrived on the scene. With the coming of the legions what had been a field of battle was turning into a slaughterhouse, until the Carthaginian general was himself the first to confess defeat by making his escape to the nearest hills with some 6,000 half-armed men. The remainder were either killed or taken prisoner. The fugitive Carthaginians improvised some sort of defensive position on a high hill, and from it defended themselves without difficulty when the Roman attempt to scale the precipitous slope had failed. But surrounded as they were on a barren hill-top, with no source of supplies, their position in a few days became intolerable. Desertions began, and finally the general himself sent for ships - the sea was not far away - and abandoning his men made his escape by night to Gades.

Some interesting factors come up here. It seems strange that Scipio was unable to finish off 6,000 Carthaginian troops. It also seems strange Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was able to get to such a good defensive position with his 6,000 men so soon after a total defeat. Scipio was probably unable to finish off Hasdrubal son of Gisgo because of one of the following two reasons, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo's strength and position was far stronger than indicated, or Scipio had trouble elsewhere requiring him to leave. I favour the former reason. It is likely that Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had this position in mind when he was retreating and he managed to get his army to it after some skirmishing, possible he left a rear guard force behind somewhere which was wiped out, thus the conflict immediately before Scipio got to this position. If this is true then the position must be able to be supplied by sea, after all Hasdrubal son of Gisgo seemed to get away easily enough, as did Mago Barca and who knows who else. This brings up another interesting fact. Livy indicates that this hill was close to the sea. This is significant as Ilipa was over 100 kilometres away from the sea. Assuming Hasdrubal son of Gisgo had a day to withdraw after Ilipa, and managed a few more days at a reduced rate he may have made 60 to 80 kilometres, however this is a quick march if you are being constantly harassed by the enemy. It is possible the retreat took longer than Livy indicates. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo escaped from the siege to the coast and was picked up by Carthaginian ships during the night. He then sailed back to Gades and sent back the ships for Mago.

Scipio left Marcus Junius Silanus with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to maintain the siege and marched back to Tarraco. This march took 70 days, as Scipio moved slowly checking on each Spanish tribe to ensure its loyalty. Scipio would of arrived back in Tarraco by late August.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 16) When Scipio learned that Hasdrubal had fled he left a force of 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse with Silanus to maintain the siege of what was left of the Carthaginian army on the hill, and returned to Tarraco. The march thither took him seventy days as he was constantly stopping on the way to inquire into the behaviour of the various communities and petty princes so as to be able to reward them on a proper estimate of their services.

The Carthaginian force being besieged by Marcus Junius Silanus seemed to be commanded by Mago Barca and Masinissa. Masinissa began to secretly negotiate with Marcus Junius Silanus in order to save himself, at least according to Livy. However after reading Livy it seems Masinissa escaped the siege in the same manner as Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and took troops with him. According to Livy we see him up north talking to Scipio before he left to go home and raiding Roman allies with, according to Livy, Roman permission in order to make it look like Masinissa was still a loyal Carthaginian ally. Personally I think Livy tries to make Masinissa's conversion over to the Romans occurred earlier than it did and for the wrong reason. Masinissa joined the Roman cause only after fighting two major battles against Syphax in Africa, so its safe to assume Masinissa was still loyal to the Carthaginian cause at this point in time. Also as we have him raiding Roman allies, he must of escaped with some of his cavalry from the disaster at Ilipa.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 16) After he left (Scipio), Masinissa entered into secret talks with Silanus, as a result of which he crossed with a few people to Africa, in order to ensure that his own nation would obediently follow him in his change of policy. (It is very unlikely that this occurred, however at least we know Masinissa was in this location at this time.)

Soon after this Mago Barca escaped from the siege by sea and it seems Masinissa did the same. The army which was left behind soon began to desert, surrender and generally break up. By the end of the campaign season the Carthaginians had no field army left, the Romans had effectively ended the war.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 16) Mago then made his way to Gades on the ships sent back by Hasdrubal; the remainder of the army, abandoned by its leaders, either deserted or dispersed amongst the neighbouring communities. No force of any significance, either in numbers or strength, was left.

We can guess that if Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago Barca managed to escape, as many Carthaginians, Africans and Native Carthaginians were saved as possible. Possibly only a few thousand at most. These would of made their way back to Gades, after all the native Africans would of not deserted at all. This whole episode seems a bit odd as why would Scipio not deal with the remnants of the Carthaginian army when he had the opportunity. He probably had problems up north and left Marcus Junius Silanus with a inadequate force to deal with the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians probably escaped with what troops they could as soon as possible, possibly no more than two weeks after assuming their position, and Marcus Junius Silanus marched to join Scipio at Tarraco.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 16) Soon afterwards Silanus rejoined Scipio at Tarraco with the news that the Spanish war was over.

Another option is that the bulk of the Carthaginian army escaped from the disaster by sea or flight. When Hasdrubal began his withdraw he tried to cross the Baetis River, but could not. The Baetis River is very wide and in the face of the pursuing Romans Hasdrubal would of found it impossible to cross. He probably made it straight for the coast, soon coming under the skirmishing attacks of the Romans. Getting close to the coast he stood and tried to hold back the Romans. Possibly only with a part of his army, Hasdrubal probably left the army with light cavalry and made his way back to Gades. For a small force probably only a days quick march. There he assembled his fleet and sailed it up the coast, against possible another days activity. Back with the army Mago and Masinissa would of tried to hold on and may have split the army up. Masinissa may have taken the cavalry, which could of got away, and Mago the African and Carthaginian troops to a good defensive position near the coast. The Spanish portion would of split up into many parts as they fled. The fleet arrived and all that could be saved was saved. Scipio probably left Silanus behind to mop up any Spanish forces or round up the Carthaginians left behind. I don't favour this account, but in the end all the options had the same effect. The destruction of the Carthaginian army.

Once back in Tarraco Scipio left Lucius Marcius Septimus in charge of the army at Tarraco and Marcus Junius Silanus in charge of the army at Nova Carthago, possibly his 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Scipio with Gaius Laelius then sailed down to Nova Carthago and then over the sea into Africa in order to meet with Syphax. Cirta was the main city of Syphax, so the Romans probably sailed to Saldae. However Livy does indicate the city was adjacent to Nova Carthago, which put it further east. This would of taken Scipio about a week. He then apparently made a treaty with Syphax and then sailed back home again. The whole episode may have occurred over a 2 week period. Again this all seems a bit suspect and I tend to believe it never occurred. Also according to Livy Hasdrubal son of Gisgo arrived in the city at the same time and the two met, again a bit suspicious. The final result of all this was nothing.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 17) He began with Syphax, King of the Masaesulii, a tribe bordering the Mauri and on the coast more or less opposite New Carthage in Spain. Syphax had a treaty at the time with the Carthaginians, but Scipio, supposing it would have no more weight or sanctity with him than agreements ever do have with barbarians, who invariable support the winning side, sent Laelius, armed with valuable gifts, to put to him the Roman cause.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 17) so he (Scipio) left Marcius and Silanus in charge of Spain - the former at Tarraco, the latter at New Carthage whither he had proceeded from Tarraco with all possible speed - and in company with Laelius set sail from New Carthage in two quinqueremes and made the passage to Africa, mostly under oars with a calm sea, occasionally helped by a light breeze.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 18) A treaty was concluded between Syphax and Scipio, and Scipio left Africa. With variable winds and much stormy weather he reached New Carthage four days later.

Castulo & Iliturgi (June-July)

Back in Spain Scipio decided to attack Castulo and Iliturgi. (Note: there are two Iliturgi in Spain, this is the Southern one) Livy claims this was to punish them for their betrayal of Publius Scipio and Gnaeus Scipio many years previously.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 19) Of these the most important, and the most guilty were Iliturgi and Castulo. The latter place had been allied to Rome while success attended her arms, but had gone over to Carthage after the death of the two Scipios and the destruction of their armies; Iliturgi had added crime to desertion by the betrayal and murder of the survivors of the defeat who had fled there for refuge.

Scipio summoned Lucius Marcus Septimus from Tarraco and sent him with a third of the army to attack Castulo. Scipio commanded the other two thirds and marched on Iliturgi. Scipio then assaulted, took and sacked Iliturgi. He then marched on to Castulo, which was occupied by some Carthaginian forces as well as Spanish. The Spanish were under the command of Cerdubelus while the Carthaginians under the command of Himilco. The Spanish betrayed the town and Scipio took it without a fight. Lucius Marcus was then ordered to bring under the control of Rome any of the Spanish tribes which had not yet been completely subdued, while Scipio went back to Nova Carthago.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 19) Marcus was summoned from Tarraco and sent with a third of his forces to attack Castulo, while Scipio himself with the remaining two-thirds marched to Iliturgi, making five stops on the way.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 20) The leader of the Spaniards, Cerdubelus, openly supported surrender; in command of the Carthaginian auxiliaries was Himilco, and he and his troops, together with the town, were betrayed into Scipio's hands by the Spaniards.

Marcus crossed the Baetis River and took the surrender of two powerful Spanish communities. He then marched on to Astapa, where he took the town. The inhabitants of Astapa destroyed their own town and killed themselves rather than surrender. Marcus took another two communities and then marched back to Nova Carthago.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 21) After this Marcus was commissioned to bring under the control of Rome any of the Spanish tribes which had not yet been completely subdued, and Scipio returned to New Carthage.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 22) Marcus crossed the river Baetis (known locally as the Certis) and received the surrender of two wealthy communities without bloodshed. Then came the action at Astapa; Astapa had always stood by the Carthaginians, but more annoying than its allegiance to Carthage was the personal hatred, beyond what was justified by the exigencies of war, which the inhabitants felt for the Romans.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 23) Such was the destruction of Astapa by fire and sword. The troops got nothing out of it whatever. Marcius frightened into surrender the other communities in the neighbourhood and then rejoined Scipio with his victorious army at New Carthage.

The Romans then tried to take Gades by trickery, with Lucius Marcius Septimus attacking by land with light troops and Gaius Laelius attacking by sea with 7 triremes and 1 quinquereme. However Mago Barca discovered the plot and foiled the plan. Laelius fleet met a small Carthaginian fleet of 1 quinquereme and 8 triremes and defeated it. The Carthaginian commander, Adherbal escaped to Africa with 5 triremes.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 23) Just about this time deserters from Gades offered to betray the town together with the Carthaginian garrison and its commander and the fleet. Mago had stopped there after his escape from the battlefield, and having got together some ships on the Atlantic coast had collected with Hanno's help a number of reinforcements, some overseas from Africa and some from the neighbouring districts of Spain. Promises were exchanged with the deserters, and Marcius proceeded to Gades with a force of infantry, marching light, while Laelius was ordered to join him with seven triremes and a quinquereme for a combined operation by land and sea simultaneously.

The time line here is a bit fuzzy as we do not know if this occurred now or if it occurred much later in the year. Livy's account seems a bit confusing. It only seems reasonable that this action would have occurred as soon after the defeat at Ilipa as possible, but I could be wrong. Anyway while the Romans were advancing towards Gades, Mago Barca sent Hanno, a cavalry officer, with some Africans to recruit some Spanish troops. He managed to raise 4,000 Spanish troops when Lucius Marcius Septimus attacked him, dispersed the Spanish and sent Hanno packing to Gades. This must of occurred close to Gades. Anyway the plot to take Gades was foiled and both Marcius and Laelius returned to Nova Carthago.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 30) About the same time as the mutiny at Sucro, which ended as I have described, Hanno, serving along the Baetis as a cavalry officer under Mago, was sent from Gades with a small party of Africans to raise troops, and by the offer of pay succeeded in arming some 4,000 Spaniards. He was shortly afterwards defeated by Marcius and his camp taken; most of his men were lost during the confusion of the capture, and some were killed by the Roman cavalry as they were trying to make their escape. Hanno got away with a few survivors.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 30) Meanwhile Laelius took his fleet through the Straits to Carteia, a town on the Atlantic coast where the sea begins to open out west of the narrow entrance. There had been a good chance, as I have already mentioned, of taking Gades without bloodshed, as representatives came to the Roman camp with a promise to betray it. But the plot came to light before it could be put into effect; Mago arrested the conspirators and handed them over to the magistrate Adherbal for deportation to Carthage. Adherbal shipped them in a quinquereme, which he sent on ahead as being the slower vessel, and himself followed not far behind with a squadron of eight triremes. The quinquereme was just entering the straits when Laelius, also in a quinquereme and followed by seven triremes, came out of the harbour of Carteia and made for Adherbal and his triremes confident that the quinquereme, once inside the Straits, would be unable to make its way back against the strong tide.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 30) but Adherbal, with five ships he still had, made sail and got away to the African coast, leaving Laelius the victor.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 31) Returning to Carteia Laelius heard of what had happened at Gades - how the plot to betray the town had been exposed and the conspirators had been sent to Carthage with their object unaccomplished. He accordingly sent a message to Marcius saying that unless they wanted merely to waste time by hanging about Gades they ought to rejoin the commander-in-chief at once. Marcius agreed, and a few days later both men returned to New Carthage. Mago, who had been threatened by land and sea, was much relieved by their departure, and, what was even better, the news that the Ilergetes had risen against Rome gave him hopes of recovering control of Spain.

Spanish Revolt (July-August)

According to Livy Scipio fell seriously ill, which caused a revolt of both some Spanish tribes and part of the Roman army. Mandonius and Indibilis caused the revolt of the Laetani, who then attacked the Suessetani and Sedetani, both Roman allies (Note: Sedetani may be the Edetani, a tribal group south of the Ebro River. In addition Livy talks about the Lacetani rather than the Laetani, however most historians believe he got the spelling wrong and actually meant to say Laetani).

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 24) Mandonius and Indibilis, disappointed in their hope of a Spanish kingdom for themselves after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from their country, roused their countrymen (the Lacetani, actually the Laetani of NE Spain) called out the Celtiberians and devastated by raids the territories of the Suessetani and Sedetani, both allied to Rome.

To make matters worse the Roman army in the North, then positioned just south of the Ebro at Sucro, mutinied. Scipio managed to deal with this quickly, but it did have the effect of delaying his action.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 24) Another outbreak (revolt), this time amongst Roman troops, took place in the camp near Sucro. There were 8,000 men in the camp, on duty as garrison for the tribes south of the Ebro.

Soon after this the Ilergetes joined the rebellion. Soon the rebel army had grown to 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry and it crossed into the territory of the Sedetani where it made camp.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 31) Mandonius and Indibilis returned home and remained for a time quietly awaiting news of the outcome of the mutiny, for they were reasonably confident that if the mutineers - Roman citizens - were pardoned for going astray, then their own misconduct, too, might well be forgiven. But once the extreme severity of the punishment became known (they were executed), they could not but think that their own guilt deserved, in Roman eyes, a similar penalty; so once again they called their people to arms, collected such auxiliary forces as they had had before, and with 20,000 foot and 2,500 horse crossed into the territory of the Sedetani, where they had a permanent camp at the beginning of the rebellion.

When all this was occurring Scipio was in Nova Carthago with the bulk of his army. He quickly assembled his army and marched up to the Ebro River. This was done in ten stages according to Livy, which may have meant 10 days. The distance is about 400 kilometres which would of taken about 13 days to cross. If Scipio marched very quickly he may have made it in 10 days. Anyway he crossed the Ebro and in 4 days made it to the enemy army. This puts the battles about 120 kilometres from the Ebro, possibly a bit north of Cissis. Scipio had Gaius Laelius in charge of the cavalry in the battle.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 33) After his speech Scipio dismissed his troops with orders to prepare to march on the following day. Reaching the Ebro in ten stages, he crossed the river and four days later pitched camp in sight of the enemy.

The engagement started with a bit of skirmishing, when Scipio managed to surprise a group of Spanish light troops and kill them. However the real battle occurred on the following day between the two armies. Livy's account of the battles is as follows;

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 33) The valley, as I have already said, was narrow - too narrow to allow the deployment of all their troops; about two thirds of the infantry, therefore, moved into line, together with the whole cavalry force; the remainder of the infantry were left straggling up the side of the hill. In Scipio's view the lack of room to manoeuvre was in his favour, both because fighting in a confined space was likely to suit Roman troops better than Spanish and because the enemy line had been driven to take up a position on ground which did not afford room for his whole force. Seeing therefore that his own cavalry could not, for lack of space, be used to protect his flanks, while the Spanish cavalry which had been brought down in to the valley with the infantry would be quite useless, he made an unexpected tactical move, and ordered Laelius to take the Roman cavalry round the back of the hills by any route which would least expose them to view. The object of this move was to avoid mixing mounted and unmounted troops in the coming engagement and to keep the two arms, as far as possible, separate. meanwhile Scipio ordered his whole infantry force to face the enemy, forming his front line of four cohorts, there being insufficient room to extend further. He then engaged at once, to distract attention from his mounted troops which were making their way around the hill; nor, in fact, did the Spanish realise they were being outflanked until they heard the din of cavalry coming into action in their rear. The two arms, infantry and cavalry, were not separately engaged; down the narrow valley - too narrow to permit anything like a mixed action involving both together - two lines of foot and two squadrons of horse were in action against each other. On the Spanish side neither army could support the other; the Spanish infantry, which had been rashly brought into its present position throughout reliance on cavalry support, was being cut to pieces, and the Spanish cavalry, outflanked and surrounded, could do nothing, now that their unmounted comrades had been wiped out, either against the Roman infantry in front of them or the Roman cavalry in their rear. They formed a circle and sat their horses, trying to defend themselves as long as they could, but in the end all were killed. Of all who fought in the valley, not a single Spanish infantryman or cavalryman survived; only the remaining third of the Spanish force, which had stayed on the slope of the hill to watch the fight from a place of safety rather than take part in it, were enabled by their position to find an opportunity to escape. The two princes escaped with them, slipping away in the general confusion before the whole line could be surrounded.

Scipio then captured the Spanish camp and captured a further 3,000 men. Roman losses amounted to 1,200 men killed and 3,000 men wounded.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 34) On the same day the Spanish camp was captured, with about 3,000 men in addition to other booty. Roman and allied losses in the battle amounted to about 1,200 men killed and over 3,000 wounded; the victory would have been less costly if the fighting had been on more open ground where there would have been a better chance for a hard-pressed to make their escape.

Indibilis and Mandonius, which Livy explains are brothers, now made peace with Scipio. The peace was amazingly lenient. Scipio ordered Lucius Marcius Septimus into Further Spain and Marcus Junius Silanus returned to Tarraco. Scipio waited for a few days and then marched after Marcius. Why he was doing all this is anyone's guess, it could be that there was the threat of further revolts which Scipio needed to suppress or more likely the losses scared Scipio. Livy goes on to indicate the losses were severe and a third of the enemy were still running around. Better to make peace now and deal with the matter later.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 34) Marcius was sent on into Further Spain and Silanus was instructed to return to Tarraco, while Scipio himself, after a few day's delay to allow the Ilergetes to pay over the money which had been demanded, set off with troops marching light and overtook Marcius not far from the Atlantic coast.

Mago's Raid (September)

Mago Barca, who was in Gades, decided on a daring raid directed at Nova Carthago. He manned his fleet and sailed to Nova Carthago where he disembarked and attempted to take to town by trickery. This failed and Livy indicated he lost 800 men and 2,000 weapons. His army probably was in the area of 4,000 men, possibly the survivors of Ilipa. He sailed back to Gades and after initially being refused entry got in. Mago then assembled all the men he could and left Gades for Pityusa. Immediately after Mago left, Gades surrendered to the Romans. Possibly after the victory up North Scipio decided to Finnish off the remaining Carthaginian strong hold in Spain, Gades and it was his arrival which caused Mago to leave and Gades to surrendered. The scare at Nova Carthago may have caused Scipio to give the rebel Spanish such good terms. Anyway Scipio then sailed to the Balearic Islands where he raised more troops and sailed off into North Italy.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 36) Sailing along the Spanish coast, Mago landed troops not far from New Carthage for a raid on the countryside, and then put in with his fleet at the town itself.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 36) Next day, when the fleet had gone safely back again to the open sea, some 800 bodies and 2,000 weapons were found between the wall and the shore.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 37) Mago on his return to Gades found himself shut out of the town. Sailing in to Cimbii, which was not far distant, he sent representatives back to Gades to complain of the gates being barred against a friend and ally;

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 37) He then sailed for the island of Pityusa, which lies about 100 miles off the coast and was inhabited at the time by Carthaginians. His fleet was consequently welcomed with all friendlessness; supplies were generously furnished and, in addition, weapons were given him and his men to supplement the ships crews. This addition to his strength encourage him to sail for the Balearic Islands, fifty miles away.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 37) They disembarked and established themselves in a strong position above the harbour; they took possession of the town and its adjacent lands without opposition, impressed and sent to Carthage 2,000 auxiliary troops, and hauled their ships ashore for the winter.

Scipio now handed control of Spain to Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus and he sailed back for Rome in 10 quinqueremes. The Roman Carthaginian war in Spain was over, although Spanish trouble would flare up in the following year.

(Livy, Book XXVII, Para 37) The men of Gades, after Mago's departure from the Atlantic coast, surrendered to the Romans.

(Livy, Book XXVIII, Para 38) Such were the achievements in Spain under the leadership and auspices of Scipio. Scipio now handed over control to the pro-praetors Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus, and returned with ten ships to Rome.

Time Line (206 BC)

A time line for this year is very difficult to determine, but I will give it a go. I personally think Livy's account is a bit mixed up, but initially lets try and make Livy's account work. Scipio probably left Tarraco in early April. He reached Castulo or Iliturgi in early May. Hasdrubal marched out to Ilipa by early May, possibly in response to Scipio's arrival. Scipio sent Silanus off the raise mercenaries and once they arrived he marched off to meet Hasdrubal. This may have taken a minimum of 2 weeks, so we have the two armies facing each other in mid May. After a week the battle occurred and the pursuit took another week. Scipio now takes 70 days to get back to Tarraco marking his arrival early in August. He left Silanus behind with the Carthaginian army but after its dispersal he marched up and arrived in Tarraco about the same time as Scipio, as he marching far quicker.

Early in August Scipio leaves Marcius in Tarraco and takes Silanus with him to Nova Carthago. Once there he leaves Silanus in charge of that city and sailed off the Africa and back. The march from Tarraco to Nova Carthago would of taken about 2 weeks and the trip to Africa and back another 2 weeks putting us at the beginning of September.

Back in Spain he orders Marcius from Tarraco to come down and he marches against Castulo and Iliturgi which could of taken about 2 weeks. Assume the taking of each city took about a week and that Marcius had moved to Nova Carthago to met Scipio's arrival, we are at the beginning of October. Marcius went off to take a few more communities, taking another 2 weeks bringing us to mid-October. Now he probably marched for Gades now, while Scipio ordered Laelius by sea to Gades. At the beginning of November Laelius fought his naval battle and Marcius defeated Hanno attempting to recruit some troops. Both heard about the Spanish revolt and they march North as quickly as possible, arriving in Nova Carthage by mid-November.

The Spanish revolt up north probably occurred about the beginning of October but the mutiny and actions down south caused Scipio to delay his counter move. By mid November he would of been ready and marched north. He took two weeks to get to the Spanish army and on the way he may have been joined by Laelius by sea. The battle occurred by the beginning of December and he immediately marched South to finish off the Carthaginians. By mid December he arrived in Gades, effectively ending the war. Someone he managed to sail back to Rome, possibly in winter or even the beginning of the following year. To put it bluntly Scipio was certainly running around Spain at an amazing rate. It just does not add up.

Generally I believe Scipio marched to the upper Baetis River as indicated and probably met Hasdrubal son of Gisgo in Battle by mid-May, however here we must look at some interesting factors. Livy claims Scipio took 70 days to get back to Tarraco, why did he take so long. It should of taken him from four to five weeks, not nine weeks. We know Scipio and his other commanders were involved in lots of fighting in the Baetis Valley. Iiliturgi, Castulo and Astapa as well as many other communities were taken, either by force or threat. In addition we have naval battles off Gades and land battles close to Gades. It seems more reasonable that Scipio was actually engaged in a series of campaigns against the remaining pro-Carthaginian towns and tribes. Most of these events may have occurred in the 70 day period indicated by Livy, especially if Scipio divided his army into three parts. One under Marcius and Silanus each and the major army under himself.

If this account is true Scipio found himself back in Tarraco sometime during August. For some reason he goes to Nova Carthago. Possibly to prepare for the final cleaning up of the Carthaginians, however why bother to go the Tarraco in the first place. Again we use guess work but its very possible the revolt of the North Tribes occurred much earlier than we think, possibly July-August. If so Scipio may have not finished cleaning up the Carthaginians down south and was forced to march up to Tarraco to meet the revolting Spanish tribes. He may have gone via Nova Carthago and taken 10 days from there to get to the Ebro and 4 more to attack the tribes. If so Scipio meet the rebel tribes men by the end of August and by early September had all under control.

He knew he had to get down south against as soon as possible, otherwise the Carthaginians may be able to take back some of the areas lost. So by early October we find him back down South. He may have rushed back because of Mago's raid at Nova Carthago. Once back down south the Carthaginian finally leave Spain, Mago must of left by mid-October in order to get to North Italy before the bad weather set in. Also we know Scipio went back to Italy, he needed to leave by the end of October. Over all this seems more reasonable. As for the trip to Africa, it either did not occur or when Laelius was running around with the fleet near Gades he could of gone over and tried a bit of diplomacy. Whatever he tried it failed.

Chronology - 206 BC

April	Beg	Scipio leaves Tarraco with his army.
May	Beg	Scipio reaches Castulo. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo marches out Scipio sends Silanus off to raise more mercenaries.
May	Mid	Both armies are facing each other. Battle of Ilipa, Romans victorious.
June	Beg	Carthaginian survivors besieged by Romans. Scipio marches back North to secure his rear, leaving Silanus behind. Scipio splits his army into two, with Marcius commanding a third of it. Together they attack and take Castulo and Iliturgi.
June	Mid	Marcius continues to attack and take several towns, including Astapa. Carthaginians either escape, surrender, disperse. Silanus now marches up to Scipio's position. Marcius marches on Gades, while Laelius by sea.
July	Beg	Marcius defeats Hanno and Laelius defeats Adherbal, however attempt to take Gades has failed and they move north to meet up with Scipio.
July	Mid	Spanish tribes North revolt. Scipio deals with a mutiny of Roman troops.
August	Beg	Scipio has reassembled his army, which now march North to deal with Spanish revolt.
August	Mid	The Romans defeat the Spanish forces North of the Ebro. Scipio sends part of his army South while he secures his rear. He force marches and rejoins his army again.
September	Mid	Mago lands a force close to Nova Carthago and is forced back. Scipio arrives in Nova Carthago and continues his southward march. Mago sails back to Gades and after a bit of difficulty gets back in, he soon decided to abandon Spain entirely, sailing to the Balearic Islands for winter.
October	Beg	Gades surrenders, the war in Spain is over.
October	Mid	Scipio sails for Italy.

Balance of Forces - 206 BC

Romans

Gaius Laelius **(42 vessels)** Only 1 quinquereme and 7 triremes are used this year, the rest of the fleet of 34 Roman quinqueremes may not be operational.

Scipio

Lucius Marcius Septimus

Marcus Junius Silanus **(41,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry)** 32,000 Roman/Italian infantry, 3,000 Roman/Italian cavalry, 9,000 Spanish infantry, 1,000 Spanish cavalry.

Carthaginians

Mago Barca **(34 vessels)** 34 quinqueremes. (Probably at Gades)

Adherbal **(9 vessels)** 1 quinquereme and 8 triremes.

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo

Masinissa **(50,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry)** 18,000 Veteran/African infantry, 4,000 Veteran/African cavalry, 6,000 Militia, 26,000 Spanish infantry, 500 Spanish cavalry.

Pro-Carthaginian Spanish

Mandonius

Indibilis **(20,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry)** Revolted in July.

Spanish Revolt crushed - 205 BC

The Ilergetes and Ausetani revolted and assembled an army of 30,000 foot and 4,000 cavalry under the command of Indibilis. The Roman army under the command of Lucius Cornelius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus met them in the territory of the Ausetani. In the resulting battle the Romans won a decisive victory.

The Campaign (205 BC)

Scipio had left Spain and the fighting was moving to new areas, however back in Spain the Spanish tribes were still thinking about getting rid of the Romans totally. Especially as now the Carthaginians were gone. Indibilis, the prince of the Ilergetes, rebelled. He had some involvement in the previous years revolt by the Laetani. He quickly raised an army of 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry in the territory of the Sedetani (Again he may be talking about the Edetani)

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 1) In the course of this summer a new and very serious situation arose in Spain: Indibilis, the prince of the Ilergetes, rebelled, his sole reason behind his admiration for Scipio which made every other Roman officer seem by comparison contemptible.

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 1) By these and similar arguments Indibilis roused to action not only his own people but the neighbouring tribe of the Ausetani and others, too, either on his own borders or on theirs. Thus within a few days a force of 30,000 foot and some 4,000 horse assembled, according to Indibilis's instructions, in the territory of the Sedetani. (possibly Edetani)

The Roman commanders, Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus united their armies and they marched through the territory of the Ausetani, which Livy claims was hostile. This could indicate that the Ilergetes now had the support of the Ausetani, and very possibly the Laetani. We don't know where their army was originally deployed, but if they marched through the Ausetani territory to the territory of the Sedetani (or Edetani) it seems reasonable they started their march from Emporiae. The Romans camped within 6 kilometres of the Spanish camp and after a bit of a skirmish on the first day the battle occurred next day. Livy's account;

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 2) At dawn next day the Romans were confronted with the spectacle of the entire Spanish force drawn up under arms and in battle order about a mile away.

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 2) The Ausetani held the centre; on the right wing were the Ilergetes, on the left the less important Spanish tribesmen. Between the wings and the centre they had left on each side a sufficient gap to allow the cavalry to pass through when the moment should come. The Romans, through their dispositions were in other respects according to usual practise, in one point followed the Spanish example and left lanes for the cavalry between the legions. It was clear to Lentulus that the advantage would lie with the side which was the first to send its cavalry forward through the gaps in the opposing line; so he instructed his military tribune Cornelius to pass the order to the cavalry to charge at the gallop through the open lanes in front of them. The struggle between the Spanish and Roman infantry had not started well; the Twelfth legion on the left, facing the Ilergetes, was giving ground, and Lentulus was compelled to reinforce it by bringing up the Thirteenth from the reserves. This was successful, and as soon as the balance in that sector was restored, Lentulus hurried to his colleague Acidinus, who was in the forefront of the battle encouraging him men and ordering up reserves wherever they were needed. he told him that all was now safe on the left wing; Cornelius had his orders and would soon surround the enemy with a whirlwind cavalry movement.

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 2) The words were hardly out of his mouth when the Roman cavalry charged, flinging the Spanish infantry into confusion and at the same time closing the passage by which the Spanish had intended to send their own cavalry into action. This being no longer possible, the Spanish horsemen all dismounted, while the two Roman commanders, seeing the enemy lines breaking up, his standards wavering, and panic and confusion everywhere, urged their men with utmost insistence to press their advantage and give the disintegrating enemy army no opportunity to pull itself together again. The wild tribesmen could never have withstood the weight of the attack which followed, if their prince Indibilis had not himself gallantly risked his life in advance of the front line together with his dismounted cavalymen. For some time a bloody struggle continued, until at last Indibilis was fatally wounded; he was pinned to the ground with a lance through his body, and the soldiers who had been fighting to protect him were overwhelmed with missiles and all killed. That was the signal for a general route.

The Spanish lost 13,000 killed and 1,800 prisoners and the Romans lost 200 men, according to Livy. Soon after this the tribes surrendered and the rebellion was crushed, soon after it had started. It seems Mandonius was given to the Romans and Indibilis was killed, indicating that this revolt was probably a continuation of the previous year. Scipio probably left Spain in a bit of an unstable state as it was not strategic any more and he wanted to go back to where the action was.

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 2) The Spanish dead amounted to 13,000, prisoners of war to about 1,800: of the Romans and their allies rather more than 200 were killed, mostly on the left wing.

(Livy, Book XXIX, Para 3) Later the rebels were summoned by Mandonius to a conference, where they complained bitterly of their disastrous failure, poured out their wrath on the men responsible for the rising, and voted that envoys should be dispatched to arrange a capitulation and the surrender of their arms. The envoys laid the responsibility for the rising upon Indibilis and the other chieftain, most of whom had been killed in the fighting,

Charts and Tables

Personalities

Adherbal	Magistrate of Gades in 206BC, commanded a small fleet of 1 quinquereme and 8 triremes which was defeated by a Roman fleet under the command of Gaius Laelius. He withdrew to Africa after the defeat.
Amusicus	Leader of the Ausetani in 218BC. Revolted against the Romans in 218 BC and when his cause was lost he found refuge in Hasdrubal Barca's camp.
Andobales	Polybius uses this name, while Livy uses Indibilis. See Indibilis.
Attenes	Leader of the Turdentani army in 206 BC. Abandoned Hasdrubal son of Gisgo after the Battle of Ilipa.
Cerdubelus	Spanish commander of a Spanish mercenary force in Castulo in 206 BC, he surrendered the town to Lucius Marcius Septimus.
Chalbus	Leader of the Tartesii in 216 BC, led the revolt against the Carthaginians in that year, but was defeated before the end of the year.
Culchas	Roman ally in 206 BC, who provided 3,000 foot and 500 cavalry for Scipio. Probably led a tribe close to Castulo or Baecula.
Edeco	Leader of the Edetani in 208 BC. By the use of hostages was an unwilling ally of Carthage from 211 BC to 208 BC, but after the fall of Nova Carthago became a Roman ally.
Gaius Laelius	First appears commanding the Roman fleet in 209 BC. Scipio probably brought him over from Italy in 211 BC. In 206 BC he went to Africa (possibly with Scipio). During this year he also commanded a fleet of one quinquereme and 7 triremes which defeated a Carthaginian fleet under Adherbal and unsuccessfully tried to take Gades by trickery. He commanded the Cavalry during the battle against the revolting Spanish tribes up North late in 206 BC.
Gaius Nero	Sent to Spain in 211 BC to hold down the Roman position after the defeats of 212 BC. He engaged in some minor campaigning against Hasdrubal Barca and when Scipio arrived late in 211 BC he was replaced by Marcus Junius Silanus. He probably went back to Italy after this.
Gala	Leader of the Massyles, the main tribe in Numidia. Strong ally of Carthage till his death.

Gnaeus Scipio	Brother of Publius Scipio and uncle to Scipio, was the first Roman commander to land in Spain in 218 BC. He landed at Emporiae in 218 BC and defeated Hanno during that year. In 217 BC he defeated an enemy fleet under Himilco and with his brother marched on Saguntum. In 213 BC he saved his brother from defeat and seemed to command the Roman army for the remainder of the year, capturing Saguntum at the end. In 212 BC he commanded the secondary force and secured his brother line of communication until the bulk of his army deserted. His army was defeated and he was killed soon after.
Hamilcar	The father of Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago.
Hamilcar son of Bomilcar	Sent to Spain in 214 BC to raise mercenaries. He raised an army which was involved in the battle of Iliturgi and Intibili. This was probably destroyed or deserted after these battles. Hamilcar son of Bomilcar was probably killed in these actions, or may have gone back home soon after.
Hannibal	Brother of Hasdrubal Barca and Mago Barca. Left Spain in 218 BC in a march to Italy.
Hanno (I)	Was left in command of Northern Spain by Hannibal in 218 BC, was defeated and captured at Cissis in 218 BC.
Hanno (II)	Was sent to Spain in 207 BC with reinforcements and was captured by Marcus Junius Silanus in a battle somewhere in the territory of the Carpetani during that year.
Hanno (III)	A Carthaginian cavalry officer under Mago Barca was sent to raise mercenaries in 206 BC, but was defeated by a Roman force under Lucius Marcus Septimus. He escaped from this disaster and probably joined Mago Barca when he left Spain.

Hasdrubal Barca Brother of Hannibal and Mago Barca. Left in command of Spain in 218 BC. Marched up north in 218 BC but was too late to save Hanno. In 217 BC he launched an invasion of the North, but after his fleets defeat he withdrew South. In 216 BC he was forced to deal with a Spanish revolt down south. In 215 BC he was involved in a defence campaign until he lost the battle of Ibera. In 214 BC he was once again involved in a defensive campaign against the Romans and after reinforcements began to push them back after the battle of Iliturgi. This stopped after the battle of Intibili and Hasdrubal withdrew. In 213 BC he was once again involved in holding the Romans back, but later that year he sailed for Africa to command an army against a Numidian revolt. He returned to Spain by the end of 213 BC, but not before Saguntum falls. In 212 BC he commanded the army that protected Nova Carthago and faced Gnaeus Scipio. After the deserting of the bulk of the Romans Spanish allies he was involved in the destruction of Gnaeus Scipio's army. He was probably involved for the remainder of the year securing the South. In 211 BC he was involved in battles with Tiberius Nero and was forced back South over the Ebro River. In 210 BC he was involved in the invasion of the Carpetani, probably based from Saguntum. In 209 BC he was still campaigning against the Carpetani until Nova Carthago fell. In 208 BC he held the Romans back around Saguntum, until a large portion of his Spanish mercenaries deserted. heavily outnumbered he slowly withdrew to Baecula, to wait for reinforcements. Scipio attacks first and forces him from his good defensive position. Soon after this he marched up North and leaves Spain for good, hoping to reinforce Hannibal and decide the fate of the war there.

- Hasdrubal son of Gisgo Sent to Spain in 213 BC with an army. He marches north and was involved in the siege of Iiliturgi. Soon after Castulo revolts and he marches south to deal with the revolt. In 212 BC he was still involved in dealing with the revolt and before the Romans arrive had managed to suppress it. He then met Publius Scipio and together with Mago Barca managed to defeat his army after gaining unexpected Spanish help. Immediately after this he marched to Gnaeus Scipio's position and with the other two Carthaginian generals defeated Gnaeus Scipio. He marched up north and crossed the Ebro River, where he suffered some minor setbacks. In 211 BC he marches down South ending up at Gades, possibly to recruit mercenaries. In 210 BC and 209 BC he was involved in the invasion of the Carpetani. In 208 BC he was once again raising more troops and securing the Southern area. When Hasdrubal Barca arrived at Baecula he marched to join him, but got there too late. He was left in command of Spain soon after this, when Hasdrubal Barca left. In 207 BC he was involved in securing his territory and raising mercenary, which he succeeded very well in. In 206 BC he assembled his entire army and met the Romans at Ilipa, where he suffered a minor defeat. Soon after his Spanish mercenaries deserted and he withdrew to a fortified position close to the sea. He managed to evacuate as many men by sea as he could and then sailed for Africa, leaving Mago Barca in charge.
- Himilco (I) Commander of the Carthaginian fleet in 217 BC, suffered a naval defeat at the Ebro in that year. He probably commanded a small army in Saguntum in 216 BC while Hasdrubal Barca was dealing with a Spanish revolt. He was sent to Africa late in 216 BC and returned in 215 BC with reinforcements. He probably campaigned down south in this year and in 214 BC gives the command of his army to Hasdrubal Barca. he probably remained with Hasdrubal Barca to the end.
- Himilco (II) Commander of a small Carthaginian force trapped in Castulo in 206 BC, after Ilipa. The town surrendered and he was captured.
- Indibilis Leader of the Suessetani in 212 BC. In 212 BC he led an army of 7,500 men which was coming to the aid of the Carthaginians, however he originally agreed to be a Roman ally and changed his mind which was the main cause of Publius Scipio's defeat. Publius Scipio attacked him but he was caught by the Carthaginian army and was destroyed. Indibilis has a force in the Carthaginian army when he defected to the Romans in 208 BC. This caused Hasdrubal Barca to abandon central Spain and he withdrew south. In 206 BC Indibilis caused the Laetani to revolt from Roman control. Indibilis managed to get Celtiberian help and with this army attacked the Suessetani and Sedetani tribes, both of which were still loyal Roman allies. After this the Ilergetes joined the rebellion and the combined army met Scipio in the territory of the Sedetani, where it was defeated. In 205 BC Indibilis was the leader of the Ilergetes, where he once again caused another revolt. This time he was killed in the fighting.

Tiberius Fonteius Publius Scipio left him in command of the camp and after Publius Scipio was defeated and killed he became commander of the survivors. He managed to extract what men he could and marched North.

Lucius Cornelius Scipio

(Common name Lucius) The brother of Scipio. He commanded a small Roman army in 207 BC, which attacked and took Orongis. He may have gone back to Italy by 206 BC.

Lucius Lentulus

(Common name Lentulus) One of the two commanders which Scipio left in control of Spain in 206 BC. Co-commanded the Roman army which suppressed a Spanish revolt in 205 BC.

Lucius Manlius Acidinus

(Common name Acidinus) One of the two commanders which Scipio left in control of Spain in 206 BC. Co-commanded the Roman army which suppressed a Spanish revolt in 205 BC.

Lucius Marcus Septimus

(Common name Marcus) Was left in command of the Roman forces North of the Ebro River in 212 BC. After the defeat of the two Scipio's he became the commander of Roman forces in Spain. He managed to form an army which managed to hold the Carthaginian armies back late in 212 BC. In 211 BC he was joined by Gaius Nero and possibly became his second in command. In that year when Scipio arrived he was appointed as Scipio's personal assistant. IN 206 BC, after the battle of Ilipa he was appointed commander of the Roman army based at Tarraco. Soon after this he was involved in the attack of Castulo and Iliturgi, possibly being used to hold down Castulo while Scipio attacked Iliturgi. After this he was involved in suppressing the Spanish tribes around this area. He took two major towns and then assaulted Astapa, which he took. He then took two more communities and marched back to Nova Carthago. He now commanded a small fleet which sailed to Gades to attempt to take it, he failed in this but managed to defeat a small Carthaginian fleet sailing for Africa. He was then involved in helping Scipio suppress the Spanish revolt in the North and was ordered to march South into Further Spain and possible towards Gades.

Mago Barca

Was sent to Spain in 214 BC to help his brother. First engaged the Romans at Ilturgi and later at Intibili. In 213 BC he was with Hasdrubal Barca when the Celtiberi army was defeated and engaged the Romans and besieged Ilturgi. After Hasdrubal son of Gisgo left to deal with a Spanish revolt the Romans managed to drive off the Carthaginians. Soon after this Hasdrubal Barca left Mago Barca in supreme control of the armies facing the Scipio brothers. He met the Romans at Munda and Aurinx where he suffered a major defeat. In 212 BC Mago Barca was sent south to recruit Spanish mercenaries. When the Romans struck he joined up with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and helped in the destruction of Publius Scipio's army. Afterwards he marched to the other Roman army and helped to defeat it in turn. After the Roman disaster he marched north with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, commanding the Spanish mercenaries and light cavalry. He suffered some minor defeats at the hands of the Romans and withdrew to the south bank of the Ebro River. In 211 BC he was involved around Castulo, possibly raising new mercenaries or campaigning against the Spanish tribes in the region. In 210 BC Mago Barca was involved in the invasion of the Carpetani, commanding a mercenary army. Soon after this he was recalled to suppress a revolt of the Conii, which he successfully done. In 209 BC Mago was still in the territory of the Conii, until Nova Carthago fell. He probably marched to Abdera to keep an eye on the Romans in Nova Carthago. In 208 BC he was involved in raising more mercenaries when the collapse of Hasdrubal Barca's position caused him to march to his brothers aid. He arrived too late, but his forces allowed his brother to rebuild his army and march for Italy. Mago Barca then sails for the Balearic Island where he recruited some troops. He sailed back to Spain in 207 BC with his small force where he met up with Hanno. Together they marched into the territory of the Carpetani where they recruited a mercenary army. The Romans managed to attack this force and Mago Barca was able to escape with the cavalry and light troops. In 206 BC Mago joined Hasdrubal son of Gisgo who met the Romans at Ilipa. Here the Carthaginians suffered a minor loss, but the desertion of the majority of their Spanish allies caused them to retreat to a prepared position close to the coast. Mago Barca held out in this position for a few weeks before he withdrew by sea to Gades. Back in Gades he attempted to form a new army and sent Hanno to recruit some Spanish troops. Hanno was caught and defeated by the Romans and only escaped with his cavalry. Finally Mago Barca sailed to Nova Carthago with his new force and failed to take Nova Carthago, he sailed back to Gades and took on new reinforcements and supplies. The approach of the Roman army finally convinced him to leave Spain forever and he sailed to the Balearic Islands where he wintered.

Mandonius

Brother of Indibilis and with him from 208 BC to Indibilis death in 205 BC when he was surrendered to the Romans for causing so much trouble. See Indibilis.

Marcus Junius Silanus (Common name Silanus) Sailed to Spain with Scipio late in 211 BC. He was Scipio's second in command. Initially given command of the Roman army North of the Ebro in 211 BC. In 209 BC he was left in command of the Roman army north of the Ebro River while Scipio took Nova Carthago. In 208 BC he once again commanded the northern Roman army. In 207 BC he was ordered to attack a Carthaginian mercenary army in the territory of the Carpetani, which he did successfully. In 206 BC he was ordered to raise a mercenary force, which he did. He joined up with Scipio and was involved in the battle of Ilipa. After the defeat of the Carthaginians he commanded the force which besieged the remaining Carthaginian army. After the Carthaginian had left he joined Scipio in Tarraco. He then marched South and took command of Nova Carthago. Close to the end of the year he once again went north and took command of the Roman force at Tarraco. He would of left with Scipio in 206 BC.

Masinissa Son of Gala, leader of the Numidian tribe of Massyles. He was given command of the Massyles army in 213 BC, which was involved in the defeat of Syphax, who had revolted the year before. Initially a co-commander under Hasdrubal Barca who was involved in the first great victory, he commanded the pursuit of Syphax, another victory against Syphax and finally took Syphax's surrender. In 212 BC he crossed into Spain with some Numidian cavalry and commanded the Numidian force. He was with Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and was involved in the initial harassment of Publius Scipio which resulted in his final defeat. In 208 BC Masinissa was given command of a force of 3,000 cavalry, which he used in 207 BC in an effective guerrilla war against the Romans. In 206 BC he joined the main Carthaginian army, which was finally defeated at Ilipa. He escaped from this disaster with the bulk of his cavalry and was involved in a bit more raiding actions against the Romans before he sailed back to Africa, possibly because of the death of his father.

Moenicaptus A Gallic leader killed at Aurinx in 213 BC while serving under the Carthaginians

Publius Scipio	The brother of Gnaeus Scipio and the father of Scipio. In 217 BC he arrived at Emporiae with reinforcements for Gnaeus. Marching South he joined Gnaeus and marched on Saguntum. The Carthaginians were busy dealing with a Celtiberi invasion. They failed to take Saguntum. In 216 BC Publius Scipio commanded the fleet, while his brother commanded the army. The Carthaginians were busy dealing with a revolt so the Romans were engaged in consolidating their position. During 215 BC Publius was probably involved in the Battle of Ibera and in 214 BC in the Battles of Iiliturgi and Intibili. In 213 BC Publius commanded half the Roman army and marched to meet an allied Celtiberi army. The Carthaginians defeated the Celtiberi army forcing Publius back North where he met his brother. Publius was almost captured by the Carthaginians after this and seems to be not involved in any more fighting for the rest of the year. He may have been wounded. In 212 BC Publius commanded the main Roman army which drive deep into Spain. Close to Orongis he waited for Spanish help, which never arrived. Instead a Spanish tribe came to help the Carthaginians. In the ensuing battle Publius was killed and his army almost totally destroyed.
Quintus Statorius	A Centurion sent by Scipio in 213 BC to help train Syphax's infantry.
Scipio	The son of Publius Scipio, later known as Scipio Africanus. He arrived in Spain in late 211 BC and after preparing his army in 210 BC he launched a daring raid against Nova Carthago, taking that most strategic city in 209 BC. In 208 BC he marched his army down the coast, taking Saguntum and most of the cities between Tarraco and Nova Carthago. He crossed into the Baetis Valley where he defeated Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula. IN 207 BC the Carthaginian failed to meet him in battle so he was involved in consolidating his position in the Baetis Valley. In 206 BC he met Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at Ilipa and spent the rest of the year consolidating his position in Spain. By the end of the year the war was over and he left for Italy.
Syphax	The leader of the Masaesytes, a major tribe in Numidia. He led a revolt against the Carthaginians in 214 BC to 213 BC, but was finally defeated in 213 BC. After this he remained a loyal Carthaginian ally, especially after he marries Hasdrubal son of Gisgo's daughter.
Tiberius Fonteius	Publius Scipio left Tiberius Fonteius in charge of the camp in 212 BC before he was finally defeated. Tiberius managed to extract the survivors and he marched north, joining Lucius Marcus and together they managed to keep things together until Nero arrived in the following year.
Vismarus	A Gallic leader killed at Aurinx in 213 BC while serving under the Carthaginians

Spanish & Numidian Tribes

Ausetani	Spanish tribe north of the Ebro. Never fully conquered by the Carthaginians, joined the Romans in 218 BC but constantly was involved in revolts and unrest. Revolted against Roman rule in 218 BC and 205 BC.
Bastetani	Spanish tribe in the mountains close to Abdera.
Carpetani	Spanish tribe in the interior of Spain, unconquered by any nation although the Carthaginians invaded them in 210 BC and 209 BC. In 207 BC Hanno and Mago Barca raised troops here and possibly in early 206 BC.
Celtiberi	Spanish tribe in the interior of Spain. Invaded Carthaginian Spain in support of the Romans in 217 BC, but must of suffered a heavy defeat. In 213 BC it once again invaded Carthaginian Spain, but was caught and defeated before it could join the Romans. In 212 BC it contributed a large force to the Roman army, however after the defeat of Publius Scipio deserted, leaving Gnaeus Scipio exposed. After this it stayed neutral, but seemed to favour the Carthaginians and provided various mercenary contingents to them. Livy used Celtiberi to describe a wide range of Spanish tribes, including the Carpetani.
Conii	Spanish tribe close to Gades, probably revolted from Carthaginian control in 209 BC. May have provided troops in 206 BC.
Edetani	Spanish tribe just south of the Ebro, in 208 BC joined the Romans and before that date may have been a Carthaginian ally. After the defeat of the Romans in 212 BC became a Carthaginian ally, but in 209 BC after the fall of Nova Carthago joined the Romans once again. In 205 BC joined the general revolt against the Romans and was defeated.
Ilergetes	Spanish tribe North of the Ebro and generally independent. revolted from the Romans in 218 BC, but surrendered soon after a Roman army appeared. In 206 BC they joined another revolt against the Romans and surrendered after being defeated. In 205 BC they rose up again and were once again defeated.
Laeetani	A Spanish tribe North of the Ebro River. It was involved in a revolt against the Romans in 218 BC, where the defeat of its main army caused it to surrender. In 206 BC it was involved in yet another revolt, where it was once again defeated. Livy calls them the Lacetani, which may have been a spelling error. In 205 BC it probably once again helped a Spanish revolt.
Maesesses	A minor branch of the Bastetani tribe, close to Orongis.
Masaesytes	A Numidian tribe, under control of Syphax.
Massyles	A Numidian tribe, under control of Gala, the father of Masinissa.
Maurusian	A Numidian tribe in the extreme west of Africa, close to Gades.
Mentissa	A Spanish tribe close to the Ausetani, probably very close to the Laeetani.
Oretani	A Spanish tribe in the heart of Spain. Not involved much by this war.
Sedetani	A Spanish tribe North of the Ebro River. Almost certainly the Edetani.

Suessetani	A Spanish tribe, commanded by Indibilis in 212 BC. It was an army from this tribe which was the cause of Publius Scipio defeat in 212 BC. In 208 BC this tribe joined the Romans and in 206 BC it may have been involved in a Spanish revolt up North. It was probably close to the Edetani.
Tartessii	A Spain tribe between Gades and Urso. It revolted in 216 BC and was defeated in the same year, rejoining the Carthaginian alliance.
Turboletas	A Spanish tribe between Nova Carthago and Saguntum. Livy blamed this tribe for starting the war and in 213 BC the Romans sacked their capital city and possibly destroyed their strength.
Turdentani	A Spanish tribe West of Gades. Generally outside the Carthaginian area of influence, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo spent a lot of effort in gaining this tribe as an ally. After the initial defeat at Ilipa in 206 BC they deserted, sealing the Carthaginians fate.

Towns & Places

Abdera	Carthaginian colony or strong ally on the Mediterranean coast. May have been Mago Barca's base late in 209 BC, after Nova Carthago fell. May have been Masinissa's base after Orongis fell in 207 BC, but probably surrendered to the Romans late in 207BC.
Amtorgis	A small town on the Tader River, close to Nova Carthago. Hasdrubal Barca was based there in 212 BC while he was facing Gnaeus Scipio.
Ascus	Small town bordering the territory of the Tartesii. Probably close to Urso. Was used as a supply depot by Hasdrubal Barca in 216 BC. It was taken by a Tartesii army in 216 BC and liberated soon after by Hasdrubal Barca.
Astapa	A loyal ally of the Carthaginians to the end, totally destroyed in 206 BC by a Roman army under Lucius Marcius Septimus.
Atanagrum	The main town of the Ilergetes. It was besieged by the Romans in 218 BC and surrendered after a few days.
Aurinx	A town, probably close to Saguntum. Site of a battle in 213 BC, which resulted in a Carthaginian defeat and the eventual fall of Saguntum.
Baecula	A small town on the Baetis River. The site of a major battle in 208 BC in which Scipio defeated Hasdrubal Barca.
Baetica	A Region around the Baetis River between Baecula and Gades.
Baetis River	A major river in the south of Spain. The centre of Carthaginian power.
Balearic Island	An island off the coast of Spain, generally pro Carthaginian but fairly independent. Mago Barca hired some Balearic mercenaries in 208 BC, which were involved in fighting in 207 BC. Mago Barca winter's in the Balearic Island in 206 BC.
Bigerra	A Spanish town South of the Ebro, probably close to Iliturgi. Was in the Roman alliance in 213 BC.
Black Stones	A location in the territory of the Ausetani, between Iliturgi and Mentissa according to Livy. Probably close to Tarraco.
Carthage	Capital of the Carthaginian empire.
Castalon	An area near the town of Baecula.
Castulo	A Spanish town deep in Carthaginian controlled Spain. Romans probably first made contact with the inhabitation in 217 BC. In 213 BC it revolted and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was sent to suppress the revolt. At the beginning of 212 BC it was still allied with Rome, but it swapped sides or Hasdrubal son of Gisgo forced them to rejoin the Carthaginians before the Romans could get to it. In 211 BC Mago Barca used it as a base but by 206 BC it was a neutral town, supporting the Romans. After the battle of Ilipa a Roman army under Lucius Marcius Septimus besieged and took it in 206 BC.
Cissis	A small town North of the Ebro, scene of a battle in 218 BC where the Romans were victorious.
Ebro River	A major river in the North, divided the Roman portion of Spain from the Carthaginian portion.
Ebusus	Chief town on the Island of Ebusus, off the Spanish coast.

Emporiae	Greek colony town in the northern portion of Spain. Solid ally of Rome for the entire campaign. Joined the Romans in 218 BC.
Gades	After Nova Carthago fell this was the main Carthaginian city in Spain. Surrendered to the Romans in 206 BC.
Ibera	A flourishing town very close to the mouth of the Ebro River and on the South side of that river. It was a Carthaginian ally in 215 BC and was the scene of a Roman victory in that year.
Iiorci	Small town close to Nova Carthago and possible the sight of the battle which destroyed Gnaeus Scipio's army in 212 BC.
Ilipa	Scene of the final Carthaginian defeat in 206 BC.
Iliturgi (North)	Spanish town South of the Ebro. In 217 BC Hasdrubal Barca used this town as a base for a short time after the his naval defeat at the mouth of the Ebro River. The town joined the Romans (or were talked by the Romans) in 214 BC. In that year the Carthaginians tried to retake the town and failed. In 213 BC the Carthaginians besieged it but failed once again to take the town. By 211 BC the town was once again in Carthaginian control. It probably becomes Roman controlled in 208 BC.
Iliturgi (South)	Spanish town close to Castulo. In 206 BC Scipio attacked and took it, in response to their defection in 212 BC. This indicates it may have been allied to Castulo when it revolted.
Intibili	A Spanish Town south of the Ebro River. After the naval defeat at the mouth of the Ebro River Hasdrubal withdrew his army to this town. In 214 BC it was a Roman ally. It possibly became an ally late in 215 BC after the battle of Ibera, or early 214 BC when Publius Scipio marched his army through that area. The Carthaginian army marched to the gates of Intibili, where it met a Roman army. In the ensuing battle the Carthaginians suffered a defeat. It probably once again joined the Carthaginians in late 212 BC and rejoined the Romans in 208 BC.
Longuntica	A small town, possibly just north of Nova Carthago on the coast. The Romans raided this town in 217 BC
Malaca	A Carthaginian colony on the coast between Gades and Nova Carthago. Possibly threatened by the Romans in 207 BC and certainly by 206 BC would of been Roman controlled.
Massilia	A Greek city on the coast of Gaul, who became a loyal Roman ally.
Mijaras River	A River close to Iliturgi.
Mount Victory	Publius Scipio used this location as a camp during 213 BC. It was probably very close to Iliturgi.
Munda	Location is unknown, however it must of been between Iliturgi and Saguntum. Site of a Roman victory in 213 BC.
Nova Carthago	The main city in Spain for the Carthaginians. It was captured by the Romans in 209 BC. There were 10,000 citizens and 2,000 artisans in the city then. Mago was able to arm about 2,000 men in 209 BC from the citizen body.
Nova Classis	A small town close to the Ebro. Site of the Roman camp in 217 BC.
Onusa	A small Carthaginian town on the coast, between Saguntum and Nova Carthago. Taken and sacked by a Roman fleet in 217 BC.

Orongis	A Strategically placed town between Nova Carthago and the Baetis River. Generally pro Carthaginian and possibly the base of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo in 212 BC while he dealt with the revolt of the Spanish tribes in that area. In 207 BC it was possibly the base for Masinissa while he was engaged in his guerrilla war against the Romans. Late in 207 BC Lucius Cornelius Scipio assaulted and took the town.
Pityusa	A pro-Carthaginian island off the coast of Spain.
Pyrenees Mountain	A mountain range which divides Spain from Gaul.
Saguntum	The casta belle for the 2nd Punic War, this Greek town on the Spain coast was the main Carthaginian base for the early part of the year. In 217 BC a Roman army arrived at the gates of Saguntum, but failed to take it. From 216 BC to 213 BC Saguntum was the main base of the Carthaginian army, being used at least twice as a base to regroup and reform the army. In 213 BC, after several battles of which the last was close to Saguntum the Carthaginian armies were shattered and Saguntum, fell to the Romans. In 212 BC the Carthaginian managed to retake the town and in 211 BC and 210 BC it was once again the main Carthaginian base up North. In 209 BC Saguntum was totally bypassed by Scipio when he took Nova Carthago. In 208 BC the Romans took Saguntum, possibly after a major portion of the Spanish allies in Hasdrubal Barca's army defected and joined the Romans.
Saldae	A coastal city in Numidia.
Salo River	A River which joined the Ebro close to the centre of the Celtiberi tribes and which runs towards Saguntum. The River forms a possible direct route from the Celtiberi tribes to Saguntum.
Sexi	A Carthaginian town on the coast of Spain. Possibly taken by the Romans in 206 BC.
Sucro	The main base of the Roman army in the north in 206 BC. The town is just south of the Ebro River.
Tader River	A River close to Nova Carthago and the town of Ilorci. In 212 BC it divided the army of Hasdrubal Barca and Gnaeus Scipio.
Tagus River	A major River in Spain, flowing into the Atlantic.
Tarraco	A Greek colony on the coast of Spain. In 218 BC it welcomed the Roman army and was used as a major base by the Romans for the bulk of the war.
White Fort	Publius Scipio made his initial camp here in 213 BC, the location of Hamilcar's death. It was probably Between Saguntum and Ilturgi and inland, possibly at the foothills.

SUMMARY OF BATTLES IN SPAIN (218 - 205BC)

Battle	Date	Commanders	Forces	Infantry	Cavalry	Elephants	Total
Cissis	218BC	Hanno	Carthage	17,000	3,000	nil	20,000
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*	20,600	2,800	nil	23,400
Atanagrum	218BC	Unknown	Spanish	13,000	2,000	nil	15,000
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*	20,600	2,800	nil	23,400
Ebro (Sea)	217BC	Himilco	Carthage				40q
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*				35q 20t
Celtiberi (Salo Valley)	217BC	Hasdrubal Barca	Carthage*	30,000	5,000	21	35,000
		Unknown	Spanish	26,000	4,000	nil	30,000
Tartesii (Baetis Valley)	216BC	Hasdrubal Barca	Carthage*	22,000	3,000	21	25,000
		Chalbus	Spanish	26,000	4,000	nil	30,000
Ibera	215BC	Hasdrubal Barca	Carthage	31,000	5,000	21	36,000
		Publius/Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*	32,000	4,000	nil	36,000
Iliturgi	214BC	Hasdrubal/Mago Barca	Carthage*	44,000	7,500	20	51,500
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman	28,000	4,000	nil	32,000
Intibili	214BC	Hasdrubal Barca	Carthage	40,000	7,000	13	47,000
		Publius/Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*	37,000	4,000	nil	41,000
Celtiberi (Salo Valley)	213BC	Hasdrubal/Mago Barca	Carthage*	35,000	5,000	50	40,000
		Unknown	Spanish	30,000	3,000	nil	33,000
Munda	213BC	Hasdrubal/Mago Barca	Carthage*	35,000	5,000	50	40,000
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman	36,000	4,000	nil	40,000
Autinx	213BC	Hasdrubal/Mago Barca	Carthage	31,000	5,000	11	36,000
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman*	32,000	4,000	nil	36,000
Orongis	212BC	Hasdrubal/Mago Barca					
		Hasdrubal Gisgo/Indibilis	Carthage*	29,000	6,500	nil	35,500
Ilorci	212BC	Publius Scipio	Roman	19,000	3,500	nil	22,500
		Hasdrubal/Mago Barca					
Tarraco	212BC	Hasdrubal Gisgo	Carthage*	42,000	10,000	nil	52,000
		Gnaeus Scipio	Roman	10,000	1,500	nil	11,500
		Hasdrubal/Mago Barca					
Nova Carthago	209BC	Mago Barca	Carthage	1,000	0	nil	1,000
		Scipio*	Roman	25,000	2,500	nil	27,500
		Hasdrubal/Mago Barca					
Baetica	208BC	Hasdrubal Barca	Carthage	22,000	3,000		25,000
		Scipio*	Roman	38,000	5,000	nil	43,000
Carpetani (Tagus River)	207BC	Hanno/Mago Barca	Carthage	14,000	2,000	nil	16,000
		Marcus Junius Silanus	Roman*	10,000	500	nil	10,500
Ilipa	206BC	Hasdrubal Gisgo	Carthage	50,000	4,500	nil	54,500
		Scipio	Roman*	41,000	4,000	nil	45,000
Sedetani	206BC	Mandonius/Indibilis	Spanish	20,000	2,500	nil	22,500
		Scipio	Roman*	20,000	2,000	nil	22,000
Ausetani	205BC	Indibilis	Spanish	30,000	4,000	nil	34,000
		L.Lentulus/L.Manlius	Roman*	30,000	3,000	nil	33,000

Index

A

Abdera, 65, 77
Adherbal, 95
Africa, 36, 37
Amtorgis, 44, 45, 49
Amusicus, 7
Andobales, 69
Ascus, 17
Astapa, 94
Atanagrum, 7
Attenes, 89
Aurinx, 35, 36, 37, 44
Ausetani, 7, 56, 105

B

Baecula, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71
Baetica, 80
Baetis, 17, 67
Baetis River, 34, 80, 92, 94
Balearic Islands, 74, 77, 78, 99
Bastetani, 81, 85
Bigerra, 34
Black Stones, 56

C

Carpetani, 60, 65, 78, 85
Carthage, 15, 16, 18, 20, 27, 29, 37, 57, 78
Castalon, 71
Castulo, 11, 34, 35, 37, 45, 47, 57, 65, 86, 94
Celtiberi, 12, 32, 33, 43, 44, 46, 49, 78, 79
Cerdubelus, 94
Chalbus, 17
Cirta, 93
Cissa, 3
Cissis, 5, 6, 7, 56, 97
Conii, 60, 65, 85
Culchas, 86

E

Ebro, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 16
Ebro River, 18, 21, 23, 27, 28, 32, 33, 50, 59, 62,
68, 70, 78, 96, 97
Ebusus, 11
Edeco, 68
Edetani, 68, 96, 105
Emporiae, 2, 3, 6, 7, 56, 77, 105
Emporium, 12

G

Gades, 15, 17, 36, 57, 59, 63, 65, 77, 78, 80, 90,
92, 95, 99
Gaius Laelius, 62, 69, 93, 95, 97
Gaius Nero, 55, 56, 57, 62

Gala, 37, 38
Gaul, 2
Genil River, 80
Gnaeus Scipio, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15,
32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 94

H

Hamilcar, 33
Hamilcar son of Bomilcar, 27
Hannibal, 2, 4, 10, 20, 22, 26, 56, 88
Hanno, 3, 4, 5, 6, 77, 78, 79, 80, 85, 95
Hasdrubal Barca, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17,
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37,
38, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60,
63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74
Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, 31, 33, 34, 37, 44, 45, 46,
47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 63, 65, 67,
70, 74, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93
Himilco, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 63, 94

I

Ibera, 21, 23, 26
Iiorci, 49
Ilergetes, 5, 6, 7, 97, 105
Ilipa, 85, 86, 90, 95, 99
Iliturgi, 11, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 47, 56, 77, 94
Indibilis, 45, 46, 47, 69, 70, 96, 99, 105
Intibili, 11, 27, 28, 29

L

Laeetani, 7, 96, 105
Longuntica, 11
Lucius Cornelius Scipio, 81
Lucius Lentulus, 100, 105
Lucius Manlius Acidinus, 100, 105
Lucius Marcus Septimus, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 93,
94, 95, 99

M

Maesesses, 81
Mago Barca, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 44, 50, 51,
52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 63, 65, 67, 70, 74, 77, 78,
79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 95, 99
Malaca, 77
Mandonius, 69, 70, 96, 99, 106
Marcus Junius Silanus, 56, 62, 63, 69, 78, 79, 80,
85, 86, 91, 92, 93, 99
Masaesydes, 37
Masinissa, 38, 44, 46, 74, 77, 85, 86, 91, 92
Massilia, 10, 16, 56
Massyles, 37
Maurusian, 38
Mentissa, 56
Mijaras River, 33
Moenicaptus, 35
Mount Victory, 33
Munda, 34, 35, 36, 37

N

Nova Carthago, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 16, 35, 38, 43, 45,
59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 77, 93, 94, 95,
97, 99

Nova Classis, 11

Numidia, 37, 38

Numidian, 5, 23

O

Onusa, 11

Oretani, 85

Orongis, 45, 69, 70, 77, 81

Ostia, 56

P

Pillars of Hercules, 60

Piso, 52

Pityusa, 99

Publius Scipio, 2, 9, 10, 12, 15, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 62, 94

Puteoli, 55

Pyrenees, 3, 73, 74

Q

Quintus Statorius, 37

R

Rhone, 3

S

Saguntum, 3, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36,
43, 44, 45, 50, 56, 59, 65, 68, 70

Saldae, 93

Salo River, 12, 32, 33

Scipio, 56, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70,
71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106

Sedetani, 96, 97, 105

Sexi, 77

Sucro, 96

Suessetani, 45, 46, 70, 96

Syphax, 37, 38, 91, 93

T

Tader River, 45

Tagus, 60

Tarraco, 3, 5, 6, 7, 44, 55, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 69,
73, 78, 81, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99

Tartesii, 11, 16, 17, 18, 22, 85

Tiberius Fonteius, 47, 49, 50, 55

Turboletas, 35, 36

Turdentani, 35, 36, 85, 89

V

Valerius Antias, 52

Vismarus, 35

W

White Fort, 33